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This research analyzes the relationship between the environmental and social elements in 
Mexico’s Payment for Environmental Services (PES) program in the Huasteca Potosina region 
from 2003-2011.  Both the regional and local scales are examined to understand patterns of 
deforestation and identify the factors influencing community forest conservation.  
The multi-scale approach to deforestation on social properties is based on GIS analyses 
of land tenure and forest change in 613 agrarian nucleos, or social properties, from 1980 to 2010. 
At the community scale, a sample of 43 agrarian nucleos in 12 municipios was selected to 
explore the potential correspondence between implementation of the PES program, the National 
Forest Comission (CONAFOR) prioritization scheme, deforested areas and extreme poverty.  To 
assess the PES’ impact on raising social awareness about the environment and decreasing 
deforestation and to analyze the potential linkages between poverty, land tenure systems, and 
forest management a combined methodology including GIS analysis, participant observation, 
questionnaires and interviews with participants and stakeholders involved in the program at 
different levels were used.  
The research shows that poverty and the lack of certified property rights have not been 
the major triggers of deforestation as forest conservation policy-makers in the country have 
claimed. The analysis of forest coverage from 1980 to 2010 points to different factors leading to 
changes in deforestation rates. Although it is true that forest conversion into agricultural lands 
has been the leading cause of deforestation, it has been strongly promoted by government 
programs, especially during the first decade of study for valley forests (as opposed to mountain 
forests). In comparison, the last two decades showed a significant decrease in the deforestation 
rates, mainly because few remnants of forest remained in the valleys.  
The land reform of the 1990s altered deforestation rates differently according to which 
agrarian nucleos participated and how. From the 613 nucleos examined in the Huasteca Potosina 
region, the majority, 76 percent, certified their properties at the individual parcel level, 13 
percent certified only the perimeter of their boundaries along with a few communal parcels like 
school plots, and the remainder either stayed uncertified or privatized some or all of their 
individual plots under dominio pleno (meaning full domain of the property). On the whole, forest 
coverage decreased by a little less than seven percent during the first decade of the certification 




tenure chosen. The nucleos with dominio pleno lost 24 percent of their forest, and nucleos that 
certified individual parcels saw a six percent decrease.  Contrary to predictions, the uncertified 
nucleos and those that certified only the perimeter of their territories lost virtually no forest (two 
percent). Over the last decade deforestation rates have decreased, and nucleos that certified their 
perimeters, those that certified all individual parcels, and those remaining uncertified even saw 
increases in forest coverage by three percent, one percent, and less than one percent, 
respectively. Those with dominio pleno continued to experience deforestation by two percent. 
Still, when taking into consideration how land availability, population, and traditions have 
influenced deforestation before, during, and after the certification process, the results show that 
the certification program has had little impact in increasing or decreasing forest coverage over 
the decades.       
 In regard to the Payments of Environmental Services (PES) program, intended to prevent 
deforestation on social properties, the economic impacts were low, as seen in the lack of land use 
diversification and forest under communal lands. A marked geographical variation can be seen, 
however, between the more successful northern mestizo area dominated by temperate forest, and 
the less successful southern indigenous areas dominated by shade-grown coffee in more tropical 
forests. Despite the different economic impacts, PES projects proved to be sustainable where 
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The Payments for Environmental Services Program (PES) is one of the most recent 
trends in forest conservation policies worldwide. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze 
the program’s impacts on decreasing deforestation and poverty in social properties (ejidos and 
agrarian communities) at a regional and local level in the Huasteca Potosina region of Mexico, 
from the inception of the program in 2003 until 2011.  Most forested properties in Mexico are 
socially owned and managed, and in 1992 Mexico began a voluntary program of converting such 
properties to individual private properties.  Thus, any analysis of the PES program must take into 
consideration the influential process of and changes in land titling.  Has the change in property 
tenure affected the success of the PES program?  Moreover, the PES program has the explicit 
goal of reducing extreme property.  Has this actually happened, have the poor participated, and if 
they have, has the program worked to reduce their poverty? Ultimately, have all types of land 
tenure systems and people at all socioeconomic levels seen a slowing or even reversal of 
deforestation at equal rates, or have these rates been differential?  To help answer these 
questions, GIS data was complemented by interviews and the application of questionnaries of a 
variety of landholders about the effectiveness of the program. Overall, this multi-scale study 
attempts to give a better understanding of the most remarkable social and environmental impacts 







To analyze the PES program’s impacts in the Huasteca Potosina region, the following objectives 
were set: 
 
1. Evaluate the correlation between patterns of deforestation and extreme poverty in the region.  
PES programs in Latin America are conceived as a way to reduce deforestation by 
compensating landowners’ stewardship of their forests, with the underlying assumption that 
poverty triggers deforestation. Following this logic, Mexico’s national strategy for PES has 
prioritized very high and high poverty areas. The first step in researching this relationship was to 
map the spatial correlation of the forested areas under risk of deforestation and the economically 
poorest areas at the municipio and nucleo agrario level. A sample of 43 nucleos (communities 
and ejidos) was chosen and a Geographic Information System (GIS) was constructed to define 
the risk of deforestation index and the overall economic marginality of the nucleos agrarios.   
To obtain the risk of deforestation index of each nucleo, two datasets were used: one vector 
shapefile defined by the National Forest Commission (CONAFOR) and the Environmental 
Protection Prosecutor (PROFEPA), and a raster dataset developed by the National 
Environmental Institute (INE). To analyze the deforestation patterns over time, forest covers of 
the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) land use and vegetation inventory 
series SI (1980), SII (1990), SIII (2000) and SIV (2010) 1 were used in conjunction with Landsat 
3 and 5 (TM) imagery from the same decades.  The land use changes and areas under risk of 
deforestation in the sample communities and ejidos were then compared to the high poverty 
zones in the region at the municipio and nucleo level using the database of the National Council 
of Population and Housing (CONAPO) marginality index per locality.  
 
2. Explore the potential correspondence between the implementation of the PES program on 
communities of the Huasteca region and CONAFOR’s prioritization of areas scheme.  
                                                            
1 Series I was constructed in the 1980s with fieldwork reference of 1968-1981-1988, Series II was constructed in 
the 1990s with fieldwork reference of 1993-1996, Series III was elaborated in 2002 and 2003, and Series IV was 





The priority areas or eligible zones were areas already delimitated by CONAFOR and 
available in shape file format; these were added to a GIS to evaluate their spatial correspondence 
with the implemented PES programs from 2003 to 2011. Besides the spatial correspondence 
between PES and priority areas, CONAFOR’s environmental and social criteria required for the 
implementation of PES were evaluated in the sample of 43 communities in terms of their 
correspondence with the allocated PES projects.  
 
3. Evaluate the contribution of the PES toward stopping deforestation in the Huasteca Potosina.   
To evaluate the influence of the program at a regional level, the percentages of forest cover 
to non-forest cover were tracked in the 43 sample communities from the inception of the 
program in 2003 to 2011, with attention being paid to the forests covered in the program. Other 
elements like property regimes, population density, and marginality were considered for their 
possible influences on forest conservation. 
 
4. Evaluate the perceptions and impressions of its participants of the PES program to gauge its 
social impact on the study area.    
Semi-structured interviews and questionnaires were conducted on participants and non-
participants in the 43-community sample to document their experiences and perceptions of the 
PES’s impacts on forest management, social organization and local economy. The communities’ 
perceptions were also compared with their deforestation patterns before and after the 
implementation of the program. 
       
5. Evaluate the program’s influences on community land tenure, rights, access, use and 
decisions over forests use.  
After the agrarian land reform of 1992, communities and ejidos have embraced different 
degrees of privatization and forest access that influences the way the program is implemented. At 
the beginning of the PES implementation, CONAFOR decided to include in the program only 
the areas certified under the PROCEDE program, but due to the amount of forested areas under 
uncertified lands, the program decided to expand its criteria. For this study, different types of 
land tenure systems were selected to reveal the degree to which this variable has influenced 






The overarching hypothesis for this dissertation is that the social factors of extreme 
marginality and indigeneity are not strongly associated with forest depletion patterns. Rather 
success of the PES program depends instead on other social phenomena like community 
organization, land use traditions and experience working on conservation or agro-productive 
programs that are stronger determinants of the maintenance or the depletion of forest in 
communities.  Under this general hypothesis are the following corollary hypotheses: 
 
1. The poorest communities are less likely to deforest, but they are the most likely to be 
included as “priority areas for conservation” under the PES program.  
Although the PES program tries to reach the poorest in order to stop deforestation in 
the hilliest and least-arable regions where most standing forests remain, (Alix-Garcia, De 
Janvry, and Sadoulet 2008), such forests are at least risk to begin with.  For example, in 
Costa Rica it is precisely the poor who impact the forest the least that participate most in 
PES programs (Pagiola 2002, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). In Mexico where the 
conservation strategy is to reach priority areas under risk, the program is most likely to 
reward the good managing practices of the poor communities as well.  Thus, the 
assumption that the poor are the greatest threat to forests, watersheds, and soil 
preservation must be re-evaluated. 
 
2. Communities with well defined property rights are more likely to conserve their 
forest and participate in conservation programs than the ones without.   
Property rights have been implemented as part of the neoliberal strategy to alleviate 
poverty and the deterioration of natural resources under the assumption that insecurities 
in land tenure are one of the first threats to the forest and biodiversity conservation 
(Landell-Mills 2002, Merino and Martinez 2009, Larson et al. 2013). This is the highly 
contentious “tragedy of the commons” argument of Hardin (1968).  The logic behind 
securing property rights to individuals is based on two assumptions.  One is that legal 
recognition of boundaries creates both a sense of security in property ownership and thus 




Secondly, it is thought that people, regardless of culture or social condition, are 
inherently egocentric and thus will selfishly and recklessly appropriate and exploit any 
resources that are not their own, including communal forests, before others do.  
Privatization, then, will cause people to take better care of what is legally theirs and theirs 
alone while providing them with crucial  tools to regulate land uses and the 
environmental governance of their lands (Spears et al. 1994).  On the other hand, an 
opposing logic is that social and economic factors like land privatization and poverty can 
disrupt community governance and lead to forest overexploitation (Heynen 2005). The 
PES program has indeed prioritized the certification of property rights for eligibility to 
participate and it is also intended to prevent community disruptions that could threaten 
the forests. 
  
3. The addition of an economic value to the environmental services of forests has 
spurred positive adaptations in the way communities and ejidos manage their 
resources.  
It was expected that the selling and buying at forest services to achieve more rational 
land uses receive positive responses especially in forested communities with no 
commercial timber. This market-oriented conservation strategy compensates land owners 
for the provision of environmental services over other land uses on their properties by 
adding an economic value to the conservation of forest and diversifying the local 
economy (Velázquez et. al. 2002, Muñoz-Piña et. al 2008). The PES approach of 
protecting areas under risk by rewarding good forest practices can diversify and improve 
local economies while increasing environment awareness and the appreciation of 
environmental services.   
 
4. The effects of the PES program on decreasing deforestation varies geographically, 
depending on the topographical characteristics of the nucleos agrarios and their 
degree and time of dependency on agricultural and cattle ranching activities.   
It was expected that communities located in the lowlands with longer dependency on 
activities like sugarcane production or cattle ranching would be less likely to appreciate 




burn agriculture that benefits from long fallow periods. The level of dependence on 
agriculture and cattle ranching has also been influenced by federal and state subsidies for 
agricultural development that counteract forest conservation efforts.  
 
5. The maintenance of traditional community organization is an essential factor for the 
sustainability of forest conservation programs.  
With the new land reforms in Mexico, communities have had the option to maintain 
the rights to their common social property or divide the land rights into individual 
properties. As several studies have shown, well organized communities and ejidos with 
internal rules for its management that have maintained their forest as communal lands 
also have a positive record of involvement with NGOs in forestry management programs 
(Alcorn 1984a, Velázquez, Durán-Medina, and Jean-Francois 2003, Klooster 2002, Alix-
Garcia et al. 2009).  Communities with good internal organizations are then not only 
more likely to participate in environmental conservation programs but also to maintain 





iii. Methodology  
With what kind of approach can one evaluate how the environmental and social elements of 
the PES program have behaved at a regional and local level regarding patterns of deforestation 
and poverty reduction?  This chapter sets out to answer this question. 
The study required the creation of a multi-scale geographical information system (GIS) for 
the spatial analysis of forest cover change, land tenure, marginality and the implementation of 
PES at a regional and nucleo scale. The data collection at the regional and nucleo level combined 
archival and bibliographic research about the region’s history on land tenure, development, 
environmental impacts and forest conservation initiatives to obtain the context of the present 
PES program and its implementation. In addition I did 11 months of ethnography walking 
forested areas under the PES program, applying community surveys, interviewing community 
leaders, and participant observation at myriad meetings related to the PES program. 
 
The multi-scalar approach  
The area of study at the regional scale is defined by the Huasteca Potosina boundaries, 
which includes 22 municipios. At this scale a regional analysis of social properties was made 
using data collected from 611 nucleos agrarios, which include ejidos and indigenous 
communities, and focused on the diferent land tenure systems and changes in forest over three 
decades. At the municipal level, only 11 municipios where a fair amount of forest still exists 
were considered for the study of forest conservation, marginality, and PES (see Map 1).  Within 
this area, two sub-areas – the northern and southern – were identified and compared based on 
their economic and cultural characteristics.  At the local scale a sample of 43 nucleos within 
these eleven municipios was selected for the analysis of the program’s implementation and local 
impacts. For finegrained longitudinal analysis of the PES impact on reducing deforestation, only 
the six nucleos that participated in both periods (10 years total) were considered.    
 
The data development at the regional level  
The data sources used for the construction of the digital database for the analysis of spatial 
correspondence between areas under risk of deforestation, extreme poverty, and the different 




- The National Council of Population and Housing (CONAPO) marginality index per 
county and locality as a way to measure poverty. The marginality index is based on the 
following variables of the INEGI’s national census of population and housing made every 
five years.  
 
Variable Abreviation 
% Illiterate population of 15 years old or 
more  
p15YM_AN 
% Population of 15 years or more with 
uncompleted primary school  
p15PRI_IN 
% Population without sewage and 
sanitation services  
pVPH_S_EXCSA  
% Population living in houses without 
electricity  
pVPH_S_ELEC 
% Population living in houses without tap 
water  
pVPH_AGUAFV 
% Houses with a level of overcrowding  PROM_OCUP 
%Population living in houses with dirt 
floors   
pVPH_PISOTI 
% Population living without refrigetator 
pVPH_S_REFRI 
          Table 1. Marginality variables 
 
CONAPO created two different indexes, one for the municipio and one for localities.2 The 
first one was used as it was created, and the second one was aggregated to calculate the 
marginality index at the nucleos agrarios level since one nucleo can contain several localities.    
- To identify the areas under risk of deforestation, two national databases were used, the 
“Critical Forested Zones” shapefile that the Assistant Prosecutor for Natural Resources 
(Subprocuraduria de Recursos Naturales) and the Federal Prosecutor for the Protection 
                                                            
2 Localities are an INEGI classification of a populated space that can range to a single house to a settlement of 




of the Environment (PROFEPA) use to define areas where the natural vegetation has 
reached high rates of destruction. The second database was the “Risk of Deforestation 
Index” raster image IRDef 2.0.1, created in 2011 by the National Ecology Institute (INE), 
which contains a more accurate classification of the areas under risk of deforestation by 
economic pressures. The IRDef 2.0.1 data is available by state at the webpage 
http://www.ine.gob.mx/irdef-db. 
The Critical Forested Zones database is good for monitoring areas where environmental 
violations are usually registered, but it is not accurate at the nucleos or community level. The 
Risk of Deforestation Index on the other hand was especially design to be used by CONAFOR 
staff to better allocate their programs like PES. The values of the index are based on the Von 
Thünen model, which weighs the factors guiding landowners to change from forest land use to 
more profitable ones like agriculture or cattle ranching. The variables that increase or reduce the 
profitability of the land use change in this model are: distance to local or regional markets, the 
type of forest, the existence of primary and secondary vegetation, elevation, slope, accessibility 
to towns and urban centers, adjacent agricultural densities, corn yield, marginality level, number 
of inhabitants in the nearest center, natural protected areas, and prices of corn and cattle (INE 
2011). The patterns of deforestation during the last decade were used to obtain a better estimate 
of fluctuation caused by each variable.  
 
- The agricultural, livestock, and forestry census data from 1991-2007 were used to 
document land use over time at the municipio level.  Specifically, the variables used 
were:  
o Agricultural surface data,  
 for perennial and seasonal crops 
 rain-fed zones and irrigated zones  
o Cattle ranching data, 
 Heads of cattle and its zoo-technical function per municipio  
 Surface area of cultivated grasses and alfalfa  
o Deforestation data 
 Surface deforested for agriculture and cattle ranching activities  
o Timber exploitation data 
 Volume of timber extracted by tree species  
 Number of sawmills that report timber by species per municipio  
o Reforestations 





- The aggregated information of the Censo ejidal 2007 was used to document the 
distribution of land and its uses by social properties in each municipio. The variables used 
were: 
o Agricultural, cattle ranching and forestry land use 
 economic activities and methods of operation, collective or individual  
 overall agricultural surface in parceled areas, including documentation of 
irrigation technology  
 parcels farmed communally  
 area cleared for communal agriculture and cattle ranching  
o Land distribution  
 Total number of ejidatarios, comuneros, and posesionarios (children of 
ejidatarios) by municipio  
 Ejidatarios and comuneros according to gender and possession of 
individual parcels   
 Posesionarios by gender and possession of individual parcels  
 Ejidos and communities with avecindados by gender  
 
 
For the land tenure categorization and organization of social properties, the agrarian nucleus 
database created for the Huasteca Potosina (Kelly et al. 2010) was used as a base. In 
particular, the variables used from the database included: size of communal lands, land 
tenure, percentage of forest, number of land owners, and drawing from the national census 
data of 2005 and 2010 total population, percentages of indigenous population, and 
marginality indexes.   
 
Data collection at the nucleos agrarios level 
Little data exists or is unavailable at the nucleo agrario level, so most had to be collected in the 
field or constructed.  
- The marginality index per nucleo was constructed by aggregating the mean value of the 
localities’ marginality indices inside each nucleo. The variables taken into account at the 
locality level are the same as at the municipio level, except for the percentage of working 
population earning twice the minimum wages, which was replaced with the percentage of 
houses without a refrigerator. According to the CONAPO statistical analyses, the last 
variable proved to have more weight in defining marginality at the locality level.  
 
- The variables for INE’s economic risk of deforestation index (IRDef) were used for the 





- For the land use change analyses, the INEGI vector datasets of national land use and 
vegetation inventory series SI (1980), SII (1990) and SIII (2000) and SIV (2010) 3 were 
used to look for spatial correspondence between deforested areas and marginality. 
 
- I visited participant and non-participant nucleos in the sample for the application of 
community questionnaires (see appendix IV). For the areas under the PES program, I also 
visited their participant area to observe the conditions of the forests as well as the 
environmental service activities they were doing.    
 
Field work  
Initial fieldwork began in the summer of 2009 while doing a reconnaissance of the 
region’s forest programs. I became interested in communally owned forests and management 
after previous work in the region related to participatory research mapping and the changes in the 
social land tenure systems brought with the counter-reforms. In 2009 I focused on CONAFOR’s 
national reforestation program, which preceded the PES program. While visiting communities 
and ejidos in the program I found out that for some the reforestation program was actually part of 
a follow up to the PES program. The new PES program covered substantially bigger areas and 
involved more communities, which attracted my attention to it.  
 
Selecting the sample of communities and ejidos for the study   
The second fieldwork season, from March to August 2011, I focused mostly on the 
indigenous southern part of the Huasteca Potosina study area.  Since most of the PES programs 
in this region are located in the municipio of Xilitla (see map below), I chose it as my base of 
operations. I made a list of communities and ejidos participating in PES since 2003 and started 
visiting them, first asking the head officials known as comisariados, whether I could attend their 
next community meeting (asambleas) to talk about my research and ask for their participation on 
my survey. The survey was composed of 58 questions related to general aspects of their 
community or ejido, the land uses, access and distribution, and their participation and 
management of the PES program. Depending on the communities’ management of the PES 
                                                            
3 INEGI land use and vegetation series were constructed:  I in the 1980s with fieldwork reference of (1968)-1981-
1988, II was constructed in the 1990s with fieldwork reference of 1993-1996, III was elaborated in 2002 and 2003, 





program, the interviews and questionnaires were applied to either the general assembly, the PES 
committee, or both.  In addition to the questionnaire, we arranged for a tour of their forests under 
the PES program. In exchange and gratitude for their participation in the study, I offered a map 
of their nucleo that included the location and area of the PES program in which they were 
participating, which, ironically, most of them all lacked. For the southern region I selected 27 
nucleos, 19 of which had participated in the PES program for at least one period and eight had 
yet to participate.  
The third fieldwork season was made from February to April, 2012 in the northern region 
covering the municipios of El Naranjo, Cd. Valles, and Tamasopo (see map below). The 
fieldwork there was delayed by a wave of narco-trafficking violence during 2011. El Naranjo 
was my base of operations, where I applied the same approach I used to reach the ejidos on the 
south.  One advantage, though, was that I had previously met many of the nucleos committee 
members at previous PES regional meetings, which greatly facilitated gaining their participation. 
For this region I selected 16 nucleos of which 10 had participated in the PES program for at least 





Map 1. Study Area 
Differentiating the CONAFOR staff from me  
PES staff visits the properties in the program at least every two years, often depending on 
a community’s standing in the program, to verify the environmental services work. There are 
also technicians that are subcontracted by participants to provide technical assistance and who 
often visit potential participants to encourage their enrollment. Although I constantly explained 
my doctoral project, community members and even technicians constantly mistook me for an 
under-cover inspector for CONAFOR. The program technicians are not employed by 
CONAFOR but need to be certified by it in order to work as assisting technicians for 
communities. The constant confusion unintentionally opened doors for me, but eventually nearly 
everyone came to accept the explanation of my independent project. I met most of the 
technicians in the region, and some allowed me to join them in their regular visits to my targeted 
communities as well as others under their responsibility, greatly enhancing my acceptance by the 




refused to participate but spread rumors about me to the communities to the effect that 
participation in my project would put their PES in jeopardy.  Luckily, these were in the minority, 
and some communities welcomed me despite their technician’s warning.  
 
Visiting the areas under the PES program 
I used different approaches depending on whether the environmental services used pertained 
to agroforestry or hydrological services. In areas with hydrological PES programs, I convened a 
meeting with at least the designated community committee to apply my questionnaire. During 
this meeting, I asked when the next scheduled maintenance of their forests was planned, at which 
time the committee members would guide me on a tour that usually included several hours of 
mountain walking. For the areas under the agroforestry PES program, which were mainly in 
indigenous nucleos, visits were made to several shade-grown coffee orchards, and interviews 
with the owners were also made there in the countryside, including questions about the 
maintenance of their parcels and the variety of species involved. These hikes, though grueling at 
times, turned out to provide invaluable ethno-botanical data and forums in which community 
members felt the freedom to speak out about the program. 
Additional interviews were made with key actors in the region like the CONAFOR 
technicians implementing and overseeing the program, other CONAFOR staff, and ecology 
personnel in the municipal governments.  I also interviewed staff from NGOs, governmental 
agencies, and academic groups involved with the program as official Management Units 
(UMAFORES) in promoting, supervising, and elaborating projects. 
 
GIS Analyses 
All of the GIS analyses were made using the ArcGIS 10 program.  
Spatial correspondence between poverty and deforestation patterns  
 The spatial correspondence between these two variables was applied to the municipal and 
nucleo level using the marginality index developed by CONAPO at the locality and municipal 
levels, including two data sets of deforestation risk (the San Luis PotosíIRDef 2.0.1 data 
developed by INE and the PROFEPA data) and the four INEGI land use and vegetation series 
that run from 1980s to 2010. The PROFEPA data was only used to identify broad areas subject 




the forested areas under risk. Thus, the IRDef high resolution focus on forested areas allowed the 
analysis of areas under deforestation risk at the nucleos agrarios level.  The size of the IRDef 
raster grid corresponds to 300 meters by 300 meters or nine hectares on the ground.4 This data 
allowed for gauging the overall risk of deforestation of a specific area by using the mean level of 
risk.  
 
Risk of deforestation at the municipios level 
To obtain the risk of deforestation per municipio, the IRDef data was intersected with the 
municipal data on GIS.  The raster image was converted into a polygon using the “Level of risk” 
as the attribute value for grouping into different categories. Once the polygons for risk of 
deforestation were created, the shapefile was then intersected with the municipal marginality 
index data. The “intersect” geo-processing tool was then used to create areas of coverage of 
thousands of polygons sharing the same attributes. The “dissolve” geo-processing tool allowed 
for the statistical analyses of the numeric data like range, or standard deviation and the mean risk 
of deforestation by municipio.  
The same geo- processing tools were applied to indentify the types of forest at risk of 
deforestation by intersecting the IRDef shapefile with the INEGI’s most recent land use and 
vegetation data: the SIV series. The resulting data (Risk_Intersect_VegetationIV) was then 
summarized by municipio. The correlation analyses of these variables were made using the SPSS 
statistical program, at the municipios and nucleos level, using both parametric and non-
parametric methods. 
 
Identifying poverty and the government programs to reduce it 
Poverty is conceived by the government, as a structural problem of societies when its 
members lack the opportunities for development or the capacities to reach it.   In Mexico, the 
National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Politics (CONEVAL) addresses 
poverty’s multidimensionality and classifies it in two blocks: 1- the lack of social rights, which 
                                                            
4  The cells data is categorized in four ways:  1) NIV_Riesgo - a qualitative level of risk classification that goes from 
very low to very high, 2) Riesgo - the economic pressure of deforestation index with four decimal values from 
0.0000 to 0.9999, 3) Value - a discrete value that reflects the probability of deforestation from 1 to 9999, 4) Count - 





are: food, education, health, social security, and household; and 2- earning an income below 
‘well-being’ (at least two minimum wages per month). People are considered poor if they lack at 
least one of the mentioned social rights or have an income below the well-being index, and are 
considered extremely poor when they lack at least three social rights and their income is below 
the wellbeing.  
The incidence of poverty in Mexico is greater in rural areas than in urban areas (61 
percent of the population versus 40 percent), and within rural areas, indigenous populations tend 
to be more marginalized than the mestizo population (72 percent versus 42 percent) (CONEVAL 
2012). At the state level, San Luis Potosí occupies ninth place, with at least 50 percent 
(~1,353,300 people) living in poverty.  
To combat poverty, successive governments have implemented several programs to 
improve social rights and economic wellbeing of the marginalized population. In 2012 there 
were 275 national programs to combat poverty, 189 more than in 2004 (ibid.).  Programs are 
divided in three categories: budgetary, where implementation requires following operational 
rules like the PES program; subsidiary, which follow guidelines like Oportunidades; and “direct 
action”, which provide public services. The programs with operational rules represent 35 percent 
of the federal budget, followed by subsidiary programs with 33 percent, and the provision of 
public services with 32 percent (ibid.).  
The government’s main focus has been education, with 103 programs, followed by 51 for 
economic wellbeing, and 41 related to health; these three areas alone consume 78 percent of the 
annual budget (around $62,114,400 USD) (CONEVAL 2012). The greatest improvements can be 
seen in regard to access to health services, where the percentage lacking dropped from 58.6 in 
1990 to 21.5 by 2012 (Bis). Most relevant to this dissertation are the 24 programs for healthier 
environments. SEMARNAT is in charge of the healthy environment programs and oversees 30 
that cover several of the social and wellbeing rights, most of them (20) directly related to the 
environment while others are more indirectly linked through education (1), economic wellbeing 
(4), health (2) and housing (3). Eighteen of these programs fund technical assistance, including 
studies and the implementation of environmental services, infrastructure, and production or 





Programs target specific populations. For nucleos agrarios nine programs address the 
social and economic dimensions of poverty, five give direct economic aid for wellbeing, two are 
focused on a healthy environment, including the PES program, and others involve social security 
and employment. The total funding designated for nucleos agrarios in 2012 was USD $182 
million (CONEVAL, 2012), and from 2003 to 2011 the PES program alone received an average 
of USD $54 million per year to support 5,967 nucleos agrarios, for an average of $9,000 each 
(CONAFOR 2012).     
  
Marginality and risk of deforestation at the nucleos level 
Construction of the Marginality index 
The marginality index of the nucleos was obtained through several steps: first, the 2010 
marginality index of the 1662 localities inside the Huasteca Potosina region was obtained from 
the CONAPO’s webpage (http://cat.microrregiones.gob.mx/catloc/) for San Luis Potos and 
added to the GIS database. The five nominal classes of the index were changed into a rating 
system of degrees of marginality, from 0 to the lowest to 5 as the highest. Not all localities 
showed marginality, but this was mainly because of the lack of specific census information for 
having less than 6 persons. Due to lack of information, 327 localities had to be excluded from the 
marginality analyses, although they were included in the analysis of total population at nucleo 
level. The total number of localities included in the marginality calculations was 1336 with a 
mean marginality index of 4.1 (high).  
The second step was to accurately identify the localities that belonged to each nucleo. 
The 2010 INEGI census data for localities available in shapefile format was used to spatially 
locate the localities or points inside each nucleo’s polygon using the “intersect” geo-processing 
tool in Arcmap. Since several nucleos have populations living outside their designated lands, the 
accuracy of each nucleo’s total population was enhanced by verifying the position of the 
localities near the polygon borders. This was greatly facilitated by using the catalog for localities 
in the National Agrarian Register (RAN,  http://www.ran.gob.mx/ran/index.php) for each nucleo 
in. This database, however, has two disadvantages: one is that it only contains the data of the 
nucleos that have been already certified by PROCEDE, so uncertified nucleos could not be 
verified; the other is that the catalog has not been updated since the 2005 census, so several new 




provided information for a great number of missing localities while also helping to review the 
boundaries’ of the certified nucleos. Fieldwork and GPS recording of the localities also helped to 
improve and rectify the database. For example, the ejido “Las Abritas y anexos” appeared in the 
catalog as part of the municipio of Cd. Del Maíz, which was recently divided to create the new 
municipio of El Naranjo, where this ejido now belongs. In addition, the catalog shows the ejido 
without any localities inside the nucleo, but from the 2010 census and fieldwork, two localities 
were identified inside the polygon. In other nucleos like “La Hincada” and “Tanlacú” the 
polygon boundaries had to be reshaped because of recently added annexes and incorrectly placed 
localities.  
Once the localities for each nucleo were identified and the polygons database was 
updated, the localities were spatially aggregated to the corresponding polygon on the GIS using 
the “intersect” function. The 358 localities within the sample nucleos had an overall mean 
marginality of 4.3, with a very small standard deviation value of 0.5269. The localities data was 
then summarized by nucleo using the “dissolve” geo-processing function to obtain the mean 
marginality value and the total population per nucleo. The mean marginality within the sample of 
43 nucleos resulted in a 4.17 value, with a standard deviation of 0.36. As the mean marginality 
value of all the localities in the Huasteca, this variable’s fluctuation is very low, which means 
that the majority of the localities are highly marginal. Statistically, it means that this variable 
does not have a normal distribution, causing a ceiling effect that inhibits significant correlation 
with other variables. The graphic below shows how the distribution of the variable tends to 
concentrate in the 4th index value. 
 




Although the results show that the nucleos are similarly marginalized, previous research 
suggested there were differences in the degree of marginalization between the northern and 
southern area. Therefore, a more precise index was calculated for the nucleos in an attempt to 
correlate marginality with risk of deforestation and total forest change at this scale by weighting 
the same eight variables of the census that CONAPO used to calculate the localities’ marginality. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables among the sample are shown in the table below.  
 
    Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
p15YM_AN 4.87804878049 34.00000000000 16.5176250452747 6.93656358510593 
p15PRI_IN 14.1643 41.1429 26.302794 6.9399233 
PROM_OCUP 3.0000 9.0000 4.697674 .9394751 
pVPH_S_EXCSA .0000 24.1379 5.181007 4.9950880 
pVPH_S_ELEC .0000 107.6142 15.148441 21.9584607 
pVPH_AGUAFV .0000 285.0254 50.841292 49.9772418 
pVPH_PISOTI 3.3613 107.1066 29.267070 20.9673328 
pVPH_S_REFRI 13.24 100.00 55.3110 23.19803 
Valid N (listwise)     
43 
    
                      Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the marginality variables on the sampled nucleos 
The correlation analyses between the eight variables shows the percentage of illiterate 
population (p15YM_AN) expectedly related to the population with incomplete primary school, 
but also with the infrastructure-related variables like having no electricity (pVPH_ELEC) and 
running water (pVPH_AGUAFV) and even more strongly with houses with dirt floors 





Table 3. Correlation matrix of the variables used for the marginality index at the nucleos' scale 
 
Following CONAPO’s procedure at the localities level, the variables were standardized 
before evaluating their weight in the marginality index. Once the variables were standardized, a 
“Principal Component Analyses” or PCA method was used to obtain their weight in the 
marginality value. The table below shows the components or variables in the same order of the 
matrix, so the first is the percentage of illiterate population and so on. The results of the 
significance of each variable for marginality differ from what CONAPO identified as the most 
explanatory using the 2010 census.  In their analysis, the percentage of houses without a 
refrigerator (the last component in this table) had the most weight, while my analysis at the scale 
of the nucleos, the percentage of houses with dirt floors (the 7th component) had the most (see 





Table 4. Principal Component Analysis of Marginality Variables at the Nucleos Level 
 
The components used to create the marginality index for each nucleo (Yі) were based on 
the values of the first column on the component matrix of (ω) multiplied by the standardized 
values (Zі) and summed to obtain the total measure (IM). The equation is expressed as: 
Yi = ω1,1 Zi,1+ ω1,2 Zi,2+… ω1,8 Zi,8 = IM 
The values obtained after computing the formula for each nucleo resulted in a wider range of 






Graphic 2. Distribution of the marginality index at the sampled nucleos 
 
The marginalization categories from (1 to 5) were assigned to the nucleos using CONAPO’s 
classification as follow: 
 
Category Inferior limit Superior limit 
1 Very low -1.83197 -1.32309 
2 Low -1.32309 -1.06870 
3 Medium -1.06870 -0.81425 
4 High -0.81425 0.71231 
5 Very high 0.71231 11.2608 
 
To determine what these values indicate in the categorization of CONAPO’s 
marginalization index, the technique of Dalenius and Hodges was used to stratify these values 
into the five groups or categories of the localities index. The stratification was made using the 
statistical program “R”. Because the program does not accept negative values, 3.4 points were 
added to the index values in order to make them positive.  The method uses the covariance which 
is CV= for the modified values and the requested number of stratums (Ls= 5). The constructed 
marginality index for the nucleos was then ready to be used in correlation risk of deforestation 
and other total change in forest cover.  
 
Construction of the risk of deforestation index at the nucleos level 
Once the value of marginality was evaluated for the 43 nucleos, the risk of deforestation 
index was calculated in order to correlate them. The risk index was obtained with the help of GIS 




using the spatial analysis tool of “extraction” by polygon option. The cropped image was then 
converted into a polygon shapefile in order to be intersected with the nucleos’ shapefile. The 
outcome file identifies all the polygons with different indexes of risk inside each nucleo. To 
calculate the area of deforestation risks, a geometry calculation tool in the attribute data was used 
and the different degrees were then summarized by nucleo.  
To obtain the mean risk of deforestation per nucleo (DefR), the following equation was used: 
𝜇𝜇DefR=∑(𝐷𝐷1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴1) + (𝐷𝐷2 ∗ 𝐴𝐴2) + (𝐷𝐷3 ∗ 𝐴𝐴3) + (𝐷𝐷4 ∗ 𝐴𝐴4) + (𝐷𝐷5 ∗ 𝐴𝐴5)/∑(𝐴𝐴1:𝐴𝐴5) 
Where: 
D = the degree of deforestation risk (1: very low to 5: very high)  
A = the sum of areas covered by a specific degree of risk (1 to 5)   
 
The resulting values were added to the attribute table of nucleos. The data was also analyzed 
with the SPSS statistical software, where it shows it with a normal distribution.  
 
Graphic 3. Risk of deforestation index’s distribution in the sample nucleos 
 
Patterns of land use and vegetation change at the nucleos level  
To determine the changes in forest cover within the nucleos, the INEGI land use and 
vegetation series from the 1980s (SI), 1990s (SII), 2000s (SIII) and 2010 (SIV), and the National 
Forest Inventory of the year 2000 (t3) were used as bases of analysis. These covers were clipped 
and intersected to the nucleos’ polygons to calculate their geometric areas using Arcmap. The 




and secondary forests under the arboreal and scrub stages, excluding the herbaceous stages under 
the premise that they have recently experienced major disturbances.  
The vegetation series data were corroborated with the Landsat (TM) imagery, ortho-photos 
from 1985, and Google Earth’s more recent images for the area in 2010 and 2011 for major 
discrepancies. To compare the last vegetation series with the most recent imagery on Google 
Earth, the vegetation and the nucleos layers had to be converted into a KML format.   
The percentage of total forest change from the 1980s to 2010 at the nucleos’ level for TE and 
TR were made for the 43 nucleos of the sample and were then included as the variables for total 
changes in temperate and tropical forest in the correlation matrix.  
The following nine variables form part of the correlation matrix: 
1- Total population: the total population living within the nucleos’ jurisdiction in 2010. 
2- Indigenous population: the percentage of people that speak an indigenous language or 
that identifies themselves as indigenous.   
3- Region: North and south regions described in the introductory chapter. 
4- Communal areas: the percentage of communal area coverage in the total nucleo area 
5- Years in the program: the years that the nucleo has been participating in the PES program 
6- Marginality Index: calculated by weighting eight variables of the locality census for each 
nucleo. 
7- Deforestation Index: calculated from the mean value of the IRDef cells within the nucleo 
8- Total change in TE: percentage of temperate forest change from 1980 to 2010     
9- Total change in TR: percentage of tropical forest change from 1980 to 2010     
 
Analysis of the spatial correspondence between CONAFOR’S priority areas and the actual PES 
program areas in the Huasteca.  
CONAFOR has significantly changed its priorities for areas to be included in PES since 
the program was launched in 2003; however, the last prioritization schemes of 2009-2012 have 
consolidated most of the elements of previous versions, which in turn were used in this study to 
evaluate the allocation of PES on the sample of nucleos.5  
                                                            
5 The 2010 and 2012 CONAFOR versions of PES zonings were compared with the PES grading scores of each nucleo 





The delimitation of the areas eligible for PES was based on six general environmental 
variables defined at the earlier stages of the program. Each variable has an assigned number of 
points that reflects its biological importance, and an area can have various overlapping variables.  
A total of at least six points qualifies an area as eligible for PES. The variables and their grading 
are as follows: 
Environmental Variables Points 
1. Natural Protected Areas 7 
2. Important areas for bird conservation 5 
3. Ramsar sites (wetlands of international importance) 4 
4. Priority mountains 3 
5. Terrestrial priority regions 2 
6. Hydrological priority regions  1 
 
Once the areas were designated, the different payments were calculated according to the 
land use, the type of vegetation recorded in INEGI series IV, and risk of deforestation using 
INE’s risk of deforestation by economic pressures (IRDef data)6. The areas with differentiated 
PES were downloaded from CONAFOR’s website and compared with INEGI’s land use 
vegetation series IV to analyze the type of vegetation under eligible areas. 
In addition, CONAFOR has created a new process for assigning eligible areas based on the 
aforementioned data. The process involves a grading system that considers eight general and six 
specific variables in each category (hydrological, biodiversity, etc.) for which a community is 
applying.  
The eight general variables include:  
1- The proposed area must have at least 200 hectares (ha) and 50 percent of it must be 
forested.  Priority points are awarded according to the type of property: five for lying 
within a biosphere reserve, four for being in a federally protected natural area, three for 
location within in a state protected area, two for inclusion in a privately owned protected 
area, and one for being outside any protected area.   
                                                            




2- The area lies within the same watershed with other properties in the PES program (five 
points, one if not). The Founding Trust of Shared Risk (FIRCO), a branch of the 
agricultural ministry of (SAGARPA), officially delimited all watersheds nationwide. 
3- The ejido or community has constituted an environmental surveillance committee 
accredited by PROFEPA (five points, one if not).   
4- The area lies withint a zone targeted by CONAFOR for development via PES programs 
(five points, one if not).      
5- The forested property has a sustainable planning program approved by its members and is 
registered in CONAFOR’s online list (five points, one if not). 
6- The property is at risk of deforestation as defined by INE and described previously. The 
grading points increase with the risk: medium risk (two), high risk (four) and very high 
(six).  
7- The area is at strong risk of natural disaster as defined by the National Center of Disaster 
Prevention (CENAPRED). Such risks in the Huasteca include landslides, frosts, and 
especially floods and droughts. The CENAPRED’s identified risks of natural disasters at 
the municipal level are available on their website: 
http://www.atlasnacionalderiesgos.gob.mx. The grading points increase with risk: 
medium risk (two), high risk (four) and very high (six). 
8- The participants have presented a geo-referenced proposed polygon according to the 
operation rules (Four points, one if not).  
Hence, a property can have a maximum of 37 prioritization points for entry into the PES 
program. Then, according to the PES category they are applying for (hydrological, biodiversity 
or agroforestry), six more specific variables are evaluated for a potential maximum of 29 
prioritization points. The highest scores among each state have better chances of being approved 
for the program. 
For hydrological PES the following six variables are considered: 
1- The percentage of the arboreal coverage of the proposed area: over 70 percent (five 




2- The area covers overexploited aquifers, as determined by the National Water Council 
(CONAGUA). The list of overexploited aquifers7 in the country is available on line at 
http://www.conagua.gob.mx/atlas/ciclo21.html. San Luis Potosí has five overexploited 
aquifers in the altiplano (high, dry) region but none in the Huasteca.  
3- The polygon is located in a watershed with available surface water. The grading score 
increases at the highest points of the watershed and amount of water availability. 
According to CONAGUA, the Huasteca Potosina is within the IX hydrologic watershed 
called Golfo Norte (North Gulf). Human pressure on water sources there is rated at 19%, 
or “moderate”, and thus only receives two prioritization points. Nevertheless, it is located 
in a zone of extreme drought (map 17) (CONAGUA 2012), which increases its risk for 
this kind of natural disaster. An online digital atlas details the functional areas (or 
altitudes) of the watershed http://mapas.ine.gob.mx/mediofisico/hidrologia/zonfun/ that 
are used to grade the polygons. Priority scores range from seven in the highest areas to 
one point in lowlands.  
4- The degree of soil degradation, as identified by a map made by the College of 
Postgraduates (COLPOS, Mexico) and SEMARNAT at the national scale of 1:250,000 
(http://www.conabio.gob.mx/informacion/metadata/gis/degra250kgw.xml?_httpcache=ye
s&_xsl=/db/metadata/xsl/fgdc_html.xsl&_indent=no). CONAFOR assigns three points 
for low degradation, two for medium, and one for high. 
5- If the area lies within a CONAFOR strategic zone for restoration or attention (three 
points, one if not). Maps of such zones are also available in shapefile format and can be 
downloaded at the CONAFOR’s website. 
6- The biomass density of the area according to the South Frontier College (ECOSUR) 
evaluation, with five for the highest density, three for medium, and one for low. 
 
To be eligible for the biodiversity PES program, properties need to be within CONAFOR 
areas delimited for this category, except for the ones applying for agroforestry, which do not 
need to be within any areas. For a PES application on this category, the highest possible score is 
also 29 points and the grading variables are: 
                                                            





1- The property is within the Conservation Areas for Birds (AICAS) delimited by National 
Comission of Biodiversity (CONABIO) or within a Ramsar site (the world’s important 
wetlands), (four points, one if not). 
2- The property is within a hydrological or terrestrial priority region defined by CONABIO  
(four points, one if not). 
3- The property lies within a CONABIO-defined “endangered” or ”protected” species zone. 
Endangered and protected species are listed in the NOM-059-SEMARNAT-2001 and can 
be spatially located at:  http://www.conabio.gob.mx/informacion/gis/. Properties within 
species in danger of extinction receive seven points, threatened or specially protected 
species receive five, and one point is assigned otherwise.    
4- The property lies within a priority area for biodiversity conservation defined by the GAP, 
CONABIO, CONANP, The Nature Conservancy, and PRONATURA (Urquiza-Haas et 
al. 2009). Extremely high priority areas receive seven points, high priority areas receive 
five, and medium priority areas receive three. The data in shapefile format is also 
available at the CONABIO website above. 
5- The property lies within a biological corridor published by CONABIO (four points, one if 
not).  
6- Properties registered as shade-grown coffee with the National Funding to the Agricultural 
Community (ASERCA) (three points, one if not).  
 
The actual scores given by CONAFOR to the participating social properties in my study 
area are kept confidential and unavailable to the public, but I applied the CONAFOR priority 
points or scores to all social properties in my sample area regardless of their actual participation 
or not in PES programs so as to evaluate which program best suits them, if any (see Appendix I. 
PES grading prioritization in nucleos).  Sometimes I found, for example, that communities were 
participating in programs that were less suited to their type of environmental than other 
programs.  For the nucleos applying for participation in a program, I considered the total forested 
area.  Also, for properties previously rejected by CONAFOR, an additional four points are 
awarded, which I took into consideration in my application of the priority scores. Social factors 




prioritization score by CONAFOR, but they are considered in the application form for 
submission. 
Once all the variables were calculated for each nucleo, a correlation matrix of the 
environmental and the social elements mentioned above was made using the SPSS program. The 
values of the variables were first standardized and then correlated using the Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient for a non-parametric analysis and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient for 
the parametric test.  
 
Evaluation of PES’s contribution to halting regional and local deforestation. 
At the regional level, the percentage of forest covered by the program since the beginning of 
its implementation in 2003 to 2011 in relation to the total amount of forest was considered for 
the analyses. 
At the local level, the patterns of deforestation calculated for the 43 nucleos agrarios were 
tracked over the course of the program, with attention paid to the total change of temperate and 
tropical forests for each nucleo.  In addition, using one-way ANOVA, an analysis of land use and 
vegetation series from 1980 -1990, 1990 -2000, to 2000 – 2010) were made at the nucleos level 
to find out when the region experienced the most changes cover. 
 






As previously mentioned, field observations of the program areas were also carried out to 
verify the correspondence of the actual vegetation with the vegetation inventory data, including 
the stage of the forest (secondary or mature forest), presence of orchids, cultivated crops, and 
land without vegetation. For non-participating areas, walkable observations were not always 
possible since residents were less interested in the program and my research.   
These results were compared to the participants’ perceptions on the PES impacts reducing 






II. Theoretical context  
iv. The cultural and political ecology approach  
The theoretical foundation on which this dissertation is built is the field of human 
geography, particularly the subfields of cultural and regional geography and political 
ecology.  The dissertation integrates cultural, political and ecological processes that occur 
within a specific region where the protection of natural resources is promoted.  
Definitions of ‘culture’ vary according to the issue under investigation; in cultural 
geography, it refers to “the diverse patterning of human communities and their varied 
interactions with the environment as well as expression of ideas and values through human 
fashioned landscape change” (Price and Lewis 1993).  How culture is expressed across 
landscapes has driven cultural geographical research since Carl Sauer established the 
Berkeley tradition at the University of California in the 1930s, and thus the human-
environmental relationship has been a central topic. Sauer focused on the historical 
transformations of the landscape, patterns of environmental and cultural diffusion, and 
domestication processes as a way to understand the human transformation of the earth. 
Complementing this tradition has been the school of Human ecology emphasizing the mutual 
relationship between humans and their environments, which was founded by Barrows at 
Chicago in the 1920s in response to the environmental determinism that still dominated 
geography at the time (Grossman 1977:128). Human ecology paid particular attention to 
natural hazards and how societies responded to them, while the Berkeley school had a 
predilection for the study and interpretation of rural and agricultural landscapes in Latin 
America, thereby also enriching regional geography studies (e.g. West 1948, Parson 1955, 
Denevan 1966, 1971, Johansen 1963). The Berkeley school established a tradition of 
research methods that include historiography via archival research, intensive long-term 
fieldwork, detailed observation, and qualitaive methods that are still used today. The 
introduction of cultural ecology to geography is attributed to Sauer by his many intellectual 
heirs, although he never actually used the term. Cultural ecology was first developed by 
anthropologist Steward (1955) in his explorations of the processes of human adaptation to the 
environment and the effects it had on social organization (Grossman 1977:132). Steward had 




the school’s attention to history, critics pointed out that political and economic history, such 
as processes of globalization and colonialism, were ignored by the tradition even though they 
were absolutely essential to understanding human-environmental dynamics. 
With the influence of general system theory during the 1960s, human ecology developed 
a heavy focus on energy flows and the subsistence system analysis at micro scales. To this 
theory followed the adaptive dynamics approach with a great number of studies focusing on 
subsistence agricultural societies and the evolution of agricultural landscapes. The Berkeley 
school contributed to the systems ecology field with Denevan (1966) and his students’ work 
on environmental history of pre-Columbian agricultural systems of the Maya, Amazonia, and 
the Andes: Nietschmann (1972) and Waddell’s (1971) works show the influence of general 
systems and ecosystems concepts in human ecology. Central concerns in their work were 
sustainability of indigenous production systems and local knowledge. As with the earlier 
cultural ecology approach of Steward and Sauer, criticisms of systems approaches called 
attention to their lack of attention to the external influences, particularly political and 
economic, of land use and modification, as adaptations are not enacted in a self-contained 
vacuum.  Moreover, critiques have also been directed at reducing all social and cultural 
phenomena to ecosystemic adaptation. While agreeing with these critiques, it is nonetheless 
recognized the intellectual debt to the cultural ecological tradition established by Sauer in 
this dissertation, especially in the tradition’s focus on agricultural landscapes and their 
processes of change, and the methodological value placed on archival research, long-term 
fieldwork, detailed observation, and the development of multi-scalar databases and maps.  As 
will be seen, both the selection of the topic of deforestation and forest conservation in the 
Huasteca Potosina region as well as the methods of investigating them, are ultimately 
outgrowths of a scholarly tradition established by Sauer.  
Political ecology was in some ways a response to the apolitical systems approaches of the 
1950s and 60s, and an approach to modern humanity’s glaringly obvious destruction of 
environments on all scales in the 1970s.  Rather than replacing cultural ecology per se, 
polical ecology has enriched it by drawing attention to political and economic influences in 
human–environment interactions at multiple scales. Thus, the social relations of production 
and access and control over resources, for example, were problematized, and the focus was 




interact with each other and the environmental resources in the pursuit of their interests, 
adaptive or not (Bryant 1992).   
Early contributions in political ecology revolved around attacks against the Neo-
Malthusian environmental research of the time, which attended to topics like 
‘overpopulation’ without attending to the political-economic interests and processes leading 
to human destruction of ecologies (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 10-12). The field strengthened 
and congealed with attention to natural hazards and disasters by O’ Keefe, Westgate and 
Wisner (1976), Watts (1983), Blaikie (1985), Bunker (1985) and Hecht (1985), who 
stridently called for work on the political economy of environmental change (ibid.). Later 
works by Vayda (1983) and Grossman (1984) demonstrate the maturation of the field by 
urging attention to all political and economic structures influencing a given locality’s 
connections with the outside world. In geography, Hewitt’s (1983) The Interpretation of 
Calamity is considered one of the fundations for the development of political ecology, and 
the policy oriented journal of Land Degradation and Rehabilitation founded in 1989 by 
Blaikie and others helped consolidate the called political ecology approach in the discipline 
(Zimmerer and Bassett 2000, in Paulson et al. 2005).  One critique that found its mark 
against the early political ecology of the time was the over-emphasis on political economic 
structure and top-down power, including the trendiness of Marx’s ‘false consciousness’, 
Gramscii’s ‘hegemony’, and Foucault’s ‘discourse’, which downplayed the role of grassroots 
actors by portraying them as unwitting victims unable to resist their subordination and even 
contributing to its perpetuation. 
This led to an evolution in political ecology away from neo-Marxian determinism to 
attentions towards how power relations between all people mediate human-environmental 
interactions. Some of the most representative works of this period are: Blaikie and Brookfield 
(1987) on land degradation; Hecht and Cockburn (1989) on tropical deforestation in Brazil; 
Guha (1989), Peluso (1993) and Neuman (1992, 1999) on dominant conservation discourses 
in forest policy; and Watts and Peet (1993, 2004) on various topics in political ecology 
(Bryant and Bailey 1997, 13). The notion of “resilience” has also been gaining currency in 
political ecology in recent decades in tandem with the crises of global climate change and 




responses to change induced by each other, the study of which therefore implies both natural 
and social science (ibid).  
Thus, political ecological approaches come from different angles, from specific 
environmental problems (like soil erosion, tropical deforestation, water pollution, etc.) to 
concepts perceived to have important links to political ecological questions, like the ways in 
which ideas or discourses are developed or understood by different actors to reinforce or 
challenge existing social and economic arrangements (Escobar 1998). 
From the broad range of applications of political ecology, Offen (1994) identifies five 
key elements that characterize the subfield in geography: “1) livelihood production and 
reproduction as the focus of study; 2) the relationships among social, economic and 
environmental change; 3) international, colonialist and corporate interventions at the 
community level; 4) causes and consequences of environmental and social marginalization 
and its remediation and 5) empirical and historical research” (Offen 2004).  One could 
reasonably expand this list to the analysis of dominant discourses behind scientific forest 
policies and their implications, as in the early works of Peluso (1992, 1993, 2001), Jewitt 
(1995), and Bryant (1996). More recently, the study of the governmentalities on carbon 
offsetting (Bumpus and Liverman 2011) and the commodification of environmental services, 
as well as their local impacts, have expanded the understanding of the complex relations 
developing between humans and environment on a globalized arena.  
  
This dissertation pertains to political ecology in its attention to the impacts, logics, and 
operation of environmental protection (Peet et. al. 2011), and actually considers all of 
Offen’s elements as well as the more recent ones on environmental services when analyzing 
the PES program within the regional context of the Huasteca Potosina region and its impacts 
at the community level. It contributes to this budding body of knowledge on environmental 
services in particular, taking as a point of departure predominant assumptions about nature, 
green or sustainable development, political economy, and the discourses behind forest 
conservation programs and their relationship to actual practices.   
A second phase of political ecology evolved from the concerns of deterministic neo- 
Marxism in an effort to demonstrate how power relations of all people mediate human-




and Brookfield (1987) on land degradation, Hecht and Cockburn (1989) on tropical 
deforestation in Brazil, and Guha (1989), Peluso (1993) and Neuman (1992, 1999) on 
dominant conservation discourses on forest policy, and Watts and Peet (1993, 2004) on a mix 
of articles of political ecology (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 13).  
As the growing literature on the political ecology shows, approaches come from different 
perspectives, from specific environmental problems (like soil erosion, tropical deforestation, 
water pollution, etc.) to concepts perceived to have important links to political ecological 
questions, like the ways in which ideas or discourses are developed or understood by 
different actors to reinforce or challenge existing social and economic arrangements (Escobar 
1998). From the broad range of applications of political ecology, Offen (1994) identifies five 
key elements that characterize the subfield in geography: “1) livelihood production and 
reproduction as the focus of study; 2) the relationship among social, economic and 
environmental change; 3) international, colonialist and corporate interventions at the 
community level; 4) causes and consequences of environmental and social marginalization 
and its remediation and 5) empirical and historical research.” (Offen 2004). This dissertation 
also considers these elements when analyzing the PES program within the regional context of 
the Huasteca Potosina region and its impacts at the community level. There is a political 
ecology of environmental conservation where the focus has been on the impacts, logics, and 
operation of environmental protection itself (Peet et. al. 2011) as this study focus on. More 
recently, the study of the governmentalities on carbon offsetting (Bumpus and Liverman 
2011) and on the commodification of environmental services, as well as their local impacts, 
continue to increase the understanding of the complex relations developing between humans 
and environment on a globalized arena.  
The present dissertation relates to them in the sense that conservation discourses are 
taken as the starting point on the analysis of deforestation. Specifically for the analysis on the 
implications of the dominant discourse for scientific forest policy are the earliest works of 
Peluso (1992, 1993, 2001), Jewitt (1995), and Bryant (1996). Neoliberal ideas about nature, 






v. Neoliberal Reforms and Environmental Conservation Policies in Latin 
America 
 
The term “Neoliberalism” is contentious and has had different connotations over time. 
The term emerged among European liberal scholars in the 1930’s as a theoretical ideology and it 
was not until the 1970s with Pinochet’s economic reforms in Chile that it was reintroduced and 
began to be used widely in a practical sense (Chase 2002). In general, it is understood as a 
strategy for economic growth that involves “freedom” in the sense of liberalization (no 
restrictions) of markets, privatization of public goods and services (the reduction of the public 
sector), and the deregulation of capital for the promotion of market-oriented management 
practices (Perreault and Martin 2005, Goldman 2005). For Latin America, the seeds of 
neoliberalism were planted as a response to their countries’ foreign debt crises that begun in the 
early 1970’s. This chapter is intended to explain how neoliberal policies in Latin America have 
impacted environmental policies and the environment itself up to the present.  
The most influential institutions in the rapid expansion of the international economy after 
WWII, particularly in Latin America, have been the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  These banking systems set the pace of development through financial loans and 
support for repayments. Developed countries used the World Bank to invest in the development 
of what were hoped to be emerging economies in the Global South, but growth has often come at 
the cost of the environment and indigenous peoples, or those trying to subsist outside the market.  
Since its creation in 1944, the World Bank has evolved from a reluctant banker8 focused on 
reconstruction into a productive hub of interactions among such entities as economic 
departments at universities, Wall Street investments firms, agro-industrial corporations, rural 
research institutes, to other powerful elites like environmental organizations (Goldman 2005, 
12). The rise of the World Bank’s power occurred during 1968-80, when its rhetoric of poverty 
alleviation matured into the development for the global South, transforming the bank into a 
major transnational institution that facilitated the massive flow of investments to developing 
countries as well as the production of development knowledge by combining the principles of 
                                                            
8 Specially during the Bank’s first twenty years, only the most direct investments in productive capital like roads, 
ports and power plants were promoted and only to the more affluent countries (Japan, Italy, France and The 
Netherlands) as other social fields like the construction of schools, hospitals, water works, etc; needed in the 




economic growth, social welfare, and global security (ibid. 50-51). Investments in the South 
have had different foci over time, from the early creation of steel mills, oil refineries, and 
assembly factories to the inputs of improved seeds, chemicals, fertilizers, technical assistance, 
and educational and environmental conservation programs, all to increase productivity (Kiss, 
Castro, and Newcombe 2002, Castells and Laserna 1989, Goldman 2005). Some of its most 
significant infusions occurred in agriculture with the green revolution (1940’s-1960’s), when 
millions of hectares of forest were cleared for agriculture and cattle ranching (Roberts and 
Demetria-Thanos 2003b). Globalization and structural adjustment programs that emerged with 
these interventions have been perceived as some of the most disruptive external forces on natural 
resource management in Latin America; however, the same institutions have been concerned 
about sustainability. This research focuses on one environmental program promoted by the 
World Bank in Latin America and in the Huasteca in particular. 
As seen above, land tenure has been vital for the management of natural resources and 
has been a constant subject of study and debate by multiple disciplines. Land tenure and reforms 
impact not only the environment but environmental conservation policies and practices and their 
success. 
For Latin America, forest ownership has been impacted by three important shifts in land 
tenure: privatization of corporate lands that occurred in many countries after the colonial period; 
the structural adjustment era in which many social programs were cut; and the most recent 
neoliberal era in which land redistribution was restricted and privatization was enforced. The 
first liberal land reforms in Latin America occurred in the 20th century, where land redistribution 
was encouraged in some countries by the high concentration of land under a few owners after the 
colonial period while at the ame time there was an increasing number of landless population, a 
growing prospects of equity, and the urgency to increase production for international markets 
(Dorner 1992). Since 1945 Latin America incorporated its agricultural sector into a global agro-
industrial food regime with the help of agrarian reforms that dismantled the colonial land tenure 
of haciendas and large estates (Kay 1995); unfortunately few peasants got the opportunity to 
engage in agro-industry. The more equitable distribution of lands to peasants also intended to 
ease the growing social unrest while gaining political support for the intended industrialization of 
the countryside (Kay 2002, 1995). In an effort to prevent “another Cuba” and promote a new 




Inter-American Economic and Social Council of 1961 land reform legislation was enacted in 
nineteen Latin American and Caribbean countries (Stringer 1989a). The agrarian reforms of the 
20th century had important geographic differences in regards to institution-building, integration 
with international programs, and environmental impacts. Mexico (1917), Bolivia (1952), Cuba 
(1959), and Nicaragua (1979) for example, attempted extreme agrarian reforms that evolved 
from social revolutions, while other countries like Chile (1964-1979) implemented agrarian 
reforms by elected governments or military regimes like Peru (1965-75), and in other cases like 
Argentina that did not experiment with land reforms at all (Kay 2002). Regardless of the 
impetus, the reforms hardly accomplished the end of structural inequalities. A main strategy of 
most reforms was the implementation of collective and state structures to allow the government’s 
direct control over production but collective and state farms ended up being cultivated 
individually anyway. Land reforms were accompanied by Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) in which governments both subsidized and protected national agro-industry from the 1940s 
until the late 1980s (Kay 1995). Ironically, ISI was meant to diminish dependency on 
international markets, but industrialization, including for the Green Revolution, required massive 
financial and technological inputs from investors in northern countries.  
Land reforms had different environmental impacts depending on the type of land 
distribution and involvement on development programs. According to Thiesenhusen’s (1989) 
analysis, Bolivia had the highest percentage (83) of forest and agricultural lands affected by its 
land reform in 1977, while in Costa Rica only seven percent of its lands were affected in 1980. 
Despite the massive land use transformation that came along with the ISI and the colonization 
programs, poverty and economic inequalities remained because the process was too exclusionary 
and mostly landlords took advantage of the capitalization. Many peasants that received land were 
ignored and neglected from subsidies, while the bulk of government and market services 
continued benefiting preexisting commercial farmers (Dorner 1992). Perhaps what is most 
striking about this agro-industrial period in Latin America is the development of an increased 
dependency on international loans and the gap between the rich and the poor that it created. In 
regards to the environment, often land reforms were not redistributions of agricultural lands at all 
but simply opening up new forests, often occupied or used by indigenous people, for the poor to 




The accumulated debt during these period followed by explosive interests rates and costs 
in petroleum impoverished Latin America to the point that by the early 1980s, the entire region, 
starting with Mexico, declared themselves in bankruptcy (Dorner 1992). This period of economic 
recession marked the end of radical agrarian reforms and the beginning of a stronger 
international interventionism. The IMF, meant to help countries with their balance of payments, 
suddenly imposed structural adjustment programs (SAP) in exchange for loan readjustments for 
developing countries. Part of the SAPs were, demands for land tenure structures to be changed 
for the development of macro-infrastructure projects.  
The SAP projects of the 1980s included the construction of airports, highways, dams, 
mines, subsidys and fewer regulations for industries, lumber operations, and agricultural 
projects, all of which severely damaged ecosystems and caused social displacements throughout 
Latin America (Agrawal and Redford 2009). These megaprojects have been environmentally 
categorized by Taylor (1998) as either demographic push or pull: massive roads and highways 
pull settlers and businesses into new areas for resource exploitation, while other projects displace 
or push peasants off the land, as in the case of dams. In Brazil, for example, 400,000 people were 
displaced when millions of hectares of forest were flooded in the creation of several dams 
(Taylor Berardo 1998, Pfaff et al. 2007). The SAP programs were an economic boon to some, 
but for the poor and indigenous they exacerbated land problems, economic inequalities, and 
environmental degradation. 
Colonization programs and mega-projects triggered early approaches to conservation of 
natural resources during the 1970s and 1980s, but such efforts privileged conservation of areas 
over the survival and interests of the peasants and indigenous people living on the land. In 
projects like natural protected areas, biosphere reserves and corridors, local people – “zeros” in 
the global economy – had little say. In fact, 70 percent of the natural protected areas and parks in 
Latin America were created during the late 1970s and 1980s and criminalized human occupation 
and traditional subsistence systems (Neumann 1999). Finally, popular protest against soil 
erosion, unsustainable farming, biodiversity depletion, over-exportation of raw materials, and 
massive social displacements in the early 1990s forced the World Bank to address the social and 
environmental problems brought with their development projects and come up with a greener 
economic agenda (Goldman 2005, 7-13). Partly due to the SAPs, development aid for the poor 




to subcontract with and consult for the World Bank (Goldman 2005, 37). The World Bank’s 
reconfiguration and expansion in the 1990s, including the integration of environmental impact 
assessments into development projects, marked a turning point in the way conservation and 
development were seen and applied worldwide. 
World Bank projects now included a wide range of considerations, including new legal 
regimes, regulation and management of natural resources, social impact assessments, and the 
strengthening of relationships with conservation institutions. In 2000 the World-Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) established the Center for Conservation Finance, which merged the world of 
conservation with that of international finance to create a new generation of income-generating 
conservation models that could be replicated all over the world. After heated disputes between 
northern investors and the southern countries, a global conservation agenda9 compatible with 
biodiversity conservation, sustainable use of natural resources, and equitable sharing of benefits 
was finally agreed upon in the 1992 Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) (Raustiala 1997). 
The treaty committed developing nations to establish protected areas, regulate natural resources, 
and rehabilitate degraded areas with the financial support of developed countries and the 
administration of the World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (CBD 1993). United 
Nations agencies (UNEP,UNESCO, and especially the Man and the Biosphere Program-MAB), 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), big international non-
governmental organizations (BINGOs) like Conservation Inter-national, The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC), the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and the World Resources 
Institute (WRI), combined to lead these neoliberal conservation efforts (Roberts and Demetria-
Thanos 2003b). Latin America received the most funding for biodiversity conservation projects, 
and in fact, Central America’s and Mexico’s percentage of areas under protection rose above of 
the worlds’ average by 1997, soon followed by South America (Zimmerer, Galt, and Buck 
2004). By 1999, Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru, and Chile were receiving major 
donations for projects that included 23 transnational natural protected areas for the maintenance 
                                                            
9 Raustiala (1997) details the development of the international regulations of the Convention of Biological Diversity 
and its applications on the United Kingdom and United Sates of America, two states deeply involved in the process 
but with remarkably different internal institutional responses like the US rejection of the treaty, especially to the 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) commitments and the increase on responsibilities beyond their extended federal 




of habitat connectivity (Zimmerer, Galt, and Buck 2004). A key part of the conservation efforts 
was attention to property rights and resource management at the local level. 
 The increasing number of international institutions and BINGOS involved in 
environmental conservation have created larger networks of actors, development of ideas, 
knowledge and funding, but also has increased the number of decision-makers and thus 
complexity over local land management. This increased involvement of international institutions 
in the local ecologies of developing countries has prompted some to decry a new era of 
colonialism (Kenneth Iain 2005). Increasingly, local level actors must adhere to global agencies’ 
priorities, culture of administration, accounting, types of ecological and social assessments, and 
timelines or be cut out of the networks.  
The creation of buffer management zones, community based conservation (CBC), 
managed forests, and extractive reserves are some examples created to integrate conservation 
and socioeconomic development. However, social issues related to land rights, especially on 
communally owned lands and indigenous territories, have remained a core problem among 
conservation projects in many Latin American countries (Roberts and Demetria-Thanos 2003b). 
The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor (MBC) is perhaps one of the earliest documented 
projects exemplifying the dual purpose of neoliberal conservation and preserving land rights. 
The MBC was envisioned in the early 1990s in Mexico President Zedillo’s Plan Puebla Panama 
(PPP) and Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) meant to integrate eight countries 
from southern Mexico to southern Panama in a massive investment scheme.  Besides support for 
superhighways, high speed railroads, maquiladora complexes, and agro industry, the Plan also 
called for a natural corridor linking 600 natural protected areas for the purpose of green 
production of certified products, environmental services for the protection of watersheds and 
forested areas, and “fair” market channels for the local people (Finley-Brook 2007). Advocates 
claim that unlike the macroeconomic projects of the 1970s and 1980s, this strategy protects the 
environment and social elements like culture and identity (Taylor Berardo 1998). Protesters, on 
the other hand, argue that this market-friendly conservationist model has increased resource 
extraction, land use conversion, peasant bankruptcy, displacement of indigenous people, and the 
loss of traditional practices (Chase 2002, Roberts and Demetria-Thanos 2003b, Mansfield 2004, 
Heynen 2005, Perreault and Martin 2005, Heynen et. al. 2007, Igoe and Brockington 2007, 




As the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) redefined eco-
development and became more inclusive, security of land rights remained a primary focus under 
the assumption that they would bolster conservation practices and reduce poverty via free market 
integration. Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons theory was revived in Latin American countries, 
with the conflation of communal property and unregulated exploitation of natural resources.  
Thus, the World Bank pushed land privatization in nearly all its projects, which has meant 
greater concentration of power and wealth in capital-intensive operations and further 
marginalization of peasants and the reinvigoration of land claims based on ethnicity  (Kay 2002, 
26), despite the Bank’s official policies claiming to protect them. The neoliberal shift away from 
land redistribution and communal enterprises towards the privatization and de-collectivization of 
lands required a new investment infusion for land registration, titling programs, and the 
collection of taxes. The idea of securing property rights for the poor was first suggested by the 
Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto as a way to reinvigorate the urban financial system and 
overcome the 1980s crisis of Peru (Fernandes 2002). Although he has published few articles in 
academic journals, his work has been popular among policymakers on development economics, 
especially in the World Bank and the International Monetary Funding (IMF).  The titling and 
registration of the informal property system started in the early 1990s in Latin America 
purportedly as a strategy for conserving forests and other natural resources, but also to create 
incentives for external investment (Igoe 2007). Secured land tenure was also thought to support 
sustainable agriculture on the assumption that small farmers would invest in long-term land-use 
strategies and qualify for commercial or public credit programs (Taylor Berardo 1998). Loans, 
however, can also provide the capital for unsustainable practices, such as the inputs of transgenic 
seeds, pesticides and fertilizers.   
Although the term neoliberalism is commonly associated with state disempowerment by 
deregulation, decentralization and privatization (Heynen 2005), the states’ power over the 
management of natural resources has grown with spiraling regulations that have kept 
governments as the main administrators of such resources. Currently, 74 percent of the forest 
worldwide is administered by governments, two percent is owned by states or provinces, and 
nine percent is owned by local communities, while 14 percent is privately owned (Sunderlin, 
Hatcher, and Liddle 2008). In some developing countries like Nicaragua, Brazil, Bolivia, 




al. 2010), but their governments maintain strong top-down administrative power over the natural 
resources through conservation programs (Chase 2002, Roberts and Demetria-Thanos 2003b, 
Castree 2008). In Nicaragua, the shrinking of public finances due to SAP’s has caused officials 
to turn to bio-prospecting or tourism with the help of private enterprises or NGOs to fund 
conservation programs (Finley-Brook 2007). With some exceptions, the neoliberal conservation 
agenda in Latin America has had a re-regulation focus, where states in conjunction with 
multilateral agencies have rather active roles in the decision making over natural resources.  
As for local participation in the protection of their environment and resources, many 
multinational conservation projects have been criticized for only consulting with local residents 
rather than fully including them in planning and implementation. Many conservation projects 
have been criticized as being determined by the founders (development banks, aid agencies, 
foreign consultants, corporations and central governments) where all the “valuable knowledge” 
is produced while local’s inputs are barely taken into account. Finley-Brook’s (2007) analysis of 
the the MBC in Nicaragua exemplifies the top-down administrative structure and the exclusion 
of local participation. The degree and ways in which communities should participate is still 
contested, and although everybody agrees that sustainable conservation and development 
projects require local communities’ participation, centralized multinational or national planning 
continues to overshadow community buy-in (Roberts and Demetria-Thanos 2003a, Jackiewicz 
2006). On the other hand, some blame neoliberal conservation projects for putting too much 
responsibility on communities while not providing the appropriate rights and tools for success 
(Escobar 1995). A long line of participatory approaches have been tried going back to the 1970s 
(Herlihy and Knapp 2003). Examples of initiatives where local participation has been 
successfully included in resources management and development programs have merged under 
methodologies like Participatory Research Mapping (PRM), which attempts to gauge how 
indigenous people use their natural environment and make informed decisions related to 
conservation, land rights, and development. The PRM methodology has been applied in the 
establishment of biosphere reserves project in Central America like the Tawaka Biosphere 
Reserve in the Mosquitia (Herlihy and Leake 1990), the Río Plátano Biosphere reserve (Herlihy 
1999, 2001), the Bosawas International Biosphere Reserve in Nicaragua (Stocks 2003), and other 
projects in Darién and Panama (Herlihy 2003). Such projects have been successful because 




other outside knowledge related to their region, which is critical to long-term agreements for 
natural resources use and management.        
 
The Development of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) in Latin America 
In this new trend of local participation and legal property rights, came the idea of 
payments for the provision of a range of environmental services (PES) in the late 1990s as an 
innovative way to encourage local conservation. In 2003 a World Bank report addressed the 
question of sustainable development in the context of pressures on local and global common 
property resources (water, air, soil and fisheries, etc) as well as the ability of the planet to absorb 
waste and regulate the climate.  Although relatively new in Latin America,10 PES quickly 
reached $1.5 billion annually for conserving 12 to 15 million hectares in less than a decade 
(Ferraro 2001). By 2002 more than 300 projects used financial incentives for the protection of 
resources in developing countries (Landell-Mills and Ina T. 2002b). While the logic behind the 
rapidly evolving PES approach is simple -- turning environmental services into a commodity to 
achieve more “rational” land use -- its implementation is anything but simple (Wunder 2005). 
Part of the problems lies in the premise that it is the losers in the marketplace, i.e., the poor, who 
are the most environmentally destructive and thus need monetary incentives or compensation to 
care for the forests ( Pagiola et al. 2002a; 2005, Velázquez et. al. 2002, Muñoz-Piña 2003).  
While the PES logic reduces deforestation to local decisions, there are many other forces 
at play. Structural adjustment program (SAP)-driven government’s subsidies that encourage 
forest conversion into agriculture and livestock production are one.  Thus, a partial view of the 
situation can lead to policies that fail to anticipate side effects like the introduction of new 
income, consumption, expansion of labor, and land markets, all of which can have a deleterious 
impact on the environment.    
Another problem of PES programs has been their preference for privatization and well 
defined property rights to develop eco-markets. Although not absolutely required, strongly 
protected property rights have always been considered a key ingredient for the success of the 
                                                            
10 A similar strategy started to be implemented in United States by The Nature of Conservancy in 1951 
(The_Nature_Conservancy 2010). More recently, payment initiatives have been implemented in Europe in the 
form of financial incentives to keep farmers from overproducing certain crops or letting their lands revert to 
wilderness. From 1993 to 1997, 14 European nations spent an estimated $11 billion to revert more than 20 million 




PES programs ( Landell-Mills and Ford 1999, Landell-Mills 2002, Grieg-Gran, Porras, and 
Wunder 2005, Merino and Martínez 2009, Lyster 2011, Ezzine-de-Blas et al. 2011, Larson et al. 
2013, Resosudarmo et al. 2013), which has generally not been the case in Latin America, where 
property rights are often not well defined and resources like forests are often held in common or 
have overlapping claims, access, and management. There, negotiations over commonly held 
lands must be made with groups, not individuals, increasing the administrative cost of PES 
implementation. The legalization of property rights and privatization of the commons has been 
suggested as a shortcut (Lipper, McCarthy, and David 2009), but even if privatization may give 
landholders the freedom and security to invest in natural resources, PES motivates individual 
owners to restrict certain land uses that threaten the environment. In this respect, Wunder (2005) 
argued that the main concern for PES implementation should not be on private property rights 
but the de facto use of the natural resources, although he concludes that the more open the access 
to land and resources the less likely that PES will meet their intended outcomes.   
Thus, the resolution of land tenure issues on protected and prospected areas has been a 
main objective in projects like the MBC (Finley-Brook 2007), PES projects, and eco-markets 
since the early 1990s. Property rights and payments for environmental services pioneered by 
Costa Rica have spread throughout Latin America as the main toolkit for forest conservation and 
it has been adopted by the UN program for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD), the most recent multinational conservation endeavor that will be analyzed 
later. 
The Evolution of Payments for Environmental Services of the Forest 
There is a wide variety of overlapping benefits attributed to forest preservation, but four 
have been directly linked to the evolution of eco-markets: (1) greenhouse gas mitigation or 
carbon sequestration, (2) biodiversity conservation; (3) hydrological services; and (4) scenic 
value. The benefits, therefore, may be strictly local, as in the case of preserving the quality and 
quantity of local water sources, or global and local in the case of carbon sequestration.  Other 
secondary benefits might include prevention of soil erosion (Pagiola, Landell-Mills, and Bishop 
2002a). ES can also be combined with other conservation strategies, as in the Mesoamerican 
Biological Corridor, which includes the promotion of biodiversity in shaded coffee plantations in 





In general, payments compensate landowners during a set period of years for the 
protection of the existing forest (primary or secondary) or agroforestry systems and the 
prevention of land-use changes during these years. When PES requires reforestation, contracts 
demand owners to plant trees on agricultural or other abandoned land and maintain them for 10 
or 15 years via doing soil restoration activities (Bray et al. 2003, Mansourian et al. 2005). The 
payment periods are the same for sustainable forestry contracts, where landowners are 
compensated for enlisting a sustainable, low-intensity logging plan while keeping forest services 
intact (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Pagiola et al. 2005). Compensation 
varies among countries and categories: for sustainable silvopastoral practices in 2003, the 
average payments per farm in Colombia were $357 USD, $557 USD in Costa Rica, $446 USD in 
Nicaragua (Pagiola et al. 2005), and $472 USD for agroforestry in Guatemala (INAB, 2010), but 
generally in Latin American countries landowners are paid around $30 to $50 USD per hectare 
(Ferraro and Simpson 2002). The length of programs vary from five to 10 years according by 
category.To ensure that recipients maintain their contracts, payments are made in installments, 
commonly 50 percent the first years for the implementation of a management plan and 50 
percent in the following years for maintenance. 
Among the early problems encountered in PES programs is “slippage,” where recipients 
clear lands not in the program to replace the resources lost under PES (Wu 2000).  
Moreover, many Latin American countries face poor institutional and physical 
infrastructure to support PES programs, which is reflected at the implementation and monitoring 
stages. Starting with the design, when PES projects are disconnected from local realities with 
regulations that tend to restrict the use of natural resources from which poor people rely for their 
subsistence, they are destined to be unsustainable (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009, Lipper, McCarthy, 
and David 2009). Another common problem of poor design is when programs end up only 
rewarding areas where resources are at risk of being lost, devaluing and threatening the areas 
where sustainable conservation practices are being implemented (Lipper, McCarthy, and David 
2009).  This, in turn, increases social tensions. In this way more harm than good may be done 
especially in really poor areas where lower environmental impact practices might already been 
applied. 
 Another problem is the preponderance of informal land rights, which often prohibit 




have been addressing this in a variety of ways, and Guatemala is a good example of the 
complications involved. There, where most the communities occupy municipal lands, mayors can 
provide a land certificate that legitimates their use of a specific area, with which they can enter a 
variety of PES programs. According to the manager of an incentives program for forestry or 
agroforestry activities (PINPEP) on small holdings that began in 2010, the granting of certificates 
for land use are confusing for some participants who might think they amount to titles, so in order 
to avoid misunderstandings and conflicts they prefer to work with a third party institution (NGO’s 
or municipal delegations) without the communities’ acknowledgement11. Such arrangements seem 
odd since the main point is to legitimize participants’ provision of environmental services, but in 
countries like Guatemala where land titling for peasants is only beginning, they are the only way 
forward. 
 
Costa Rica, the First Implementation of PES in Latin America 
PES programs in Costa Rica were among the earliest and have been the most closely 
examined by other Latin American countries.  PES in Costa Rica emerged as a nationwide 
program based on previous forest subsidy schemes that were among the most highly-agreed 
successful conservation projects in Latin America. These conservation efforts, which included 
the creation of forestry laws and reforestation projects, were a reaction to the loss of 
approximately forty percent of the country’s forest-cover to agriculture and pasture between the 
1970s and 1990s (Pagiola 2002b). Forest subsidies allowed credit-constrained farmers to invest 
in reforestation and familiarized the population with the economic rewards of conservation. The 
four categories of PES previously mentioned have all been implemented in Costa Rica in two 
phases: the first from 1997 to 2000 compensated forest owners for the value of natural or 
recovered forest; and in the second from 2001 to 2011, eco-markets and micro- or local targeting 
schemes were developed, in which businesses pay landowners directly for environmental 
services (Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007).  
Costa Rica’s National Financing Foundation (FONAFIFO) was the first to establish a 
system of payments for water benefits based on a study of the impact of forest on hydro-energy 
                                                            
11 Personal communication with the engineer Mauricio Aguirre, in charge of the Program of forest insentives for 




power production on local watersheds (Pagiola 2002b).12 As discussed above, the PES premise 
popularized by the World Bank and UN that nature must be commoditized to be appreciated and 
conserved has generated heated ideological and technical debate. On the technical side, payments 
for hydrological and carbon sequestration services have been fraught with disagreements as to how 
to quantify the rewards of conservation.  How much forest cover, and what kinds, generates how 
much water and carbon secuestration? It is indisputable that forests help preserve hydrological 
systems, but the scientific understanding of the relations between forests and hydrology flows is 
still unclear. The same is the case for detailed measures and adequate monitoring for carbon (CO2) 
preserved by the different types of forest cover, which complicates calculations of forests’ 
monetary value (Kaimowitz 2001). Thus, Costa Rica’s calculations of the economic value of 
forests for hydrology flows were a major advance.  Unfortunately, its hydrological PES ran into 
another snag.  The services were financed ear-marked fossil fuel sales tax revenues in 1997, but 
those revenues began to be applied politically to other expenditures and since 2000 most payments 
have come from the World Bank and the GEF.  
Pagiola’s (2002)13 case study of Costa Rica’s water services highlighted several challenges, 
including the limited targeting of priority areas due to land tenure issues. Costa Rican law forbids 
public contracts with landowners unless they have land titles, but many occupants of desired 
areas of forest conservation do not have titles (Pagiola 2002b). In response, eventually a private 
fund for such occupants was created, although they still remained marginalized by the program 
and eco-market contracts with hydroelectric power plants, breweries, rafting and venture 
companies, and water utility companies (Pagiola 2002b).  These contracts nonetheless are 
considered the earliest successful advances towards the development of eco-markets and 
monitoring in Latin America, and other versions have been subsequently tried in other Latin 
American countries. The Paraná state of Brazil is a great example where water sale taxes have 
been used to pay for the conservation of watersheds used for municipal drinking water (May et 
al. 2002). A less popular approach is the one developed in the Cauca Valley of Colombia, where 
                                                            
12 The Regional Center for Studies in Ecological Economics (CRESEE) conducted a study of the effects of 
deforestation on water flows and water quality in the Province of Heredia and concluded that forest increased 
both when compared to grass cover. For more details of the study see (Castro 2001) 
13 Stefano Pagiola is the World Bank’s economist who leads the bank’s work on PES since 1994 and has published a 
volume of case studies on market-basement mechanism for forests conservation and selling forest for 




agricultural water users pay a voluntary fee for the protection of upper watersheds (Echavarria 
1999).  
Besides hyodrological projects, Costa Rica (and later Colombia and Nicaragua) has 
applied PES to the creation of sustainable forestry-grazing systems. According to the World 
Bank, PES for forestry-grazing systems implemented with the help of local NGO’s and GEF 
funding have induced positive changes in land-use,improved biodiversity, and significantly 
sequestered carbon (Pagiola et al. 2005). These PES programs developed a biodiversity and 
carbon sequestration index that identifies the degree of services provided by different land uses, 
grading 0 points for annual crops to 1 point for primary forest (bis). The implementation of such 
indices is now considered a best practice, but, depending on the available data and resources, 
they are usually too expensive in many developing countries.  Carbon sequestration programs are 
still in the developing stages but are one of the main objectives of the UN-REDD, which 
includes 13 Latin America partner countries in the calculation of the financial value of storing 
carbon in forests (UN-REDD 2009). 
Costa Rica’s experiences with PES have certainly set a starting point for a variety of 
other Latin American programs, but the extent of their success is disputed.  Sánchez-Azofeifa 
(2007) concluded that the Costa Rican deforestation rates in areas with PES were not 
significantly lower than other areas with no PES, adding that it is hard to attribute the overall 
decrease of deforestation to the PES program because the rate was already falling before 
implementation. Instead, he credits the forest conservation policies and the elaborated system of 
payments for reforestation prior to the PES.  Wunder (2005) concurs, explaining that the 
deforestation problem was already “improving” in the early 1990’s before the onset of the PES 
program. On another level, it continues to be difficult ascertaining and thereby negotiating the 
values of forests for eco-markets, especially for hydrological and carbon sequestration services.  
This is critical because the long-term sustainability of PES forest conservation projects depends 
on contracts with public and private enterprises (i.e., the eco-markets). Since 2009 REDD has 
urged its participant countries to develop a standardized measuring, reporting and verification 





The Implementation of PES in Mexico 
For Mexico a federal PES program was modeled largely after the Costa Rica one. The 
original goals of preventing deforestation under PES were to reduce soil erosion, maintain 
biodiversity, improve air quality, and restore overexploited aquifers, but eventually other social 
elements like the reduction of poverty were included. The first pilot experience in PES involved 
a hydrological services project in the Pixquiac watershed of Coatepec, Veracruz in 2002, with 
the development of a trust fund for its protection. The project was spurred by a drought in 1998 
that reduced the supply of drinking water in the entire municipality (SENDAS 2010) and has 
since then been maintained under the guidance of the National Institute of Ecology (INE).  
The implementation of the PES program began at the national level in 2003 with a focus 
on hydrological services because of the country’s growing concerns about overexploited 
watersheds, especially those linked to cloud forests and their provision of water quantity and 
quality (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008).  Originally, eligibility to enter the program included areas of at 
least 50 ha. and 80% forest cover in over-exploited aquifers near populations of 5,000 people or 
more (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008), with payments of $400 pesos/ha for cloud forest and $300/ha for 
other type of forest and a maximum payout of 4,000 ha per landowner (Alix-Garcia, De Janvry, 
and Sadoulet 2008). Favoring cloud forest turned out to have little impact on the protection of 
watersheds since only 3% of forests in Mexico are cloud forests (INEGI 2005) and the most 
threatened ecosystems in Mexico are tropical forests.14 In addition, while scientific studies on the 
benefits of forest protection-water supply are lacking, thus creating fodder for competing 
discourses (Mathews 2009), studies do show little overlap between the distribution of forests and 
overexploited aquifers (Muñoz-Piña et al. 2008). Since then, the criteria and operational rules of 
the program have been constantly modified.  In 2004 a new set of categories that included carbon 
sequestration, protection of biodiversity and the recovery of agroforestry systems were added. 
Between 2005 and 2010 the criteria for eligible areas became more inclusive, accepting areas 
with 50% of forest cover and adding other environmental priority areas like the National Forest 
Commission (CONAFOR) 60 priority mountains, a risk of deforestation index, regions with 
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runoff water shortage, and the aforementioned regions with very high and high poverty 
(CONAFOR 2009).   
Since fifty percent of the country is still forested and is among the most biologically 
diverse in the world, the type of services particularly important for its international markets are 
carbon sequestration and biodiversity (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009). As the majority of the forest (75-
80%) is hold in common by rural communities and ejidos (Bray et al. 2003) and 86% of the 
localities inside these communities (with more than 100 ha of forest) have high or very high rates 
of marginalization (INE-SEMARNAT 2002), the PES program target of areas with very high 
marginality on overexploited watersheds covered vast swathes of the country. When CONAFOR 
took over the project as a subsidized federal program in 2003, it prioritized these elements. 
The pioneering program did not have well defined policies and was launched the same 
year as most agricultural products were liberalized under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), a situation that gained it the opposition of various anti-neoliberal rural 
groups (McAfee and Shapiro 2010, Alix-Garcia et al. 2009). Unlike the National Forestry 
Financing Fund  of Costa Rica (FONAFIFO)’s long and gradual experience of forest programs, 
Mexico’s CONAFOR was a recent creation and had to hire most of the staff for the PES program 
the same year it began to be implemented (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009). Previous reforestation 
programs were managed by the National Department of Environment and Natural Resources 
(SEMARNAT), but the newly created CONAFOR was designated to implement the program. 
After several criteria adjustments in 2006, CONAFOR integrated the PES into a broader program 
called Proarbol with the technical assistance and financial support of congress, the World Bank, 
and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (Ibid.). During the period of 2003 -2009 
CONAFOR assigned US$325 millions for environmental services, covering 2,244,000 hectares 
that included 3,933 projects and benefitted more than 4,600 forest owners, including ejidos, 
communities, and small private owners (Conafor, 2009). Payments last for five years in 
exchange for “custodianship” of forests, after which the owners can reapply for another five 
years or participate in one of the eco-market programs, in which they are first trained in selling 
their environmental services to private companies or other entities dependent on forest 
preservation (Medina 2007).  Until now, the federal government is the main client and therefore 
the one who chooses which forests are eligible to be paid, which types of actions should be 




A national evaluation of the the design, implementation, and the long-term sustainability 
of the program made by the Postgraduate College (COLPOS)15 of over 300 randomly selected 
PES participants in 2003 showed that 75 percent of the lands were in common property and 
much of the areas under contract were in low risk of deforestation.In other words, much of the 
money was expended on the protection of forests that were never at risk (González-Guillén 
2008). Many contracts went to communities practicing commercial forestry, which obviously did 
not need PES incentives, but since they were previous participants in CONAFOR programs, it 
was easier for them to enroll (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009, González-Guillén 2008). Other 
discouraging pitfalls included misunderstanding of the program by participants, corruption by 
intermediaries and technicians, and failure to actually protect forests (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009). 
By 2007, the program restructured its hydrological priority areas to include vulnerability for 
overexploitation, water scarcity, and floods associated with the lost of forest (Muñoz-Piña et al. 
2008). Like the silvopastoral PES implemented in Central America, a differential value index for 
land use was created based on the type of forest: cloud forest payments per hectare receive 25 
percent more than other type (US$36.4 and other types US$27.3) because of cloud forests’ 
ability to hold water (bis). Also, biodiversity priority areas were created based on the analysis of 
areas with high biodiversity that had not been protected whatsoever, the called GAP analysis 
(Urquiza-Haas et al. 2009). These additions to the eligibility criteria demonstrate the impact that 
studies by universities and international institutions have had; however, the performance, fair 
distribution of money, and the monitoring outcomes of PES have a long way to go before eco-
markets can be implemented.  
As in Costa Rica, the second stage of the PES in Mexico seeks to devolve control to local 
governments so they can sell environmental services for profit. This requires a more detailed 
knowledge of forest benefits and costs of environmental services to know where eco-markets can 
truly be developed and where they require either a change in forest policy, mandated protection 
or continuous payments from federal or international funding (Alix-Garcia et al. 2009). On top of 
this data, potential buyers must be researched as well as traditional rules and institutions by 
which local people have managed lands in order to structure compatible and environmentally 
sustainable services projects.   
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Lessons Learned from PES for the Development of Eco-markets. 
Since the mid 1990s there has been a great variety of PES initiatives and outcomes among 
Latin American countries; different land tenure systems, government regulations, environmental 
conservation efforts prior to PES, different institutional capacities and economies among other 
factors that have driven their scale and scope. Regardless of their differences, most countries have 
relied deeply on international funders like the World Bank, GEF, The Nature Conservancy, and 
ultimately UN-REDD for the development of PES and related programs. These conservation 
funders have united their strengths with other multinational institutions like FAO, UNEP, UNDP 
and the USA International Development (USAID) for the development of eco-markets using the 
past experiences of PES for the development of a more standardized market of environmental 
services. From 1992-2000, forest services in Latin America received 43 percent of the total funding 
that the GEF used to support conservation (Landell-Mills and Ina T. 2002), and a decade later 98.5 
percent (US$171 million) have been allocated to the UN-REDD program (UN-REDD 2009), 
marking the transition from PES subsidies to eco-markets. As eco-markets and PES have become 
trendy amongst concerns of climate change, more and more land has come under neoliberal 
regulatory control (Pagiola et al. 2005, Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Arriagada 2008, Larson et 
al. 2013, Rothe and Munro-Faure 2013), especially for the new phase of eco-markets. The 
marketing of ecosystem or environmental services started to be institutionalized in 2007, during 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) when it was concluded that reducing 
deforestation would have larger and more rapid effects on reducing global carbon emissions than 
any regulation of emission policy. Soon thereafter, the United Nations Framework Convention of 
Climate Change launched the REDD initiative in its 13th conference in Bali (Springate-Baginski 
and Wollenberg 2010). By 2009, there were already 144 diverse REDD initiatives worldwide (bis). 
The intent is to have more globally standardized methods for measuring and monitoring forest 
carbon sequestration for the creation of a global market of CO2, but the program is still in the 
testing phase worldwide.  
National programs like those of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Mexico are actually both federal and 
international in their reliance on support from agencies like the World bank, the GEF, and more 
recently the UN-REDD in providing funding for payments of environmental services (Wunder 




began with private schemes but since 2010 joined the UN-REDD and now also receive millions 
of dollars in funding for their expansion (UN-REDD, 2009). The national PES programs have 
had more success to date than the private eco-market schemes because of their greater scope and 
aura of legitimacy. The disadvantage of national programs is that they tend to be more 
bureaucratic and loaded with political objectives to cater voters or other supporters, elements that 
increase the costs of implementation and veer away from local needs (Echavarria 2002). 
Communally or locally driven conservation initiatives are considered the opposite of 
state-driven ones, but since NGOs and other large institutions tend to play a key role guiding 
them, locals do little in the way of self-management. Nonetheless, studies have found that 
community-managed forests have lower and less variable deforestation rates than state-managed 
ones (Porter-Bolland et al. 2012). In terms of inclusiveness of community members, there seems 
to be little difference between community- and state-driven projects. An analysis of local 
perceptions of community-based conservation initiatives versus the state-based ones in 
southeastern Mexico (Quintana Roo, Campeche, Oaxaca and Veracruz) found that the major 
difference revolved around land ownership (Reyes-García et al. 2012). Landless members 
usually did not appear to recognize the conservation initiatives in their own communities despite 
over a decade of implementation, whereas individuals with land rights were much more aware 
and knowledgeable (ibid.). This highlights the fact that locally based conservation initiatives 
does not always imply equal inclusion and knowledge of all community members, much less 
equal management, but they do include more active participation by locals in the management of 
protected areas and thus more sustainability, especially when payments are involved.   
In general, community-based and regional scale PES projects target threatened areas that 
provide greater environmental services, while nationwide PES programs emphasize poverty 
reduction because of their political agendas. Likewise, the UN, World Bank, and the GEF also 
stress poverty reduction with their market-based approach. However, opponents allege that 
payments for environmental conservation are an inefficient means of alleviating poverty (Lipper, 
McCarthy, and David 2009). On the flip side, in the pragmatic view of economists, who are by 
far the more prolific writers in the environmental services literature, targeting areas on the basis 
of poverty reduction can rapidly alienate the potential buyers of environmental services, thus 
drying up funding and failing to alleviate poverty anyway (Pagiola 2002b, Pagiola, Landell-




approach to poverty alleviation should be applied in addition to identifying areas of poverty that 
can be ameliorated by PES. Another contradiction is that the poorest people are often the 
landless and thus unable to participate and benefit from this kind of in programs. A PES program 
with dual objectives needs to take into account the spatial distribution of poverty and quality of 
lands, concentrate on areas where the returns from agriculture or resource extraction are low but 
the environmental services are high (Lipper, McCarthy, and David 2009), but even then it will 
exclude the landless. Wunder’s (2005) analysis of PES in Latin America and Asia reported that 
people facing medium-sized environmental degradation are more likely to become PES 
recipients than the poorest who lived in relative harmony with nature because of a range of 
barriers that they had to overcome in order to switch land uses. Nevertheless, in the Costa Rica 
case, although the program’s primary intention was the protection of watersheds, it helped the 
poorest in the country because they were the ones most willing to participate (Pagiola 2002b). 
This highlights importance of relative profitability and fairness as the poor will gladly accept 
payments that may match or exceed their productive output for particular patch of land or forest 
that they didn’t intend to clear anyway, while purchasers of services in eco-markets find it 
unprofitable to pay for services in such situations until they realize that investing in the status 
quo is ultimately a wise decision and that environmental services is being provided.  
The market approach to conservation has been controversial especially as opposed to the 
respectful nature-human relationship emphasized (but not always practiced) by indigenous 
people. McAfee and Shapiro’s (2010) study of the PES in Mexico found that main criticism of 
PES by activists was the neoliberal failure to acknowledge the values of ecosystems other than 
money, including the quality of peasant life, biodiversity, and social benefits that are arguably 
priceless (McAfee and Shapiro 2010). Support from international and national elites is another 
reason for distrust by several anti-globalization and anti-neoliberal groups. The need for 
continual financing from transnational institutions and developed countries for the environmental 
conservation of the south could fall into what some analyst call the dependency trap (Perfecto, 
Vandermeer, and Wright 2009) or the development game of “aid” transfer from northern to 
southern countries. Even if part of the eco-markets’ plan is to reach local self-sufficiency, the 
fact that the main buyers of ES come from developed countries is seen as a threat for local 




development of stronger institutions and protective policies can prevent previous dependency 
mistakes. Besides, environmental problems are now global, so solutions must be as well.  
Since eco-markets are still in their initial stage, there are no robust technical and social 
evaluations of their impacts and considerable research is needed as to the demand and 
willingness to pay for the environmental services. Regardless, climate change has certainly 
driven the approach forward. So far, the two major approaches to measure and estimate the 
reduction of carbon emission from forest for REDD are stock-based and profit-based approaches. 
Mexico was one of the six countries that participated in the designing of REDD initiatives, 
together with Brazil, Nepal, Indonesia, Tanzania and Madagascar (Corbera and Estrada 2010). As 
previously mentioned, REDD intends different approaches to forest conservation, from payments 
and more secure land tenure for forest dwellers to alternative livelihood options that even include 
the possibility of resettling forest dwellers and intensifying agricultural production on non-forested 
lands. One problem that remains unresolved is the negative impacts that the formalization of land 
rights could bring for participants since they can marginalize the poor and disenfranchise 
customary authority structures that in many cases enable the poorest access to resources under 
local rules.  
While Mexico is just beginning to experiment with REDD under community forest 
partnerships in voluntary carbon markets and funds, it does has experience with earlier initiatives 
in Chiapas and Oaxaca in 1997 under the Scolel Te Plan Vivo Project. In this project forest 
holders in conjunction with a technician elaborated a project that is then registered in a carbon 
market database for potential world-wide buyers. So far, carbon offsets have been sold to 
international investors like The International Automobile Federal Foundation 
(http://www.planvivo.org/projects/registeredprojects/scolel-te-mexico/). The program was 
initially supported by the World Bank Bio-Carbon Fund, international research institutes like the 
Center of Carbon Management of Edinburg (ECCM), the Plan Vivo Foundation, researchers 
from El Colegio de la Frontera Sur (ECOSUR), and the coordination of AMBIO NGO (Corbera 
and Estrada 2010). The project sought to find the forest and agroforestry uses by indigenous 
communities and how carbon sequestration benefits can be administered to support them (De 
Jong, Tipper, and Montoya-Gómez 2000). 
REDD plans to build from these ongoing initiatives and government ministries, agencies 




existing PROÁRBOL program and think tanks like INE (The National Ecology Institute) now 
INECC, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics), and various NGO’s 
(Corbera, Soberanis, and Brown 2009). Current funders include: Fondo Forestal Mexicano, 
Mexican Carbon Fund (FOMECAR), Financiera Rural, World Bank, Ford and The Rockefeller 
Foundation.           
To conclude, history has shown environmental degradation and increasing poverty to be 
negative impacts of unsustainable development and industrialization as well as successes in 
different natural resource conservation efforts from which lessons should be learned. 
Neoliberalism offers a new market-oriented approach to conservation, which fundamentally 
involves formalizing property rights, putting a price on the environment, and creating markets 
for environmental services.  
Many Latin American countries have dutifully followed suit, but as Igoe (2007) warns, 
global programs are always digested at the local level: “neoliberalism has not automatically 
benefited local people and the environment, particular conditions are the ones that can open new 
spaces and opportunities to help or to make things worse.” Titling lands as a way to reinforce 
local people’s rights and capacity to negotiate with investors have potential threats as well as 
opportunities. Land rights do not automatically benefit local people or the environment. Much 
depends on the causes of deforestation and degradation, which may have been, and often were, 
promoted by the state in the firstplace for economic growth. This is not to say, however, that 
neoliberal conservation projects by definition harm and do not help local communities.   
Since land reforms and market-driven conservation approaches are already embedded in 
conservation policies, it is critical to identify the conditions – global, national, regional, and local 
– in which the outcomes benefit the local people and their environment. So far, positive 
outcomes like reversed deforestation in Costa Rica have been tied to its strong internal 
institutions and regulations that recognize the value of environmental services and adequately 
rewards land owners with a diversity of financial funds from international donors, national taxes, 
and private enterprises. The Costa Rica case, however, also shows these ingredients to be costly 
and possibly unsustainable in the long run if better targeting schemes are not developed. 
The development of PES and eco-markets has had a very high implementation cost and 
almost prohibitive for low income countries, requiring multidisciplinary, international 




implementation and evaluation of these projects. Despite the barriers, Latin American countries 
are barreling ahead with the market approach, no doubt in part because projects are substantially 
financed by international agencies. The ultimate success must be measured by whether markets 
can be sustained and local people and the environment, at both the local and global levels, 
benefit.  
One aspect that has received little research attention is its cultural impact on vulnerable 
groups like indigenous peoples. The evaluations of PES in Costa Rica, for example, did not 
address this issue and neither have they in Mexico, where 62 indigenous groups manage lands 
where most of these programs have been implemented. This oversight is especially egregious for 
Latin America, where ninety percent of its roughly 40 million indigenous people 
(http://www.iwgia.org/regions/latin-america/indigenous-peoples-in-latin-america) are 
subsistence farmers and depend directly on their environment for their survival (Gorman 2003) 
using diverse worldviews and traditional management strategies. While isolating these 
vulnerable groups from neoliberal trends is naïve, a better understanding of their lives before 
plowing ahead with Western economic policies is not. If all agree that conservation needs to start 
from the bottom up, traditional rules and institutions that local people have been using to control 
and manage lands should not be ignored but given special attention for the creation of 




III. The Huasteca region, environmental and cultural conditions  
What is commonly known as the Huasteca region, which spans from northern Veracruz 
to eastern San Luis Potosí, northern Hidalgo, southern Tamaulipas, and small portions of Puebla 
and Querétaro, is based on shared ecology, sociocultural traditions, and history going back for 
thousands of years16 (Meade 1942, Stresser-Péan 2008, Ochoa 1979, MacNeish 1947). By the 
late classic period (600-900 A.D.), the region shared core cultural features with the rest of 
Mesoamerica (Ochoa 1979).  
Map 2. The Huasteca region, area of influence 
 
                                                            
16 According to Meade (1942), the Huaxteca region experienced its greatest extension during the Moctezuma 
Ilhuicamina period (1440-1469), extending west to the goldmines of Guadalcazar and the valley of Tangamanga 




The Physical Environment 
The rugged landscape of the Huasteca began to form during the Mesozoic era from 
limestone deposits of calcareous and clay sedimentations, when the entire region was still 
covered by the Atlantic sea (Tamayo 2004). During the Cretaceous period the region surfaced as 
the Sierra Madre Oriental mountain range emerged.  During the Cenozoic its central low 
mountains zone took shape, followed by the formation of flood plain on the Gulf coast in the 
Quaternary (bis). The Sierra Madre Oriental ended its formation at the end of the Neogene period 
(Meade 1942). The central part of the Sierra consists of tectonic, folded, eroded, anticline and 
syncline layers of limestone, intrusive and extrusive igneous materials from subsequent volcanic 
activity, and sedimentation.  In the foothills of the Sierra and the adjacent valleys, there are 
reservoir structures with low permeability and folding without faults that explain the importance 
of the region as an oil reservoir (Tamayo 2004).           
The principal soils of the region are from three groups: rendzinas, which dominate the 
landscape developed from limestone’s residues; chernozems or black soils, found at alluvial 
flood plains and steppes; and podzolic soils, usually found in cloud and pine forest areas (INEGI, 
2005). 
The region, as seen in the map above, is fed by a great number of rivers that emerge from 
the Sierra on their way to the Gulf coast, including the Soto la Marina, Tamesi, Moctezuma, 
Panuco, Tuxpan and the Cazones. The region has very marked dry and wet seasons, such that 
creeks vary from trickles to raging torrents according to period, however, the mentioned major 
rivers always carry water. The great volume of water flowing though the network of rivers and 
waterfalls in the sierra has drawn the attention of hydroelectric plants and tourism. Other 
important water sources in the region are the several lagoons spread throughout the coastal 
plains, the largest ones in north near Tampico, where flooding is common.  
The region mostly falls below the Tropic of Cancer, which combined with its low 
elevation results in a hot climate, known as tierra caliente. According to Koeppen classification, 
the region as a whole falls into the Aw regime (tropical savanna), for its pronounced dry period 
during the winter. The more detailed climatic classification for Mexico made by Enriqueta 
García (1964) divides the region according to precipitation regimes, from tropical monsoon 
(Amgw) to sub-humid with summer rains (Aw0), to semi-humid climate (Bs) as one goes 




Climatologically, the region can be divided in two general zones: the dry huasteca near and 
above the tropic of cancer with an annual rainfall between 800 to 1000 mm; and the wet huasteca 
in the south, with 1100 to 1700 mm of annual rainfall.  
Map 3. Climatic conditions of the Huasteca region 
The variation of climatic conditions within the region is mainly responsible for the 
development of two floristic areas: the Golf Cost of México, which includes savanna grasslands, 
mangrove swamps, deciduous tropical forest, and thorn forest; and the Sierra Madre Oriental, 
with major remnants of different kinds of forest, including tropical forest in the south to 
temperate forests and cloud forest in the interior higher altitudes. The major remnants of forest in 
the region are located in the states of Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro and Hidalgo, which 
serve as biological corridors allowing the movement and survival of wildlife between the 




Map 4. Types of forest in the Huasteca region 
There are two tropical zoographic zones, an upper one that extends from the state of San 
Luis Potosíinto the humid curve of the Sierra Madre Oriental, and a lower tropical one that 
covers the drier eastern lowlands. Among the key charismatic species that traverse the region are 
major wildcats such as jaguar (Pantera Onca), puma (Puma concolor), margay (Leopardus 
wiedii), and ocelot (Leopardus pardalis) (Loa-Loza et al. 2009). Other charismatic species 
important to include are black bear (Ursus americanus eremicus), deer (Mazama americana), the 
collared peccary (Pecary tajacu), and the monarch butterfly (Dannaus plexipus) in the temperate 
and the cloud forest peaks (ibid.). The region is also famous for its tropical birds, such as the 
emblematic Red Crowned Amazon (Amazona viridigenalis), White Crowned Parrot (Pionus 
senilis), and parakeets, including the Green parakeet (Aratinga holochlora), and other migratory 





The rivers, wetlands and mangrove swamps are homes to amphibians and reptiles like the 
now legally protected Morelte’s crocodile (Crocodylus moreletti) and endemic fishes like 
Xiphophorus sp. and Astyanax sp.  The coastline of Tamaulipas and Veracruz covers a 20,100 
km² of sea shore intersected by large rivers and lagoons where a variety of shrimp – (white 
(Litopenaeus setiferus), pink (Farfantepenaeus dourarum), brown (Farfantepeneaeus aztecus) — 
and oysters abound (Ruvalcaba-Mercado 2005).  
 
The cultural geography of the region 
Ethno-history: The first settlers 
The earliest signs of agriculture in the region appeared in the floodplains of the Pánuco basin 
along the gulf coast of Veracruz and the slopes of the Sierra Madre Oriental around 7500 to 7600 
BCE, according to scholars’ estimations. Full development of sedentary agriculture in the 
Huasteca appeared later between 3400 and 2500 BCE (Meade 1942, Ochoa 1979, Hudson 2004, 
Saka 2013b, 3). The first settlers derived from a branch of the Maya language family that 
separated before the rise of Maya civilization around 2000 BCE (Stresser-Péan 2008). Meade 
(1942) categorizes these first settlers of the region as the Olmeca-Vixtoti who later became the 
Cuextecas, a people loosely integrated in the Mesoamerican interaction zone due to their early 
isolation. As communities grew and agriculture extended within the river valleys during the late 
formative period (between 1600 and 1100 BCE), a more distinctive Huasteca society called the 
Teenek began to expand from the north of Veracruz through the coastal lowlands of San Luis 
Potosíand southern Tamaulipas (Hudson 2004, 654). The Teeneks formed numerous autonomous 
provinces, each with its own governor (Ochoa 1979, 145). One of its most important centers was 
Tamtok, which emerged at the banks of the Tamuín River of the Huasteca Potosina around 1000 
BCE, until its demise between 900 and 1300 AD (Stresser-Péan 2008, 172-86).  By 500 to 200 
BCE, the Teenek or Huastec had ceremonial centers at Pánuco, Tamuín, Tancanhuitz and Ébano 
among other coastal and mountain sites, as evidenced by cues, or small mounds characteristic of 
Huastec sites (Saka 2013b), and by the Classic Period, the population had expanded north to the 
mountain range of Tamaulipas (Ochoa 1979). The most complex degree of Teenek social 
organization occurred between the 200 BCE and 800 ACE, when decentralized villages formed 
independent states with an ascribed chiefly elite that resembled other social organizaitons in the 




perhaps due to droughts or flooding, particularly between 500 and 700 CE (Hudson 2004, 
Santiago 2011, 37), yet, between 800 and 1200 AD, the Teenek expanded again northward to 
modern state of Tamaulipas near Soto La Marina River and to the south at the Tuxpan and 
Cazones River (bis), and from about 850 to 950 ACE they were involved in maritime trade 
networks that extended south across the Yucatan peninsula to the Honduras coast line of Central 
America and north to Tamaulipas (Andrews 1983).  The Soto la Marina region is actually 
considered the northern frontier of Mesoamerican civilization and has strong linkages to both the 
Huastec civilization and that of the Mississippi basin17 (Stresser-Péan 2008). Unfortunately all 
these northern Mesoamerica towns disappeared by the end of the XIV century due to constant 
wars with nomadic Chichimeca groups (bis). By the post classic period (900-1500 AD), the 
Huastec civilization extended their connections as far north as the southeast of United States and 
as far south as the Yucatan peninsula, as according to MacNeish (1947) the Gulf coast shared art, 
artifacts and settlement types18, all facilitated by maritime currents (Ochoa 1979).  
After the Teeneks’ arrival, several other groups eventually migrated into the region, 
including Nahua, Otomí, Tepehuas, Totonaca, Pame, and in the colonial period Afro-descendants 
and Mestizos19. A brief description of the ethno-history of the region is explained below. 
There are several theories for the origin of the region’s name, the most popular is the Nahua 
word Huaxtlan, meaning the land (tlan) of the bottle gourd (huaxi). The missionary and 
ethnographer Sahagún wrote in his “General history of the Things of New Spain” that the Nahua 
people named the region “Cuexteca” and the people “Cuextecos” after their first encounter with 
the chief Cuextecatl, and the name later evolved to the hispanized word Huasteca that may have 
a connection to the Teenek word cuexhté, a cotton head band still used by the Teenek women 
(Meade 1942). Another theory for the origin for the name comes from “cue”, which means 
“house of gods” and refers at the pre-hispanic mounds found in the region, such that Cuextlan 
would mean “the land of temples” (Noguera 1946). As for the first inhabitants of the core region, 
                                                            
17 The straight pipes found in the archeological site of Antonio Nogalar are very unusual in Mesoamerica and its 
relative antiquity suggest that the first pipes that were introduced in Mexico were straight because of the 
influences of the Mississippi valley (Stresser-Peán 2008). For the huastec civilization, the remains of circular 
houses, the form of the platforms, certain forms of ceramics, ball games and idols figurines of Huehuetéotl and 
Xochipili have found here its most northern extreme.  
18 Cues (rounded platforms used under their structures) that are found in the lowlands valleys, never above 1000 
m. high. 




the people themselves self-identify as Teenek, which is a contraction of Te’ Inik (Te’ for here and 
Inik for man) meaning “the man from here”, and call their territory Teenek bichou, as bichou 
means country or nation. Another name given to the region by Nahua-speaking Mexicas was 
“Huaxtecapan”.  
Another group of people that invaded the region were the Totonacos and Tepehuas, probably 
before the time of Christ, with whom the huastecos would eventually form alliances to defend 
against the Mexica empire in the post classic period, but eventually all became subjugated and 
forced to pay tribute to the Aztecs by 145420 (Meade 1942). The Aztecs demanded tribute in 
exotic items like birds (parrots and macaws), shrimp, honey, turkeys, fruits, textiles, tree bark for 
paper, pigments, animal skins, and above all human sacrificial victims (Santiago 2011, 38). 
During the early sixteenth century thousands of huastecos from the Panuco’s flood plains were 
captured by the Aztecs as slaves or for human sacrifice to their god of war Huitzilopochtli (Saka 
2013b, 7).  
 
The social and environmental impacts of the Spanish arrival at the huasteca region  
The Spanish introduced a new variety of plants, animals, epidemic diseases, cultural, social 
organization, and human genes to the American continent that forever changed the trajectory of 
history, including that of the Huasteca. When they made their first explorations into to the north 
of Veracruz in 1517, the Huastecs were already subjugated by the Aztecs; much of Veracruz and 
the Huasteca Potosina were paying tribute to the empire (Stresser-Péan 2008). The population 
was disaggregated in self-governing provinces that the Spanish named señoríos or casicázgos 
(chiefdoms), the most important being Tziuhcoac, Huexotla and Oxitipa (Pérez-Zevallos 2005). 
Besides the chiefly centers, there were villages scattered in the sierra and the coastal lagoon of 
Tamiahua (now Tampico) where population density reached seventy to hundred people per 
square kilometer; Chicontepec and Ixhuatlán (now Veracrúz), Tamuín (San Luis Potosi), 
Yahualica and Huejutla (Hidalgo) were among the most important ones (Aguilar-Robledo 1999, 
Meade 1955).  
                                                            
20 In 1454, during Netzahualcoyotl’s rule, four Huastec tributary towns paid tribute to Texcoco, part of the Aztec 
Triple Alliance. The Huastecs also allied the people of Metztitlán (in contemporary Hidalgo) to fight the payments 






Hernán Cortés first invaded the Huasteca in 1522 but abruptly left the area to suppress a 
Cuauhtemoc revolt in Tenochtitlán.  He later returned with 40,000 Tlaxcalan allies via the 
Moctezuma river into the hinterland of the Huasteca Potosina (Saka 2013b, 7). Teenek villages 
formed unsuccessful alliances to repel the Spanish in Coxcatlán, and throughout the colonial 
period the area remained a stubborn center of cultural resistance (bis).  
Cortés marked the conquered region from the Tuxpan River of northern Veracruz to Huejutla 
in Hidalgo in the west and the Huasteca Potosina in the north as “Pánuco”, where among his first 
actions was the depopulation of several villages. The major towns of the Huasteca Potosina, like 
Tamazunchale, Tampaxal, Xilitla, Tancanhuitz and Valles, all fell under Spanish political 
jurisdiction, but several revolts incited Cortés to destroy dozens of villages and burn four 
hundred villagers alive (Chipman 1967, 20-21). According to the letters of Fray Nicolas Witte, 
many Indians were tied up and burned “so that is how all that land is lost, although it was the 
most populated land that covers the sun, based on the old edifications that we found on it” 
(unedited documents of Mariano Cuevas, 1914 in Meade, 1942). Pánuco’s agricultural potential 
and easy access to the coast became its inhabitants’ curse during the colonial period, as Cortés 
and Francisco de Garay’s desire to control the area and turned it into a battlefield. Cortés claimed 
the region and divided it into encomiendas (land grants) for his supporters, but in 1525 the 
Spanish crown installed Nuño Guzmán (part of the Garay faction) as governor of Pánuco, and 
Cortés was completely ejected from the region by 1527 (Ruvalcaba-Mercado 2005).  
With Nuño Guzmán as the governor the fortune of the native people did not improve, as he 
specialized in deportating natives slaves to the Antilles. Towns especially suffered dramatic 
depopulation due to slavery, deportation and epidemic diseases; in six years Nuño shipped four 
thousand Huastecs to Mexico City and deported another eight thousand to the Antilles in 
exchange for a thousand head of cattle (Chipman 1966). In Mexico City; most of them died 
shortly after their arrival due to their low resilience to colder conditions and the harshness of 
forced labor, while many shipments of slaves to the Antilles sank from being overloaded21 (bis). 
After five years, Nuño managed to depopulate 90 percent of the Huasteca-Totonaca region and 
in areas such as Pánuco only two percent of the pre-contact population remained (Saka 2013b, 
                                                            
21 The Spanish shipped as many as four hundred huastec slaves per boat, many of which sank in the Gulf full of 




9). Some Nahua and Teenek groups were able to escape to the highlands, where they managed to 
survive and recover demographically. The main hinterlands of recovery were Tantoyuca, 
Ozulama, and the west and southwest the Huasteca mountain range (Stresser-Péan 2008, 415), 
regions that since have become important indigenous cores.  
In addition to their isolation, indigenous groups were able to survive with the help of the 
early religious orders (Franciscan and Agustino) that fought against the brutality of Nuño and 
other governors. Fray Juan de Zumárraga, the first archbishop of Mexico, also known as a 
protector of native people and enemy of Nuño, denounced him in 1528 for “leaving Pánuco 
destroyed and desolated.”  He estimated that the total number of humans exchanged for cattle 
and horses surpassed fifteen thousand (Pérez-Zevallos 2005).  
The introduction of livestock and new crops from the Old World brought drastic changes to 
the landscape. The Spaniards exploited the resources available in each region, and Pánuco 
offered little precious metals but had vast prairies that resembled those of southern Spain, where 
cattle could graze freely.  
Although Nuño Guzman governed Pánuco province for only six years, his trade in slaves for 
cattle was so massive that the Huasteca became one the most important centers for cattle herding 
in the viceroyalty of New Spain (Aguilar-Robledo 2001). Pánuco province had its own Mesta22 
that represented around 150,000 head of cattle between 1530-70 (Butzer 1991), and by the end of 
this period herding expanded from the jurisdiction of Ciudad Valles to Chicontepec, as cattle, 
horses and mules supplied meat and beasts of burden for the silver mining centers of Pachuca, 
Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí (Pérez-Zevallos 2005). As Aguilar-Robledo (2001) explains, the 
environmental conditions of the region, the niche left empty by the indigenous people, and the 
explosive growth of livestock (cows, horses and mules) set the stage for the later development of 
the ejidos and indigenous communities’ land tenure system that we know today.  
Religious orders also played an important role in founding the agrarian ideology of 
communal lands now associated with indigenous groups. The Augustinians entered to evangelize 
the Huasteca between 1538 and 155723 and started advocating communal lands for indigenous 
                                                            
22 A cattle registry post for long distance transhumance. The word comes from the Latin animalia mixta, referring 
to the beasts of diverse owners, nobles and church that hired shepherds. The concentration of herds was 
accompanied by a meeting of their shepherds. A formal council of powerful cattle holders was eventually 
established and was called a mesta. 
23 Their convent in the Nahua pueblo of Xilitla remains the oldest functioning church in the state of San Luis 




people (Saka 2013b, 10). Since the Spaniards and Creoles took advantage of the land left 
unoccupied by the indigenous depopulation by claiming them in the form of mercedes to the 
Spanish viceroy, the only fertile lands left to the Indians were the communal lands provided by 
the local friars. During the next four hundred years, the mercedes evolved into private estates 
while Indians were concentrated into small territories called repúblicas de indios.       
Indian populations were originally granted to Spaniards as encomiendas and were eventually 
subdivided in a system called cabecera-sujeto (head town–subject town) that enabled the 
encomendero (owner) to extract tribute and forced labor. The encomenderos practiced a system 
of indirect rule, with local Indian governments electing their own representatives but supervised 
by the Spanish authorities and a parish priest (Ducey 2001, 527), which allowed reciprocity and 
redistribution among the Indians and in turn strengthened alliances for the upcoming rebellions 
(Pérez-Zevallos 2005). Both the resistance and demographic collapse of the Teenek population 
motivated the Spaniards to move large numbers of other ethnic groups like Otomies, Tlaxcalans, 
and Nahuas to pacify and settle Pánuco, for which they received land grants in gratitude for their 
services (Saka 2013b, 11). Even after the establishment of colonial rule, more Nahuas from the 
central valley and Tarascans from Michoacan were imported as laborers to replace the intractable 
Teenek population (Saka 2013b, 12). Gradually, all of these groups integrated into the Nahua 
and Teenek societies.  
The Indian communities dominated the sierra agricultural production through the swidden 
agriculture of food staples like maize, beans, squash and few cash crops like sugar cane for the 
production of pilloncillo,24 cane liquor, vanilla, cotton and tobacco (Ducey 2004, 18). The 
shifting agriculture in the rugged sierra was sustainable despite the fragile rainforest’ soils as 
long as the population size remained small and the plowed plots were allowed to long periods of 
fallow. Variably known as swidden, shifting, slash-and-burn, and extensive agriculture it entails 
chopping down trees, setting them ablaze to kill weeds and use the ash for organic fertilizer, and 
planting and harvesting until weeds take over or the soil loses its fertility, usually within 10 years 
or less (Santiago 2011).  At that point, the land is left to fallow for at least a dozen years 
(Vandermeer and Perfecto 2005, 41-43). While Indian communal lands tended to be the least 
arable, they were sufficient for subsistence while the population was in recovery, but eventually 
the increasing population together with the colonial demands for tribute, taxes, and the 
                                                            




corruption of colonial officials sparked pressure on the land, environmental degradation, and 
social unrest all over New Spain.  
Throughout the colonial period Indian communities continued to experience pressure from 
estancias or private cattle ranches (Aguilar-Robledo 2003). As concerns over overgrazing 
emerged, herds began to be moved seasonally (transhumance) as had been done in the Antilles. 
To expand their options for pasture, private ranchers often united in condueñazgos (co-
ownerships), also called haciendas (Perramond 2010, 35, Aguilar-Robledo 2003). With this 
system, multiple co-owners registered with the state to regulate land access by custom (Ducey 
2004, 18, Perramond 2010, 33). Another mechanism to accumulate lands for the haciendas 
included inheritances, purchases or straight invasions of Indians’ holdings. In this way cattle 
ranchers’ territories became enormous and the concentration of lands continued through the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century (Pérez-Zevallos 2005, 85).  Religious orders and priests held 
the biggest latifundia in the region. For example, in the Valles jurisdiction, the priest Juan 
Caballero’s hacienda San Ignacio del Buey was 600,000 hectares, and Diego Barrientos y Rivera 
and Domingo Hernandez Prieto’s hacienda San Juan Evangelista del Mesquite y anexas 
encompassed 450,000 hectares in 1643 (Aguilar-Robledo 1999, 214). Although the 
environmental impact of cattle has been considered moderate, it certainly strongly influenced 
social organization and land tenure throughout the region, as the best valley lands were devoted 
to cattle and sugarcane while the worst mountainous lands were left to indigenous farming.  
By the middle of the eighteenth century, when indigenous population numbers had 
recovered, land displacement, high taxation, and forced labor under the Bourbon Reforms slowly 
caused resentment that contributed to the rebellion for independence. Especially in Yahualica, 
Huejutla, Pánuco, and Valles, most Indians lived on haciendas as servants or worked in the 
houses of priests, while those still in Indian communities worked without pay in construction 
projects and other agricultural tasks25 (Ducey 2001) and paid tribute in produce cotton blankets 
(Pérez-Zevallos 2005). After three hundred years of colonial rule, local elites largely lost their 
legitimacy and ability to keep the indigenous populations in order.   
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Indigenous groups started to recover as early as the late 1560s in the Chicontepec 
jurisdiction, gradually followed by other communities of the sierra.  The demands for 
agricultural lands caused native revolts by 1750 and invasions of ranches throughout the region 
(Valle-Esquivel 2003). The growth of mestizo or Creole population was also a key factor in the 
uprisings, as they neither belonged to the repúblicas nor the Spanish ruling caste and thus 
occupied interstices of the land tenancy system and the colonial bureaucracy, usually at the 
expense of the weaker Indian communities partly due to their Spanish-speaking skills (Ducey 
2004). They appropriated indigenous lands either by permission or by force (ibid.). In addition to 
the growth of these mixed populations, Blacks were imported to work the sugarcane in the 
valleys and eventually intermarried with the Mestizo population as well. Some escaped the 
plantations and settled in the sierra, married indigenous women, and thereby formed a new ethnic 
group: the Mulatos, another marginalized group that in only a few cases were able to obtain land 
grants.26 The combination of the forced labor, the growth of a multiethnic population, the 
establishment of a caste-based racial order, and the missionaries’ communalistic ideology set the 
foundations for agrarian violence in the nineteenth century.  
As hopes of rescinding Bourbon taxes and monopolies over tobacco increased in the 
Napoleonic period,27 several indigenous riots broke out that merged with the independence 
movement in 1812 (Ducey 2004). The insurgents challenged the extractive economy and 
government at the local level, rebelling first against local officials, the royal tobacco agents, and 
commercial elites (bis). The chaos of rebellion was such that villagers believed that the insurgent 
army was defending the Crown by attacking abusive local officials. Perhaps as early as the 
Crown’s actions against Nuño Guzman, the Indians saw the King as a paternalistic protector 
against abuses of corrupt local officials (ibid.). 
The decline of the cattle industry due to the impact on the ecosystem also added fuel to the 
fire.  Documentation of the deteriorating environment was cited in the ordinances of 1819, which 
stipulated that on pastures under stress cattle were productive at three or four years old rather 
than two in fertile grasses (Aguilar-Robledo 2001). Aguilar-Robledo (1999, 2001) argues that 
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recognition in the middle of the seventeenth century.  Lacking agricultural lands, some lived as fishermen along the 
rivers (Herrera-Casasús 1989). 
27 Tobacco was the principal monopoly that challenged the long-standing traditions of the Indigenous towns, the 




due to transhumance and evolutionary checks on cattle such as climatic disasters and diseases, 
herds inflicted a low environmental impact in the region.28  Santiago (2011) agrees that despite 
the importance of herding in the Huasteca, it did not dramatically deplete the forest. On the other 
hand, the social inequalities of the colonial era left its mark on the cultural landscape of the 
region and continue to this day.  
The peasants’ struggles to maintain their lands after the Mexican independence  
The war of independence in the Huasteca as in most of Mexico was a matter of regional affairs, 
rooted in the social tensions of local societies. In San Luis Potosi, for example, the call for 
independence war by Miguel Hidalgo in 1810 did not attract peasants from the large estates in El 
Bajio (the most productive lowlands in central Mexico) where they were provided permanent 
employment, insurance, and a social safety net, but the peasants of the Huasteca immediately 
responded to the call (Tutino 1998, 404). The peasant towns of Tamazunchale, Cd. Valles, Cd. Del 
Maiz, Rioverde and Xilitla formed a strong insurgent line that was eventually joined by other 
hinterland towns in the Huasteca Veracruzana (Ducey 2004, 60-76). The insurgence experience 
awoke the peasant population and gave them the skills, tactics, and unification of warfare for 
addressing political and social conflicts as well as confronting the several invasions that followed 
independence, like the U.S. invasion in 1847 and the French invasions in 1857.  
At the final stage of the Mexican independence, the Plan de Iguala also known as “the three 
guaranties” (religion, independence and unity) called for the creation of town councils, or 
municipalities, supposedly in the search of equality for all the inhabitants of the country. 
Following the plan, several municipal councils were created in the region from 1813 to 1821, 
and challenging the existing limited indigenous autonomy and traditions, non-indigenous people 
were allowed to participate (Ducey 2004, 97-9, Ducey 2001, 530). Although the plan included 
democratic elements, it also ensured that local elites, many of whom became militia officers 
during the independence war, remained in power.  
By 1824, the new constitution expanded suffrage to all males regardless of their ethnicity, 
which increased the indigenous social awareness and empowerment; unfortunately, however, 
they failed to foresee that liberalism would also threaten their communal lands. Their demands 
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for lower taxes and fees, regional autonomy, and protection of their communal lands from 
commercialization were what they thought liberalism entailed (Ducey 2001, 528). Unfortunately, 
the elites understood liberalism quite differently as free markets, foreign capital infusion, and 
especially the dismantlement of communal ownership (bis p. 58-60). Consequently, many 
communal lands were privatized during the independence period, as described below. 
The rapid succession of presidents, political demands and expectations, swinging municipal 
autonomy (radical federalism) at one extreme to conservative centralism at the other caused local 
insecurity and violence, and ultimately a civil war in 1832 (Ducey 2004, 172), and also led to a 
Huastec insurrection in 1845-49 called the “caste war,” which contrary to what the name 
suggests, was quite heterogeneous and had nothing to do with castes. The peasant demands for 
local political changes and autonomy was also enjoined by local elites who had lost control over 
offices and national politics. Insurgent peasants and elite conspirators believed that their 
economic wellbeing depended on dominating local political offices and that a military rebellion 
or pronunciamiento was the only way to achieve their objectives (Ducey 2004, 169, Ducey 
2001). The rebellion started in Huejutla, Hidalgo and quickly spread to the indigenous towns of 
Tamazunchale, Xilitla and Chapulhuacán despite opposition from their own prefects, then across 
the state boundaries to San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, Puebla and México (Ducey 2004, 112-17). 
This kind of pronunciamientos began to be used by the rebels as a way to win control over 
municipalities, install their own judges, local military commanders and district prefects. Because 
the new Mexican republic dispersed its power to the states and ultimately to the municipalities, 
the Huastec state was now within reach of the rural majority, allowing peasants to become actors 
in its formation (Ducey 2004, 171). In this way indigenous people rejected several of the land 
privatizing legislations (in 1826, 1856, and 1883) that threatened to displace them from their 
collectively owned lands (Ohmstede 1996).  Nevertheless, the dream of a nation of autonomous 
peasant villages never materialized, although the establishment of a new colonial order was 
thwarted. Unfortunately for the peasant populations, as Ohmstede (1996) has stated, the creation 
of municipal councils eventually evolved into a new system for dominating the rural population.  
While the peasant population, both indigenous and non-indigenous, proved to be a capable 
resistance force to the U.S invasion between 1846 and 1848, it could not prevent the state 




support of some local elites29 not only blocked the U.S. invasion of Mexico City via San Luis 
Potosí(from the Huejutla in Hidalgo through the Huasteca Potosina and the Pánuco River),30 but 
left the region to confront U.S forces at Tuxpan, Veracruz, Tampico and Tamaulipas.  With this 
flexing of muscle and national respect, the peasants returned to their villages armed in case of 
more U.S. attacks, with the intention to reclaim communal lands and end tobacco monopolies 
(Saka 2013b, 21). Local priests led them in their defense of their lands and the occupation of 
several haciendas of the region, especially in the Sierra Gorda of Queretaro and the Huasteca 
region of San Luis Potosíand Veracruz (bis). The Mexican army managed to suppress most of 
these invasions, but the peasants continued to be a force to be reckoned with in a new era of 
agrarian uprisings against municipal governments and haciendas. 
Throughout the social unrest, liberal power waned, and the government’s inability to pay off 
foreign debt encouraged Britain, France and Spain to invade the country to collect their claims. 
France sought to dismantle the liberal government with the help of the Conservative party, and 
once Spain and Britain noted France’s intentions withdrew. President Benito Juarez retreated to 
San Luis Potosi, the provisional capital, and once again the Huasteca provided a solid defense 
against the French with hundreds of indigenous guards from the Huasteca Potosina and 
Veracruzana, as well as the provision of food supplies (Saka 2013c, 22). Although the peasant 
troops were paid a salary, due to the prolonged time of the war (1861-1864), food supplies failed 
to be sufficient, such that both the army and citizen militia began to occupy unused hacienda 
lands as payments for their services (bis). When the French invasion was finally suppressed, the 
liberal government expressed its gratitude towards the peasants of the Huasteca but continued to 
their plan of dismantling communal lands.  
Lands were confiscated from indigenous communities through several laws called Leyes de 
desamortización, which abolished the communal land tenure system and made them an easy 
target for hacendados always looking for ways to expand their properties. After participating in 
two wars, the Huastecan peasantry found themselves economically depleted and demoralized 
with the increasing racist ideology developing among elites, especially towards indigenous 
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militias like grains, mules and corn (Saka 2013b, 22). 
30 The huasteca regions of San Luis sent three hundred men from Tancanhuitz, Xilitla, Tamazunchale, Axtla, San 
Martin, Aquismón, San Antonio Huichimal and Coxcatlán and thirteen from Rio Verde to form part of the artillery 




population. The clash between the elites and the indigenous peasantry continued from late 1870 
to the revolution in 1910 (Saka 2013a, 59).  The Liberal Party split as a result of a general 
discontent with the government and the general Porfirio Diaz’s rebellion of Tuxtepec in 1876, 
which led to his occupation of the presidency for over three decades. Peasants supported the 
Tuxtepec revolt in hopes of recovering their communal lands, as Díaz had proclaimed to be on 
the side of the masses, but local elites also supported him in the promises of economic growth 
and development via more privatization of communal lands and the construction of a railroad 
from San Luis Potosíto the port of Tampico, which would greatly benefit the sugar and tobacco 
industries (ibid. p 61).  These dreams of exploitation were fulfilled, and once again the peasants’ 
loyalty was taken for granted.   
 
The effects of the Porfiriato on the huasteca land tenure systems and forest 
 A lot has been said about the economic growth, progress, and the even internal stability 
that the thirty years (1876-1911) of Porfirio Diaz’ dictatorship brought to the country, but a 
different story of slavery and peasant’s land dispossessions must be told about rural Mexico 
during this period. As the journalist John K. Turner (1908) testified in his Barbarous Mexico, 
many peasants and especially indigenous people were exiled, enslaved and forced to work in 
inhuman conditions in the name of progress.  
For the Huasteca region, progress was found in the form of petroleum.  The extraction of 
the black fossil liquid caused major social and environmental upheaval that translated into more 
privatization of communal lands, indigenous land dispossessions, and the clearing of large 
forests. According to Santiago (2006), the shift in land tenure during this period was without 
precedent in the Huasteca, even when compared to the Aztec or the Spanish invasions (p.70). 
The infrastructure necessary to extract the fossil liquid – roads, telegraph lines, a single-gauge 
railroad, ship terminals, and port facilities – was built all the way from Tuxpan to Tampico and 
was called “Golden Line”.31  Three oilmen were crucial in these endeavors: the Mexican 
engineer Ezequiel Ordoñez, the American Edward L. Doheny, and the English engineer 
Weetman Pearson. Together they initialized the process of oil exploration and the 
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industrialization of the Huasteca’s coastal plains in 1901 (Santiago 2011, 45). The Golden Line 
brought a wave of immigration of all social classes32 from all over Mexico, the United States, 
and Europe, adding to the region’s social complexity via new labor hierarchies, social divisions, 
and marginalization of several indigenous communities. In two decades, 1900-1920, foreign 
oilmen alienated indigenous lands through misleading contracts while cattle ranchers, eager to 
get rid of the tar puddles known as chapopoteras, benefitted from the extraction contracts. 
Ranchers also sold their rainforest properties quickly and cheaply in fear of another indigenous 
insurrection (Santiago 2006, 74). The unstable social environment of the region made the oil 
agents work easier, rapidly supplanting local land tenure systems with monopolistic oil 
landholding. As Santiago (2006) describes in The Ecology of Oil, Environment, Labor and the 
Mexican Revolution, 1900-1938, oil extraction proved to be especially harmful for the coastal 
plains of Veracruz: “a scale without precedents in its history of human occupation, with 
degradation spreading as fast, far, and wide like never before.” Along with the oil industry, came 
diseases due to the human confinement and unhealthy working conditions in labor camps.  
The privatization of communal lands reappeared again in the main agenda of the 
Porfirian period in order to facilitate oil extraction. According to Díaz’s administration, lands 
were not “productive” under the indigenous system, therefore new legislations and reforms for 
privatization and exploitation of natural resources beneath them were created in the name of 
progress. The petroleum legislation of 1909 declared oil the exclusive property of the surface 
owner (Santiago 2006, 63), attracting more foreign oil companies into the region. By 1922 four 
companies held the petroleum rights along the Pánuco River: Doheny’s huasteca, Pearson’s El 
Aguila, the American PennMex, and a smaller subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell called La 
Corona.  After a decade, these companies came to own eighty percent of the Huasteca subsoil, 
naming the region the “oil country” (Santiago 2006, 67-70, 78, 103). 
Indigenous people were easy targets for land dispossession by the oil agents who offered 
to rent subsoil rights to their lands in the search for oil while owners could continue farming as 
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the state and once the business was known worldwide, people from outside the country arrived looking for work. 
Mexican labors were recruited in mass for physical labor; many were escaping from the revolutionary environment 
of the northern states of country. Later the Chinese arrived to the country and where recruited for service work in 
kitchens, cafeterias and hotels, with salaries higher than the Mexicans. Above them where the literate Europeans: 
Catalans, Irish, Russians and Spaniards that fled from WWI, they were hired as master mechanics, carpenters and 




usual. Unfortunately, once oil was found, the drilling of wells brought fires, pollution, permanent 
land degradation to their lands, and even death. Once indigenous people realized the danger 
involved in oil exploitation for themselves and their crops, they increased the price of their lands’ 
subsoil rights, to which oil agents either accepted or responded with violence (ibid, 74-79, 86).  
Cattle ranches, as usual, held a more advantaged position compared to the poor peasants, 
as they realized early on the royalties that could be demanded as well as the renting of their lands 
(Santiago 2006, 70-73). By breakout of the revolution in 1910, the cattle ranchers with the oil 
companies’ financial support created their own army to protect against rebellions like the one 
that would happen in Tampico in 1913 (Santiago 2006, 100, 212).33  The ranchers, however, also 
organized a long revolt (1914-1920) to protest the companies’ reticence to their demands for 
higher prices offered for rainforest real estate on the coast, the culmination of which ended with 
an increase in the price of the rainforest and the conversion of the Huasteca Veracruzana into 
camps of oil wells.  
The environmental degradation of the period was enabled by the complete lack of 
regulations so as to reap maximum profits in at minimal time and expense. The ecosystems 
where oil wells were drilled were completely destroyed: first, fires were set to deforest the land; 
once the oil was gushing, enormous pits were dug to catch the pouring oil (Santiago 2006, 104). 
Swamps, mangroves and sand dunes were converted into refineries and the Pánuco river was 
transformed into the refineries drainpipe, receiving an overwhelming quantity of around 
50,000,000 m³ of oil waste per year by 1918 (Santiago 2006, 125). In addition, the overcrowding 
conditions for workers also facilitated the constant spread of epidemics and diseases like yellow 
fever and tuberculosis all over Tuxpan to the port of Tampico during 1903 and 1922, and with 
period breakouts of malaria until 1940 (Santiago 2006, 118, 188). The reckless economic 
development of the region after independence was devastating for the majority of peasants and 
indigenous people of the region. The fall of the Porfirian regime and rise the revolution were 
again triggered by the peasantry demands of land, and better living and work conditions. 
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Land reforms after the revolution and the capitalist assault  
The environmental degradation, especially deforestation all over the country during the Porfirian 
era, awakened revolutionary consciousness on the need to reduce the rate of environmental 
destruction. The first attempt to moderate the exploitation of natural resources and protect for the 
first time agriculture and water resources emerged in 1915 when Carranza decreed a suspension 
of oil exploitation until the new government established regulatory laws (Santiago 2006, 258). 
By then, however, Mexico’s economy was already dependent on “rapid progress.”  Despite the 
revolution and the several oil worker strikes (29 between 1911 to 1921), by 1921 Mexico became 
the third world’s largest producer of oil (Santiago 2006, 216).  
With the Constitution of 1917 and its agrarian reform in Article 27, the subsoil private 
property rights were not eliminated, but owners had to be a Mexican citizen or a naturalized 
citizen and thereby subject to the state regulatory powers. This restriction in property rights, 
however, was enough to force the backup of foreign oil companies, leaving many migrant 
workers of oils camp in the Huasteca jobless and many native people in fear of never recovering 
their lands (ibid. p, 260). With all the jobless migrants on their territories, the indigenous 
population saw the urgency to organize and reclaim their alienated lands from the oil companies 
under Article 27’s “restitution of lost lands.” The agrarian reform also included a legislation for 
“idle lands,” the purpose of which was to pressure landowners to release uncultivated properties 
to those who lacked land. These reforms had a great impact on the Huasteca region because of 
the great amount of “unused” lands that hacendados kept in reserve for oil discoveries, and it 
was no surprise that Veracruz was the first state to implement it. Land barons tried different 
ways to avoid the expropriation, such as a French hacendado in Veracruz who in 1928 presented 
a provisional plan for timber exploitation on his lands to be exempt of the law (Aguilar-Robledo 
and Flores-Pacheco 2004). On the peasant side, some revolts emerged after indigenous people 
tried to sue the oil companies individually or formed organizations to request the Agrarian 
Commission land (ejido) grants to get their communal lands back (Santiago 2006, 274-276). 
Although several succeeded, they found their lands to be already severely damaged by 
deforestation, erosion, and oil contamination, especially in northern Veracruz (Santiago 2011). 
Hacendados on the contrary, found it easier to convert their recovered lands into pasture 




for peasants to reclaim their lands, the ranchers maintained the political advantage when it came 
to the most productive valley lands.     
 
The early government approaches to forest conservation and the scapegoating of peasants 
After the revolution, the country stabilized under Álvaro Obregón’s presidency (1920- 
1924).  Although known mainly for major educational and labor reforms, he also developed 
environmental conservation reforms. Perhaps the most influential academic group on the 
development of this reform was the Mexican Society of Forestry, founded in 1922 under the 
leadership of Miguel Angel de Quevedo and concerned with peasant deforestation of recovered 
lands (Klooster 2003, Boyer 2007). Quevedo’s approach to rapid deforestation focused on the 
practices of rural communities, instead of the foreign timber and oil industries that overexploited 
them. The forestry society calculated that eighty percent of the country’s deforestation was 
attributed to the peasants’ unsustainable practices, which the agrarian reform supposedly 
exacerbated (Boyer 2007, 93). As part the solution, land grantees (ejidatarios) were conditioned  
to conserve, restore and expand their forests (Santiago 2006, 276). This policy, however, was 
largely disregarded by the next administration of Plutarco E. Calles (1924-28), who reneged on 
campaign promises of land redistribution, equal justice, and labor rights to once again favor the 
oil industry.  He nonetheless decreed in 1926 regularization of the exploitation, restoration and 
expansion natural resources, but its main focus were limiting peasants and forcing ejidos with 
forested lands to form state-regulated cooperatives of producers (Boyer 2007, 121, Klooster 
2003). Following the Buccareli Agreement of 1923 with the United States, foreign companies 
were exempted from the land nationalization policies of Article 27 if they had performed 
“positive acts,” or material investments, to their properties, but the Great Depression slowed the 
oil industry’s recovery (Santiago 2006, 285). With less oil being exported from the country, 
national oil consumption was encouraged and the idea of moderating natural resources 
exploitation was officially forgotten again (ibid).  
Labor conditions also decayed in the Great Depression. In Tampico and northern Veracruz 
Rockefeller cut fifty percent of Huasteca petroleum’s workforce by 1927, and the Royal Dutch 
Shell “La Corona” closed in 1931, leaving only one third of oil workers employed  throughout the 




1933, contributing to a drop in Huasteca population from its peak high of 120,000 in the 1920’s to 
70,000 in 1930 (ibid. p. 312).  
It was not until the next presidential period of Lázaro Cárdenas that protective regulations 
for natural resources and workers returned. In a conservationist tone, Cárdenas created the 
“Department of Forestry, Fish, and Game,” again under the command of Quevedo, although he 
did not last long (Boyer 2007, 97). As Boyer (2007) explains, Quevedo was a proponent of 
scientific paternalism, which clashed with Cárdenas’ policy of giving the rural communities 
control over their natural resources. During its duration, 300 rural cooperatives were established 
to develop the peasant economy and regulate ejido timber exploitation (Boyer 2005, 31). Boyer 
(2007) argues that Quevedo’s conservationist discourse and his heavy-handed cooperative 
regulations may have actually speeded up deforestation as communities raced to turn forests into 
fields before the new regulations limited their maneuverability. The department was ultimately 
dissolved at the end of his presidency in 1940. 
Despite Quevedo, the Cárdenas administration implemented important regulatory 
changes to protect natural resources, especially regarding oil, ending the era of massively 
destructive oil exploitation in the Huasteca region. The oil industry migrated to southern 
Veracruz to what is now known as Poza Rica (Rich Well), referring to its oil wealth. In the 
Huasteca Potosina only Cerro Azul and Ebano remained as a sites of oil extraction until 1978, 
with Tampico as their major refinery center and port (Santiago 2011, 46, Aguilar-Robledo 1995). 
The Cardenas’ period was especially important for the rural Mexico because it boosted rural 
education, agricultural development, and redistributed lands to peasants in earnest for the first 
time. Eighteen million hectares of arable lands were distributed as ejidos (Klooster 2003, 98). 
Cárdenas also improved cattle ranching with the introduction of fencing to replace open range 
pasturing, exotic guinea grass, and Zebu cattle, a breed well-adapted to the Huasteca (Harnapp 
1972).  
For the next three decades after Cárdenas, Mexican leaders set forest policies that favored the 
commercial and state-owned timber interests that received exclusive rights to exploit even 
community timber lands. A forest law in 1952 allowed the establishment of semi-public 
corporations known as Industrial Forest Production Units (Unidades Industriales de Explotación 
Forestal, or UIEF’s), created for managing the regional timber extraction in place of community-




over one sixth of the nation’s forests (5.8 million hectares) for 25 years and disregarded whether 
land tenure was communal or private (ibid). The restrictions imposed by the program blocked the 
communities from direct access to timber market and forced the peasants to clear new spaces for 
other activities like cattle grazing. Thus, such “approaches to conservation” only translated into 
forest exploitation by the powerful and the peasants’ inability to manage their own natural 
resources.   
 
The period of major land redistributions and the modernization clash between mechanized 
agriculture and the long-established cattle ranching 
Land grants from expropriated properties accelerated during the Cárdenas presidential 
period and many peasants experienced economic improvement. In fact, agricultural production 
increased 325 percent nationally from 1934 to 1965 due to his agrarian reform and investment in 
agricultural development (Kay 2002, 44). On the other hand, the agricultural reform caused great 
insecurity for investors, especially cattle ranchers, who were not sure if and when their “idle 
lands” would be redistributed. To improve agricultural productivity and ease the social tensions, 
President Avila Camacho (1940-46) threw the Huasteca into another environmental crisis with 
his infamous “the march to sea” project. Camacho planned massive tropical agricultural 
development largely by way of irrigation projects to decongest the plateau region. For the 
Huasteca, the plan involved the Pujal-Coy irrigation project, which began in 1950 but took the 
state twenty nine years to finally complete its first phase due to the slow expropriation of 
238,000 hectares from the cattle-ranching elites (Aguilar-Robledo 1995, 24). The project 
absorbed ranching lands of San Luis Potosí, Veracruz and Tamaulipas and it was considered the 
biggest irrigation district in Latin America. The project did indeed achieve success in terms of 
reversing the immigration flow, as peasants from states like Nuevo León, Guanajuato, 
Michoacán, Veracruz and Tlaxcala flocked to the low-populated areas of the region during the 
first phase of the Pujal-Coy project.34 The first phase of project included mainly private 
properties, although the original plan intended to include social properties - ejidos and 
communities- in order to redistribute the land that was still concentrated in few hands. The 
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project intended for the conversion of range cattle into intensive agriculture, but also the clearing 
of 100,000 hectares of tropical forest in addition to the drainage of several lagoon.  This was 
followed by contamination of soils and water due to the heavy use of agrochemicals (Hernández 
et al. 2008, 384, Aguilar-Robledo 1995). This project, deeply studied by Aguilar-Robledo (1995) 
and Hernández et al (2008), is a prime example of failure of the technological approach, as it did 
nothing to dismantle the power of the cattle ranching elite in the region.  
With the increasing demand of beef from cities, the inputs made by the Cárdenas 
administration, and the construction of two highways – one from Mexico City to Tampico via 
San Luis and another one from the capital to Pánuco via Poza Rica and Pachuca – cattle 
production was booming by the 1950s. The ongoing demand for beef led the government to 
implement a regional livestock development project in 1968, facilitated by loans from private 
banks (Harnapp 1972, 46). The federal government secured money from the World Bank, the 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and the Alliance for Progress, and 
channeled the funds through the federal banking system to various private banks (ibid). The 
program, as Harnapp (1972) discovered, encouraged the replacement of monte or “idle” lands for 
improved pastures with the exotic Guinea and Pangola grasses especially in Pánuco, Tamuin and 
Tempoal districts. With the transportation improvements, by 1970 the Huasteca provided forty 
percent of the capital’s beef supply (Harnapp 1972). For the peasants, however, the strength of 
the cattle industry marginalized them further and diminished the availability of agricultural lands 
while providing little employment, forcing many to emigrate to find work.  
A more drastic option for indigenous communities was land “invasions”, which increased 
considerably in the 1970s (for Huejutla, Hidalgo see (Schryer 1986). In the end, so-called land 
reforms did not result in any substantial changes in the patterns of landholdings for most of 
region, although its failure sparked peasant migration in search of seasonal employment where 
they were exposed to Spanish and subsequently became more aware of their legal rights in 
regards to the land (Schryer 1986, 299). When those rights were not legally attainable, the 
invasions of largely indigenous peasants increased.         
The other major monopolizer of fertile valley lands was the sugar industry, and after the 
closure of Cuban sugar to the U.S. market in 1960, Mexico expanded its sugar industry to fill the 
void amidst rising prices (Stresser-Péan 2008, 439). Although the Huasteca had been producing 




a monopoly on sugar cane production in the mills of Pánuco, El Higo, Tamasopo, Ciudad Valles 
and El Naranjo due to their heavy use of fertilizers, agrochemicals, and improved varieties of 
sugar cane (Bassols-Batalla 1977b, 133-41).  In the Huasteca Potosina the land devoted to 
sugarcane increased from 2,000 hectares in 1960 to 15,000 in 1970 (Bassols-Batalla 1977a, 247). 
Along with sugar came diversification in tobacco, maiz, coffee, sesame, cotton, plantain, and 
industrialized citrus especially in the municipalities of Ciudad Valles, Tamasopo, San Antonio, 
Tanlajás, Aquismón, Ciudad Santos, Tamazunchale, San Martin Chalchicuautla, Xilitla and 
Tamuín of the state of San Luis Potosi.   The other state experiencing the industrialization of its 
agriculture was Veracruz, especially in the municipalities of Chicontepec, Papantla, Temapache, 
Pánuco, Ixtlahuatlán de Madero, Tuxpan, Tihuatlán, Tantoyuca, Tempoal and Gutiérrez Zamora 
(ibid).  In both states, industrialization meant the use of tractors, tillers, pesticides, and fertilizers 
and ultimately the establishment of juice extraction and processers industries. The majority of the 
irrigated lands were managed by private owners, but a few ejidos were also granted good 
agricultural lands to participate. Industrialization brought job opportunities for peasants as 
jornaleros (day laborers) during the harvests but wages were never sufficient to take them out of 
poverty. Technological modernization efforts of the 1960’s also came in the form of big electric 
plants, cement plants, a rum distillery into Cd. Valles, and the development of the petrochemical 
industry in Poza Rica and Ciudad Madero-Altamira (ibid.).  
To conclude, the history of interactions between the physical environment, social divisions, 
and cultural conditions have created the landscape that now defines the modern Huasteca region. 
The purpose of describing some of the major events that have led to the present conditions was 
to provide a better understanding of the social and environmental conflicts as well as the actors 
addressed in this research project. In the next chapter on modern neoliberal reforms, the age-old 
debate between the land privatization and the preservation of communal lands comes to the fore 






IV. Study Area: the Huasteca Potosina Region 
Political Division 
The definition of the Huasteca Potosina region varies, but the most commonly used 
reference is by the state administration, which includes twenty municipios35 covering 11,292.21 
km². For development planning and government programs, the State of San Luis subdivides the 
region into three micro-regions: north, center and south (see the map below) based on natural 
resources, economy, level of development, and cultural patterns.  
 




                                                            





The municipio administration 
The municipios’ political and administrative organization is concentrated in head towns, or 
cabeceras, where the city council is located; each city council has a governor, a municipal 
manager, and a trustee. Depending on the size and population density of the municipio, it can 
have up to eleven councilmen that represent the political parties not currently in power, called 
regidores de representacion proporcional. The city council has the obligation to reinforce, 
formulate, and update the development programs of the municipio. 36 In the Huasteca Potosina 
these programs mostly revolve around the cattle industry and agriculture. The prevailing political 
party of the region over the last 30 years have been the Intitutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 
only since 2000 the National Action Party (PAN) has gained some municipal elections in the 
south.    
 
The Geographical and Ecological Characteristics of the Huasteca Potosina 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to the regional context, the Huasteca Potosina is 
comprised by two geomorphologic units: the mountain ranges of the Sierra Madre Oriental and 
the lowland valleys. Except for some high peaks of the southwest mountain range of Xilitla that 
reach 4000 meters, the overall elevation of the region lies below 500 meters for the most part and 






                                                            





The karst topography of the 
Sierra Madre Oriental was formed of 
limestone during the Cretaceous Period. 
The eastern valley formed during the 
Tertiary Period from limestone deposits 
at the sea level.  
Three types of soils predominate: 
Calcic Leptosol (LP) in the mountains, 
Eutric Vertisol (VRe) in the lowlands, 
and Calcaric Regosol (RGe) in the 
southern mountains. Another type of 
Leptosol (LP) is found only in isolated 
low mountains of the Sierra Abra 
Tanchimpa and La Colmena (see map 2).  
Leptosols and Regosols are common on 
mountain regions; they are very shallow 
and unconsolidated soils that are best left under forest use (FAO). On the contrary, lowland 
Vertisol soils are blacker, deeper and richer in clay, which makes them more fertile than the 
sierra soils but still not as much as alluvial soils (Harnapp 1972, 14).  
The region is fed by the Pánuco river system which forms four sub-basins of the major 
rivers: Moctezuma, Pánuco, Tamesí and Tamuín. The Pánuco river together with the Tamesí 
river are considered, according to Sanders (1978), the second largest system in Mesoamerica 
after the Usumacinta in terms of the volume of water it carries and the third in length (Alcorn 
1984).  










The climatic conditions vary according to latitude, the openness to the northern winds, and 
openness to the moisture laden winds and hurricanes from the Gulf Coast (Rzedowski 1966a). 
According to Koeppen’s classification, the Huasteca as a whole falls almost entirely within the 
AW climate type, “tropical wet and dry or savanna regime.” However, a modified classification 
by E. García (1972) differentiates sub-climates and sub-zones within the region (see table1 and 
map below). 
 
Climate Type Rainy Season Dry Season 
(A)C(fm), (A)C(m), (A)C(w1), 
(A)C(w2),(A)C(wo) 
May-September December-April 
A(f) May-September There is no dry season 
Am, Am(f) May-September There is no dry season 
Aw1, Aw2, Awo July-September November-March 
      Table 5. Principal climates in the Huasteca Potosina Region according to CONABIO 
    













The physiographical elements and variety of climatic conditions conjoined in the 
Huasteca Potosina have defined three floristic provinces: The Sierra Madre Oriental, The Golf 
Coastal Plain, and The Northeastern Coastal Plain province.  
The rocky soils of the Sierra 
Madre Oriental sustain a forest 
community dominant on Quercus 
in the mountains and Pinus in the 
highest ranges along with other 
flora associated with cloud forest 
(Rzedowski 1986).  
The pine-oak forest, found in the 
western extreme between 600 to 
2000 meters above the sea level 
has affinities with southern 
Mexican, Central American, and 
the Southern U.S. forests. The 
most common species are: 
Quercus oleoides, Q. polymorpha, 
Q. sartorii, Q. germane, Pinus 
teocote and Pinus arizona. This 
type of forest is especially under 
risk of deforestation because of its commercial 
value, as the woods are considered precious for the manufacture of luxury furniture.  Small 
patches of cloud forest are found in the highest peaks and in those parts of southern Sierra 
exposed to the cold northern winds during winter. The most dominant species are: Quercus, 
Juglans, Dalbergia, Podocarpus and Liquidambar. The majority of these are considered good 
quality woods for construction. As altitude decreases, four mayor forest ecosystems can be 
identified: oak-pine forest, rainforest, semi-deciduous tropical forest, and deciduous tropical 
forest (Flores Mata et al. 1971; Puig 1976; Rzedowski 1978).  
 




Tropical perennial forest or rainforest expands along the warm humid eastern slopes of the 
Sierra Madre Oriental between 50 and 800 meters of altitude. It has affinities with the rain forest 
of the Atlantic slopes in southeastern Mexico and Central America but because of local condition 
related with soils, slope angle and sub-climates, its flora varies (Rzedowski 1963). The dominant 
species in general are: Brosimum alicastrum, Bursera simaruba, Celtis monoica, Carpodiptera 
ameliae, Ceiba pentandra, Dendropanax arboreus, Diospyros digynia, Ficus sp., Garcia nutans, 
Helliocarpus donnell-smithii, Manilkara achras, Pithecellobium arboretum, Pouteria 
hypoglauca, Protium copal, Mastichodemdrum capiri, Spondias mombi, Tabebuia roseae, and 
Trichillia. This type of forest is especially rich because of the variety of precious woods and 
biodiversity that it contains. Although many of the tree species are not prized for their timber, 
most are locally used for construction, medicine, ornamentals, and food.  
The following list of arboreal species shows the most commonly used by the Teenek people 
of the region that J. Alcorn (1984) registered in her book “The Huastec Mayan Ethnobotany.” 
(They are also commonly known and used by Nahua and Pame groups that live in the sierra.) 
Their scientific name appears in italics, followed by Spanish common name in parenthesis and 
then the Teenek name in bold. 
• Brosimum alicastrum (ramón or capomo, ohosh) is debatably one of the most important 
species in the Maya cultures for its dominance in perennial and semi-deciduous forests 
located near their prehistoric settlements. Scholars have suggested that the early Maya 
cultures encouraged the growth of this particular species in their ancient orchards (Alcorn 
1984b, Lundell 1937); however, others suggest that their high density near ancient sites is 
mainly due to the natural onset of secondary forests once cleared areas are abandoned 
(Miksicek et al. 1981). Regardless, the tree is considered sacred among Mayas, and its 
seeds are commonly found in sacred caves as offerings. In addition, the seeds have a high 
nutritional value and used to be consumed as a replacement for corn in times of scarcity, 
according to Teenek elders (Gillespie, Bocanegra-Ferguson, and Jimenez-Osornio 2004), 
although today only a few traditional communities now collect and process the seeds and 
they are used mainly as forage for livestock . 
• Ceiba pentandra is considered a precious wood, but beliefs about its being associated 
with subterranean world attracting water protects it from been over exploited. Another 




weak. It usually blooms in March and is considered a good prognosticator of the coming 
rainy season and time to prepare for planting. Medicinally, its bark and thorns are used as 
a cold infusion for measles, pox, and sores and they are frequently sold in local markets.  
• Spondias mombin (Jobo, k’inim) is a tree used to manufacture handles.  Its fruits are 
edible and used in the production of local liquor sold mainly to tourists. 
• Pithecellobium arboreo (frijolillo or coralillo, ítil) wood is also used to manufacture 
hand tools and is widely abundant in shade grown coffee plantations. 
• Dendropanax arboreus (mulumento, multe’) has relieves the symptoms of colds, 
malaise, and achiness when its leaf’s are drunk in an infusion. 
• Heliocarpus donnell-smithii (jonote, baat) has many properties attributed to it, but the 
most commonly mentioned are during childbirths, gastrointestinal pain, and the healing 
of wounds. 
• Tabebuia rosea (palo de rosa, k’uul) is also used to heal wounds, sores, malaise, and 
uterine and vaginal problems, and its fruit is also edible.  
• Cedrela odorata (cedro rojo, ikte’) wood is highly appreciated for the elaboration of fine 
musical instruments, fine furniture, and house posts. For the indigenous people it is also 
precious for the bark’s and leaves’ medicinal qualities in treating headaches, malaise, and 
even sorcery.  
 
Deciduous forests shares ecotone species with rainforests but the increased abundance of the 
following species marks the full transition into this forest: Acacia coulteri, Bursera simaruba, 
Beaucarnea inermis, Cedrela odorata, Lysiloma acapulcensis, L. divaricata, Phoebe 
tampicensis, Piscidia piscipula, Sabal Mexicana, and Zuelania guidonia. The most commonly 
used species in the region are: 
• Sabal Mexicana (palma real or de mícheros, áptaz) is an indicator of disturbance in areas 
where semi-deciduous forests predominated by Brosimum alicastrum use to be. The palm 
is valued by local people for its leaves and trunk used in house construction and the 
‘hearts’ of young trunks (palmito), a highly appreciated delicacy.  
• Aphananthe monoica (palo barranco or quebrancho, tza) has a flexible and hard to break 




• Pithecellobium flexicaule or Ebanopsis ebano (Ebano, acte, ajcte) wood produces high 
quality charcoal and is also widely used as fence posts and rural construction. 
 
In terms of biodiversity, the patches of tropical and deciduous forest are considered key 
elements of the biological corridors needed for the mobility of umbrella species like Panthera 
onca (mountain lion), Ursus americanus eremicus (black beer), Leopardus wiedii (margay) and 
Leopardus pardalis (ocelot) (Loza et. al. 2009). Recent surveys of the Sierra Madre Oriental of 
San Luis have registered 359 bird species from which 71 percent are permanent residents and 
where the most variety is found in oak, cloud and perennial forests in the central and southern 
parts of the sierra (Sahagún-Sánchez et al. 2011). Bird species like Strix occidentalis (spotted 
owl), Amazona viridigenalis (red-crowned parrot), Amazona holochlora (Mexican green parrot), 
Aratinga holochlora (green parakeet), and Cocodylus moreletii (Mexican crocodile) are among 
the umbrella species.  
Some of the threatened Sierra vegetation species according to the UICN red book list are: 
Magnolia schiedeana (endemic to Mexico and “endangered”), Clethra pringlei, C. maerophyla, 
Carya ovata (shagbark hickory), Quercus germana (Mexican royal oak, endemic to Mexico and 
“vulnerable”), Stirax glabrescens, Bauhinnia chapulhuacania, the arborescent fern Cyathea 
Mexicana (endemic to Mexico and “vulnerable”), and the orchids Stanhopea hernandezii 
(endemic), Prosthechea mariae, and P. cicheleata (Loza et. al. 2009). 
The last estimation of forest cover in the Sierra Madre Oriental of San Luis Potosí made 
in 2009 shows the predominance of oak, deciduous, and semi-deciduous forest (see table below).  
The southern range refers to the mountain appendix of Xilitla, dominated by rainforest and semi-
deciduous forest. 
 
Type of vegetation Major range (Ha.) South range (Ha.) Total percentage 
Oak forest 172,461.42 3,739.91 41.52 
Oak-Pine forest 0.18 4,653.75 1.10 
Pine 0.08 15.27 0.00 
Pine-Oak forest  4,299.72 1.01 
Cloud forest 2,526.21 1,606.12 0.97 
Rainforest 0.01 25,954.35 6.12 
Semi-deciduous tropical 
forest 






84,928.32  20.01 
Seasonal agriculture 21,609.22 14,214 8.44 
Palm grove 2,399.32  0.57 
                     Table 6. Major Types of Vegetation on the Sierra Madre Oriental 
                     Source: Loa Loza E. et al. 2009. Áreas Prioritarias para el Manejo y Conservación del Estado de San Luis Potosí.  
 
Having the northernmost extension of rainforest in the Americas makes the region a 
transitional zone and thus richer in species (Rzedowski 1968, 1978). Studies have shown the 
forests of San Luis Potosíto be richer in vegetative species than those of the Huasteca 
Veracruzana adjacent to the south (Puig 1967; Flores Mata 1971).   
The Gulf Coastal is one of the richest floristic provinces, especially farther south in 
Veracruz and Tabasco. The strip within the Huasteca Potosina constitutes, together with the 
small portion of Tamaulipas, the most northernmost extension and is dominated by deciduous 
and thorn forests. Common elements in this, hotter, dryer tropical forest are: Acacia coultery, 
Bursera simaruba, Beaucarnea inermis, Cedrela odorata, Lysiloma acapulquensis, Lysiloma 
divaricata, Phoebe tampicensis, Pscidia piscipula, Sabal Mexicana, and Zuelania guidonia.    
The Northeastern Coastal Province maintains only few remnants of its previous 
deciduous forest, as most of it (78%) has been converted into grasses for cattle ranching. The 
small patches of thorn forest remaining are considered a dryer version of the deciduous forest of 
the northeastern limits of Huasteca Potosina and are predominated by the species: Pithecellobium 
flexicaule, Phylostylon brasiliense, and Acacia unijuga. The wood found in this region is mainly 
used as fuel, construction, and medicine sold in local markets.   












Surrounded and penetrated by human activity, the remaining forests are constantly being 
reshaped and transformed.37 As seen in the previous chapter, the region shares similar cultural 
conditions to other forested areas in the countries where there are high concentrations of 
indigenous groups, in this case the Teenek (Huastecos), Nahuas, and Pames (Xi Ui). The 
northern part of the Sierra, however, is mainly inhabited almost entirely by mestizos. The 
different populations have had different interactions with the forest, making both environment 
and cultures unique38 and worthy of research in this dissertation.  
As explained above, the Huasteca Potosina region was originally inhabited by the Teenek 
people in the lowlands around 1600 to 1100 BCE (Hudson 2004). Cities like Tamtok emerged on 
the banks of the Tamuín River around 1000 BCE and remained as the most important centers until 
their demise between 900 and 1300 A.D. (Stresser-Péan 2008, 172-86).  However, it was not until 
around 900-1200 A.D., that a consolidated civilization was formed in the new center of Tamul.  
The Nahua population, now bigger than the Teenek in the region, arrived at two different 
moments in the pre-Hispanic period: the first around 800 BCE and the second during the Aztec 
expansion around 1400 C.E. (Valle-Esquivel 2003). They constitute 59 percent of the indigenous 
speakers in the region, followed by the Teenek with 37 percent, and the Pame at 3.4 percent.  
The Huasteca Potosina is home to 95 percent of the 348,551 indigenous people of the State of 
San Luis Potosi, which places the state at the number nine of the country for indigenous population 
(Serrano, Embriz, and Fernández-Ham 2002). As seen in the map of indigenous languages 
distribution, ethnicity shows a strong geographical pattern, with the Nahuas concentrated in the 
south and the Teenek in the central sierra region and lowlands. 
                                                            
37 The dynamic nature of tropical forest and the human interventions over thousands of years have made the term “climax vegetation” difficult to 
describe, rather dynamic mosaic of forest patches in different stages of successions that reach its mature cycle between every 60 or 140 years are 
identified as primary vegetation (Martinez-Ramos, 1985). Its composition then, reflects the combined impact of climate and human activities since 
ancient occupancy (Myers 1980). 
38 The te’lom, described by Alcorn (1984) is part of these unique anthropogenic vegetation zones that appear to be “undisturbed” forest from the 









As for population distribution by municipios, The National Council of Population and 
Livelihood (CONAPO) together with the National Indigenous Institute (INI) have created a 
categorization of indigenous people, which along with the INEGI XII census data of 2002, 
allows the map shown below for the huasteca potosina by municipio:  Area A designates more 
than 70 percent indigenous population; B marks between 69 and 40 percent of the total 
population are indigenous; C represents less than 40 percent when more than 5,000 inhabitants; 









Land tenure systems and the impacts of the neoliberal land reform 
As described above, since of end of the Spanish colonial period in 1821 several changes in 
land tenure have occurred. Following the independence period several campaigns of corporate 
land privatization occurred, forcing the inhabitants of rural regions (indigenous as well as 
mestizo) to resorted to different strategies to protect, recover, and acquire lands. After the 
Revolution, the federal government recognized indigenous communities and granted hacienda 
lands to landless peasants as communal ejidos for more than seven decades (from 1920 to 1990).   
The first mention of ejidos and the recovery of indigenous communal lands structures39 
came in the midst of the Mexican Revolution during the first agrarian law of 1915 in which lands 
expropriated from large estates were to be managed communaly by landless peasants.  Article 27 
of the 1917 Constitution created the legal foundation for the agrarian reform and land 
redistribution of such ejidos lands, after which petitions for ejido lands could be requested by 
organized groups of peasants with demonstrated need. Once the grant was approved, technicians 
surveyed and measured the land to deliver title and develop an official management plan. The 
size of the ejidos depended on the number of solicitants, the availability of land, and the quality 
thereof.  Whether ejidos or indigenous communal lands, these “social properties” were 
prohibited from being privatized and sold, which was intended to prevent the re-concentration of 
land in the hands of a few owners; however, internally, unequal concentrations due renting or 
purchasing arrangements were not unusual.  
The first distribution of ejido lands in the Huasteca Potosina involved the expropriation of 
land from the haciendas where the petitioners had worked before. During Cardenas presidency 
(1934-1940) the deliverery of land grants sped up, as it did in the rest of the country, but slow 
down thereafter until the 1970’s under the Echeverria administration. By then, however, land 
scarcity led to a new type of ejido called Nuevos Centros de Poblacion Ejidal (N.C.P.E), in 
which peasants were relocated and settlements were often established outside of the ejido lands 
per se, sometimes by more than seven kilometers. The N.C.P.E were the last government efforts 
of lands grants to peasants and officially ended in the late 1990s. Over a period of 70 years the 
revolutionary agrarian reform redistributed about 50 percent of the agricultural, forestry and 
                                                            
39 The concept comes from the latin word exitum and was brought by the Spaniards’ colonization laws (leyes de Indias) in 1523, as the 




livestock grazing lands of the country to peasantry, and for the Huasteca Potosina region it 
created 454 ejidos.  
In the meantime, indigenous communities have far preceded ejido grants and can have their 
titles traced back to the early colonial period, if not earlier.  Most in the Huasteca Potosina lost 
their ancestral lands after Independence and regained part of them after the Revolution using 
colonial documents like maps and taxation records to establish ancestral rights, as well as 
purchasing other former lands. The granting of ancestral community lands are considered “of 
restituted origin” by the agrarian registry. Initially, the state was slow to recognize indigenous 
communities as social properties, such that in the early 1920s six Huasteca Potosina communities 
opted for ejidos lands instead, including four Pame communities that received lands from a large 
hacienda in the municipio of Tamasopo and the Teenek community of Tampaxal in the 
municipio of Aquismón (Tiedje 2005). These early indigenous-based ejidos tend to be bigger 
than other ejidos. The process of formally recognizing indigenous communities per se started 
during Cardenas’ presidency in the 1930s and continued until the 1990s, with most occurring in 
the 1980s.  
The agrarian counter-reform of 1992 ended the distribution of social properties and 
facilitated their certification, land titling, and privatization if their members so choose, although 
many indigenous communities and ejidos have chosen to keep collective ownership of their 
lands under. Today, the National Registry of Agrarian Properties (RAN) refers to indigenous 
communities and ejidos as nucleos agrarios (agrarian units), regardless of their certification 
status. For the Huasteca Potosina 613 nucleos agrarios of varying sizes and backgrounds that 
cover 59 percent of the region, as will be discussed later.    
The counter-reform of 1992 reinforced the perception that ejidos are advantageous over 
indigenous community titles, due to the formers’ improved land measurements techniques used 
by surveyors and the privatization of a property title, causing more communities to convert and 
certify their land as ejidos. Of 159 indigenous communities in the Huasteca Potosina, covering 
seven percent (763.40 km²) of the territory and located predominantly in the southern municipios 
of Aquismón, Axtla de Terrazas, Coxcatlán, Huehuetlán, Matlapa, San Antonio, San Martín 
Chalchicuautla, Tamazunchale, Tancanhuitz de Santos, Tampacán, Tampolón Corona, Tanlajas, 





The Neoliberal Counter-Reform  
In Mexico, a series of neoliberal reforms were introduced in the mid 1980s as a strategy 
to cut the government deficit by the elimination of a great amount of subsidies, the privatization 
of state-run firms, and the promotion of foreign products and capital investments.  
The agrarian land counter-reform of 1992 was a center piece of the neoliberal 
restructuring. This counter-reform intended to reinvigorate productivity and inversions in rural 
areas as well as jumpstart the urban financial system by enabling the buying and selling of land 
through titling , a solution of the Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto (Fernandes 2002, 
Johnson 2001). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) included his ideas in 
Structural Adjustment Programs for indebted Latin American countries. These social properties, 
however, are home to a great amount of the natural resources, which led to environmental 
concerns such as that for biodiversity to be integrated into the privatization schemes. As 
mentioned above, it was thought that legal property ownership would stop land invasions, 
overexploitation of natural resources, and create incentives for external investments (Igoe and 
Brockington 2007). Privatization schemes included assistance for sustainable agriculture now 
that farmers, it was assumed, could invest in the long-term on their own private lands.  
The national land certification and property titling of the counter-reform was implementated by a 
program called PROCEDE, with whom ejidos and communities could “voluntarily” certify, title, 
and privatize their lands to varying degrees. The degrees of privatization can be classified in five 
broad categories: 
1) The lowest degree is for communities and ejidos to keep all their lands communally owned 
and certify only the external perimeter of their community. Internal organization is kept 
almost intact, and although each owner has their own parcels, they do not receive individual 
titles and internal sales can only be made through communal processes. One advantage of 
this certification is that owners do not have to pay individual taxes for their parcels or house 
plot titles. For communities and ejidos with common use lands, which are usually forested 
areas unsuitable for agriculture, the certification process gives each property owner 
(ejidatarios and comuneros) a title of an equal percentage of the common area, which gives 




2) The second degree of certification is when communities and ejidos request individual 
certificates for their parcels. Here, landowners usually acquire individual house plot titles in 
addition to certification of communal areas. The certification of parcels and house plot titles 
entails that the owner must pay property taxes; the individual or communal of payment of 
taxes is decided by a communal general assembly. The most common decision is to set a rate 
for each certification of property no matter its size. Although the decision to certify parcels 
and obtain titles is made by the majority of the community or ejido assembly, not all owners 
are obligated to certify their lands. Many poor owners do not certify or chose only their 
parcels or house plots, which inhibits them from accessing government programs and other 
types of aid. In fact, the decision to certify only the perimeter of their lands (category 1 
above) is made mainly by the poorest communities and ejidos afraid of not being able to pay 
taxes and thus losing their land.  
3) Collective ownership is another land tenure system maintained in some ejidos and 
communities, in which a group of property owners organizes to manage the land in a collective 
way, usually for agricultural or cattle production. In the Huasteca Potosina, the most common 
collective land uses are for sugar cane and cattle ranching. The presence of communal and 
collective properties helps preserve the internal organization of agrarian nucleos, even if 
individual parcels have been certified, because such areas require group maintenance.  
4) Another step towards greater privatization involves a community’s decision to certify their 
parceled lands under the title of dominio pleno, meaning total domain. This title gives each 
owner full domain over his or her property to be rented or sold without the community’s 
consent. Such titling highly threatens the internal organization of ejidos and communities, 
and unless communal lands are maintained, members might not feel obligated to any 
communal work (tequio) or contribute to other collective benefits.  So far, 25 ejidos in the 
region have chosen this title in different proportions of their territory: 18 ejidos have less 
than 10 percent of their lands under dominio pleno, three have between 20-30 percent, three 
have 50-60 percent, and only one has almost all its territory (85 percent) under dominio 
pleno. In fact, almost all of the ejidos that have chosen dominio pleno do not have communal 
use areas or have very few hectares in a communitarian parcel.  Significantly, these ejidos are 
located in lowlands where almost all the land is arable. The only exception is the ejido “El 




(forested) is communal and only four percent of their parceled arable lands have been 
certified under domino pleno.      
5)  Finally, the total privatization of a social property occurs when the majority of the members 
decide to entirely disintegrate their social system. In this case communal lands can be kept as 
areas as such or divided among the owners as individual private plots, but only if no forests 
are in play. 
In reality, communities and ejidos combine a variety of these ideal types as negotiated 
and arranged with the agrarian attorney (Procuraduria Agraria). Decisions to use combine or 
disregard some certifications over others depends largely on geographical location, local 
economy, and culture, as we will see below. 
After over twenty years since the certification program started, at least 91 percent 
(907455.88 km²) of all the social property nationally has been certified. Livestock raising (46%) 
and forests (17.5%) constitute the majority of certified common use areas and cover 623,186 km² 
of the national territory (INEGI 2007). If all forested lands in social properties are considered, both 
the certified and uncertified, scholars estimate that they represents between 70 (Bray et al. 2003) 
to 85 percent (Yates 1981) of the total forest in the country. Therefore, the potential effects of 
division and/or privatization of the forest under the land reform has become a matter of serious 
concern in Mexico for years to come (Sunderlin, Hatcher, and Liddle 2008, Yetman and Burquez 
1998, Durán et al. 2011, Merino and Martínez 2009, Perez-Verdin et al. 2009, Larson et al. 2013, 
Robinson, Holland, and Naughton-Treves 2003, Thoms C. 1998, Landell-Mills and Ford 1999, 
Angelsen and Kaimowitz 1999). Although most social property was certified under the PROCEDE 
program by 2006, a second program called FANAR has continued the certification process for 
remaining properties with delimitation conflicts.  
Although the government stopped granting ejidos and communal lands in the Huasteca 
by 1996, it has continued to encourage the formation of new “private” version ejidos for private 
owners who wish to merge their properties to obtain an ejido title. These are called constituted 
ejidos, and although the government does not provide them any additional lands, it recognizes 
their collective property as a legal institution with its own patrimony. These constituted 
properties emerged at the beginning of the year 2000, and so far 16 have registered for the 
region, all in the municipio of Tamuin.  The constituted ejidos have restrictions on their size 




usually between 20 to 30 property owners hold around 200 hectares of land, an amount that 
according to the article Article 9 of the state constitution is accredited for seasonal cultivation.40 
The map below shows the type of certification that nucleos agrarios have adopted in the 
Huasteca.   
                                                            
















As the map above shows, most of the biggest nucleos in the region were granted by the 
1960s, after which mostly smaller properties were granted. The empty spaces indicate mainly 
private properties and some state or federal properties. Especially during the 1980s, the decade 
before the neoliberal reform, there was a rise of small landgrants (see table 5) in the form of 
NCPE throughout the region.  
Date of formation  Number of nucleos 
1923 - 1940 132 
1941 - 1960 137 
1961 - 1980 105 
1981 - 1992 171 
1993 - 2005 66 
                                                           Table 7.  Distribution of agrarian nucleos by date of formation 
Regarding the type of nucleo origin, as seen in the table below there were five ways in 
which they could be formed.   
 
Type of origin Type of social property # of lands Hectares 
Division Suma  Ejidos 26 24,148.16 
Dotacion (grant) Ejidos 267 362,629.76 
Restitución   Communities and some Ejidos 159 143,749.64 
NCPE  Ejidos  133 121,855.48 
Constitucion Ejidos 16 3,194.93 
 
Division Suma refers to the ejidos that resulted from the distribution of hacienda lands, 
usually to groups of peasants that already lived and worked there. Dotaciones were grants of 
available or idle arable lands given to landless peasant. Restitución, as its names indicates, were 
lands returned to their original owners, who were usually indigenous communities, although 
some of them decided to convert into ejidos at the time of the restitution. The NCPE, as 
previously mentioned, were the last land granting efforts to landless peasants prior to the 
agrarian reform of 1992. Constitución are the new ejidos formed after the aforementioned land 






 The ejido system dominates the region, covering approximately 52 percent of the territory 
(around 5,891 km²). The distribution of the two types of social property showN on the following 
map reveals how indigenous communities in the southern region cluster together, while ejidos 
are spread throughout the region. Both types of social properties vary greatly in size, economic 
conditions, and cultures, for example, the smallest is the community of Mexcala with only 12 
hectares, while the biggest the N.C.P.E of Laguna del Mante with 46,219.58 hectares. On 
average, the size fluctuates from 500 to 4,000 hectares, and population densities closely correlate 
to the indigenous percentage of their populations.  
 











Fifty-nine percent of the territory is under a social property system while the empty spaces are 
the best arable lands that have prevailed as private properties. The situation dates back to the land 
expropriation and redistribution period, when cattle ranchers managed to maintain their lands by 
soliciting government protection licenses against expropriation. The government provided many 
of these licenses for up to fifty years in favor of the economic development of the country (Schryer 
1986), but thereby reinforcing the unequal distribution of arable lands.  
 
Governance and social organization of communities and ejidos  
Neoliberal reforms have also changed the level of state and municipal involvement in the 
affairs of social properties. Federal constitutional reforms in 2001 gave states the freedom to 
establish the characteristics of auto-denomination and autonomy of their indigenous people.  
Thereafter, the states of Oaxaca, Campeche, Chiapas, Mexico, San Luis Potosi, Nayarit, 
Tlaxcala, Durango, Querétaro and Baja California have created regulatory indigenous laws, but 
only San Luis recognizes auto-regulation at the community level (personalidad juridica). The 
2003 State Constitution of San Luis Potosí (revised in 2010) describes indigenous communities 
as those with a) a political, economic, social, and cultural unity, b) settled in a defined territory, 
and c) who recognize their own governance and authorities as part of their traditional costums.41 
In its Article 9 it is declared that such communities are for the first time sujetos de derecho 
publico42 (legal entities with public power), which means that they are recognized as an 
institution, with rights, obligations and their own patrimony. It also recognizes the legal power of 
its indigenous authorities, general assembly, internal body of police and their acts, meaning that 
their overall structure of internal governance, decision-making, and leadership structures are 
legal (Article 9. State legislation of San Luis Potosi, 2003).  
The decision of the state to recognize the indigenous communities’ legal authority was based 
on an internal analysis of 28 indigenous communities, which demonstrated a history of their 
solid and efficient organization and auto-regulation (Ávila 2009). Communities can now use the 
new legislation to demand respect from other outside authorities such as the city council at the 
municipio level (Cisneros 2011b). Although this legislation was originally created for indigenous 
communities, the state also recognizes that mestizo communities or ejidos can benefit from it as 
                                                            
41 Article nine of the State Constitution “Constitución Política del estado libre y soberano de San Luis Potosí” 2010. 




long as they have a comparable organization (Article 9. State legislation of San Luis Potosi, 
2003). This is an important step reinforcing community organization, and the next step is to 
make the beneficiaries aware of their rights and put them to practice. 
The internal organization of indigenous communities is quite complex and varies from 
community to community, but generally it directly involves at least ten to fifteen percent of 
members in core governance.  
 
The table below shows the basic authority structure from most to least powerful: 
Level Authority 
1 General Assembly, Agrarian Assembly, Assembly of authorities, 
Assembly of neighbors   
2 The Commission (president, secretary, treasury and substitutes) 
Security council (president, secretary, treasury and substitutes)  
3 Auxiliary judge  (1st, 2nd ,3rd judge) 
Municipal delegate, its substitute and secretary 
4 Major, sub-major  and corporal 
5 Police man and rural guards 
6 Vocal members, or representatives 
7 Committees  
 
Some positions, however, are not recognized by external (state or federal) laws.  One 
important one is the Municipal Delegate or Auxiliary Judge, who tend to all legal disputes, 
conflicts, controversies, and offenses that occur inside the community, whether administrative, 
criminal, civil, or family, if the problem is not so major that it must be treated by an extended 
group of authorities like the assembly of neighbors or the general assembly.  They tend to be 
present in Nahua communities, and also perform the important functions of planning and 
organizing the communitarian work called faenas or tequio, the coordination of committees, and 
the protection of natural resources (Cisneros 2011a, Ávila 2009).   
Communication between the city council and communities is made through committees that 
attend official public meetings. Committees are constantly created and dissolved according to the 




clinics and aid, senior citizens, utilities like energy (electrification), the Integral Development of 
Families’ program (DIF), nursery school, primary school, Telesecundaria (lower secondary 
school taught through television programs), PROCAMPO, which gives official economic 
support to rural producers, and Oportunidades, which provides cash payments to families in 
exchange of school attendance. Last but not least are committees dealing with natural resources 
management, such as forested social properties, especially for the ones that participate in one of 
the PROARBOL programs. 
  The complexity and extension of community governance varies according to factors like 
the size of the nucleo, origins (if they were recently created or date back to the colonial period), 
settlement pattern, and the level of assimilation or penetration of the Western culture. The 
biggest communities, for example, are structured into neighborhoods called barrios or anexos, 
each with a mayor and committee representatives, while smaller communities might have some 
settlements dispersed from the center with no official representatives. The following section 
examines forest management, policies and the neoliberal land reform at municipio and 
community levels where forests represent more than 30 percent of the territory.     
 
vi. Municipios of the study area 
As mentioned in the ethno-history section, the forest of the Huasteca region has been 
severely threatened by agriculture and cattle ranching expansion. Among the several social, 
political, economic and ecological factors that scholars have found to influence deforestation in 
Mexico, the most commonly mentioned are: population growth, uncertainty in land tenure, 
capitalism, poverty and unsuitable government policies (Vandermeer and Perfecto 2005, Lambin 
et al. 2001, Boyer 2007, Merino and Martínez 2009, Kepleis and Vance 2003). Lately, national 
and international efforts to protect the remnants of forest have focused on payments for 
environmental services (PES) to forest owners as an incentive to keep, revert, and use their land 
as forest. As mentioned above, PES has been applied throughout Latin America, including 
Mexico, with a wide variety of outcomes.  
My focus on the application of PES to forest conservation in the Huasteca Potosina has 
broader implications for neoliberal ideologies, assumptions, and strategies regarding forest 




the Sierra Madre Oriental of the Huasteca Potosina where the PES program has focused its 
efforts over the past decade on last remaining major remnants of forest (see map below). 
 
 
Map 16: Municipios of the Study Area 
 
Based on economic and cultural characteristics, the selected municipios were divided into the 
northern mestizo area and the southern more indigenous area. The more developed northern 
mestizo region includes the municipios of El Naranjo, Ciudad Valles and Tamasopo, where 
sugarcane and cattle ranching are principal endeavors. The southern area, on the contrary, stands 
out for its high concentration of indigenous population, less arable and more rugged land, and 
dedication to shade grown coffee. The differences in topography and the possibilities they offer 
for agricultural activities have influenced the economic strategies, as seen in the map below.  
The National Population Commission (CONAPO) has developed and recorded a national 




reference for poverty levels at both scales considers the overall impact of different kinds of 
disadvantages that a population can suffer, the purpose of which is to identify when a sector of 
the society lacks the opportunities to develop to its full capacity (Ávila 1995). Depending on the 
scale of analysis (municipio or locality level), different factors are considered; at the municipal 
level three dimensions are examined:  
a) Education, measured by the percentage of people at 15 years old or more that are illiterate 
and have not completed primary school.  
b) Housing, evaluated by the percentage of population i) without basic utilities like sewage 
and sanitation, electricity, and tap water, ii) overcrowding, and iii) the percentage of 
population living in houses with dirt floors.   
c) Income, based on the percentage of working population living in households with 
inhabitants earning no more than two minimum wages.  
The map below shows the municipal level of marginalization in study area based on the 
CONAPO index and its association with population’s densities. Overall, the Huasteca is 
considered highly marginalized, but important differences endure between poor southern 











The Southern Indigenous Area 
This area comprehends eight municipios: Aquismón, Tancanhuitz de Santos, Coxcatlán, 
Huehuetlán, Xilitla, Axtla de Terrazas, Matlapa and Tamazunchale. All have been catalogued 
with high and very high marginality and contain the highest proportion of indigenous people of 
the Huasteca Potosina. They are considered a multi-culturally integrated area where ejidos and 
communities of Nahuas, Teenek, and mestizos coexist even within communities.  
 
Land uses and Economy 
The communities and ejidos that populate this portion of the sierra have less capital-intensive 
agricultural production compared to their northern counterparts; according to the national 
agricultural, stockbreeding and forestry census, self-subsistence and extensive agriculture 
dominates production in most of the region. Coffee is the main cash crop for indigenous people 
and was introduced during the early nineteenth century (Stresser-Péan 2008).  Coffee plantations 
have been integrated into forest management, and during the 1980s, when social properties were 
still being federally granted, ranchers would refer to their unused forested areas as cafetales 
(coffee plantations) to avoid expropriation (Alcorn 1984b). Overall, the amount of forest in the 
southern region covers 86,587 hectares, from which 59 percent (51,260 hectares) has been 
categorized as secondary vegetation.    
 More area is covered by secondary vegetation (locally known as monte) than agricultural 
areas.  Secondary vegetation essentially refers to areas of fallowing of previously cleared 
agricultural fields or primary vegetation that has been partially disturbed. For the municipios of 
Xilitla, Tamazunchale and Aquismón, areas of secondary vegetation are at different stages of 
managed regrowth usually in orchards or shade grown coffee plantations with a wide variety of 
species of timber and non-timber products. The graphic below shows the proportion of land uses 
in each municipio of the southern region according to the vegetation series IV (SIV) data made 
by INEGI. The municipio of Aquismón is the only one with a high percentage of land devoted to 





Graphic 5. Land uses by municipality in the southern region 
According to these data Aquismón possesses the most natural resources, with a forested 
area of 21,408 hectares, yet it is also one of the most marginalized in the state. The cultivated 
pastures (17,616 hectares aprox.) in Aquismón are privately owned and contain sedges and forbs 
intermixed with natural shrubs to feed cattle for milk and meat, and secondarily pasture horses, 
sheep, and goats (INEGI, 2007). The pastures on the best valley lands are monopolized by a few 
ranchers, which has exacerbated inequality and especially increased the marginalization of the 
indigenous populations, who cultivate small cornfields and perennial crops like coffee on the 
ridges and slopes of the sierra. The uneven land distribution and accompanying pressures on the 
people of the sierra have motivated the introduction of PES for them.  
The rest of the municipios have similar agricultural practices; most of the inhabitants 
make a living from self subsistence cornfields along with cash crops of coffee, palmilla, and 
sugarcane for the production of piloncillo43 or to sell it to sugar mills. Another common source 
of income is the rental of pasture to private owners since very few members of social properties 
possess their own cattle. Some low-lying municipios like Coxcatlán and Huehuetlán near the 
Pan-American Highway capitalize on the strategic location to specialize in orange orchards, with 
secondarily production in mangos, bananas, and avocados. The map below shows the 
distribution of these main land uses according to INEGI land use and vegetation data for 2010. 
                                                            






























Religion has played a fundamental role in both indigenous and mestizo people’s daily 
lives. Catolicism is the dominant religion, but for the indigenous it is often a syncretic veneer for 
Mesoamerican beliefs and practices, such as merging the sun god, the moon goddess and other 
nature spirits with Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and other saints. Religion is enmeshed in peasant life 
and gives meaning to the agricultural cycle, particularly regarding rituals at the sowing and 
harvest times (Avila et al. 2008). For the Teenek, for example, Dhipaak is the mythical heroe 
who defied the supreme God who jealously hided corn in the ‘stomach’ of the sierra and brought 
it to people (Alcorn 1984; Ariel de Vidas 2003). The introduction of Protestant religions (e.g., 
Evangelicals, The Light of the World, and Jehova’s Witnesses) came in the 1960s but have only 
a minor presence. Overall, 10 to 15 percent of people in the Huasteca is afilliated with these 
religions (Avila et al. 2008).  While no major conflicts between the religions have been reported 
for the Huasteca, unlike other areas of Mexico, the introduction of Protestantism has undermined 
the traditional civil-religious cargo or “duty” system and has influenced a separation from 
religious and civic duties among communities’ organization (ibid). 
 
Organizations and Political Parties 
A wide variety of organizations operate in the region at multiple levels, from the national, 
the regional, and communal. In 2008 74 peasants’ national organizations, ejido unions, regional 
organizations, groups of women and cultural groups were in operation (Avila et al. 2008). Some 
of the most influential were the National Peasant Confederation (CNC), the Democratic Peasant 
Union (UCD), and the National Union of Coffee Organization (CNOC), the latter of which has 
12 local branches in the southern municipios and is linked to the Union of Indigenous and 
Peasant Organizations (COCIHP) (ibid). In adition to uniting coffee growers, COCIHP also 
organizes piloncillo makers (unprocessed brown sugar), orange growers, and women producers, 
giving it a strong presence in the southern region.44  Cultural organizations include traditional 
doctors, dancers, musicians, artisans, and community radio stations. Overall, the Huasteca 
Potosina is well organized, cohesive, and autonomous compared to other Mexican regions (Avila 
et al. 2008). Other organizations with more political character are the ones associated with the 
                                                            
44 See http://www.redindigena.net/organinteg/cocihp.html. for more information about their affiliated 




indigenous and peasant struggles to obtain or recover land, including the Democratic Huasteco 
(MHD) Movement and the Citizen Front (Frente Ciudadano), which still have great ability to 
mobilize people despite the end of the land grants (ibid). 
The strongest political party in the region is the Intitutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), 
the one that dominanted the country in various permutations for 70 consecutive years after the 
Revolution. Other parties like the National Action Party (PAN) and coalitions like New Aliance 
(PNA) have occupied municipal presidential chairs in the southern region but only for brief 
periods, except for Aquismon, where the right wing party PAN has held power since 200045.       
   
The Development of Payments of Environmental Services (PES) in the Southern Region  
The PES program in the State of San Luis Potosí started precisely in this southern region 
in 2003, first in Xilitla, which still has the most PES projects in the region. A pilot project started 
with seven communities participating in the Payments for Hydrological Services Program 
(PSAH), the first nation-wide PES created and implemented by the forest commission, 
CONAFOR. The advantage the region offered for PSAH was that many communities share 
boundaries with the Sierra Gorda biosphere reserve and nine communities constituting 800 
hectares in the Sierra of Xilitla known as La Silleta were already part of another forest 
conservation program (Lands for Conservation and Environmental Services pilot project), that 
managed the NGO of Sierra Gorda. This program worked in collaboration with CONAFOR to 
establish the federal PES program in the region. As the national priority was hydrological 
conservation, communities PES was ultimately an exchange for case water collection and 
infiltration.  
The next year in 2004 carbon sequestration and the improvement of agroforestry systems 
(the PSA-CABSA category) were added to the program in Xilitla and still today it has the 
biggest concentration of PES projects under this category; 26 of the 44 PSA-CABSA projects in 
the state in 2011 were implemented here.  Until now, however, funding for carbon sequestration 
has only been for project design not for the implementation of PES. As the map of PES shows 
below, from the four categories available in the program (Hydrological, Agroforestry, Carbon 
                                                            





sequestration and Biodiversity), only hydrological and agroforestry services have been 
implemented in the region for actual payments.  
Until 2010, agroforestry projects did not have a demarcated area, only circles to indicate 
the community or ejido that was participating. More recent projects are accurately represented by 
polygons of participating coffee-parcels made by the federal Subsidies and Services for the 
Commercialization of Agriculture and Livestock (ASERCA) for monitoring. Without delimitated 
areas for the early years of implementation, it is difficult to estimate the areas under agroforestry 
services at the regional scale, however, at the community level; participants in the program have 
detailed censuses of the individual parcels in the program. For the hydrological PES there are 
more detailed polygons totaling 35,488 hectares in the southern region since 2011. In total, 
agroforestry and hydrological PES programs include 33 nucleos agrarios; agroforestry projects 
are predominant in indigenous communities (six out of seven have them), while hydrological 
projects are more common in ejidos. Some examples of how these programs have been 











The Northern Mestizo Area 
The northern study area comprises three municipios: Ciudad Valles, El Naranjo and 
Tamasopo, covering 241,956 hectares. With its fertile valleys, the region has been the focus of 
major irrigation projects, especially for the development of sugarcane and cattle.  With the 
introduction of improved varieties and industrialized sugarcane, production has increased 
dramatically. Ciudad Valles, El Naranjo and Tamasopo in that order are the major sugarcane 
producers of the state, covering 84 percent of the overall production (4,820,359 ton per year)46.  
As mentioned, in contrast with the southern region the majority of the population is mestizo, and 
the indigenous population of Tamasopo and Ciudad Valles is only seven percent while in El 
Naranjo the percentage is not statistically significant. The disappearance of indigenous 
population, as mentioned in the ethno-history chapter, dates back to the Spanish arrival, when all 
the indigenous settlements were completely destroyed and suitable lands quickly occupied for 
cattle ranching.  
 
Land use and Economy  
According to Butzer and Butzer (1992:20) and Aguilar-Robledo (2001), this northern 
zone was the site of many granted livestock ranches before 1575. The landscape predominated 
by coyol palms, grasses, cactus, and agaves was quickly transformed into pastures (Aguilar-
Robledo 2002). The rapid growth of cattle during the early years of colonization (1530-1570) 
was facilitated by the availability of lands left after the native depopulation, as well as the pre-
existence of grasses and the lack of grazing competitors for livestock (Aguilar-Robledo 2001, 
Butzer 1992). As in the southern region, cattle ranchers managed to maintain their domain over 
the lowlands despite the land expropriations, Ciudad Valles is still one of the main cattle 
producing municipios in the entire state, with over 70,000 units47.  
Although cattle ranching and sugar cane production are the leading economic activities of the 
region, forestry (see graphic below) and lumber have been important parts of the economy since 
the colonial period. According to the National Agriculture, Stockbreeding and Forestry Census 
                                                            
46 Censo Agropecuario 2007. Tabulados por municipio No. 10, INEGI.  




of 2007, Ciudad Valles reports the most timber extraction in the state, with 74 registered 
sawmills and approximately 5,550 m³ of tropical woods cut yearly. Tamasopo, in contrast, cuts 
only 116 m³ of oak and 165 m³ of other tropical woods with its 73 sawmills, and El Naranjo cuts 
348 m³ of mainly oak with 32 registered sawmills.   
 
 
Graphic 6. Land uses by municipality in the northern region 
 
As with the land use distribution patterns of the southern region, most of the forested 
areas are owned by social properties, namely, 89 nucleos agrarios with 287,043 hectares. Of the 
total 209,137 hectares of “primary” forest in the region, 80 percent (169,341 hectares) are within 


































As in the south, the northern population here is predominantly Catholic, although more 
orthodox.  Evangelicals and other Protestant religions are present in small percentages, but there 
are no major communal conflicts based on religion.  
 
Organizations and Political Parties 
The north is also organized in national peasant unions, regional organizations, ejido 
unions, and other social cooperatives and nonpropfit organizations. The Pujal Coy project and 
the agrarian conflicts that emerged with it incited the creation of numerous peasant organizations 
(Avila et al. 2008). Now corn growers, cattle ranchers, sugar-cane growers among others form a 
wide variety of trade organizations.  
Regading political parties, like in the south, the PRI has maintained control, except in the 
municipio of CD. Valles (the biggest and wealthiest among the region), which has seen constant 
shifting of power between the PRI, PAN, and the Workers’ Party  (PT).  Between 2007 to 2009 
PAN won control over the region gaining the elections in the three municipios. The PRI, 
however, has recovered power thereafter.    
 
 
The Development of the Payments of Environmental Services (PES) in the Northern Region 
The PES program in this region started in 2004 with the ejido of San Jose de Corito and 
El Durazno in Tamasopo. From the 129 projects that have been implemented in the state of San 
Luis since 2003, 42 are located in this region. Although the territory presents several eligible 
areas for bio-diversity projects, most of the projects have been for hydrological services, with the 









V. The Correlation between Deforestation and Poverty in the Huasteca 
Potosina Region.  
The presumed connection between deforestation and poverty has been one of the main 
justifications for the PES program in impoverished areas worldwide, and Mexico is no different. 
This study examines the deforestation-poverty relationship at a regional and community levels, 
using spatial correspondence analysis between marginality, risk of deforestation, and total 
deforestation.  
Using a marginality index to measure poverty.    
Following the CONEVAL poverty guidelines, the National Council of Population 
(CONAPO) has created a marginality index based on eight variables that represent the 
multidimensionality of poverty. Since 1990 the index has been used to designate when a sector 
of a society – be it at the municipio, nucleos agrarios and localities (settlements) level – falls 
under the poverty line. While a general description of the index was discussed in the 
methodology chapter, here the variables considered for each scale will be explained.  
 
At the municipio level  
The eight variables applied to the 2010 population census include the percentage of the 
population: 1) 15 years or older who are illiterate; 2) 15 years or older who have not completed  
primary school; 3) without sewage or sanitations services, 4) without electricity, 5) without tap 
water, 6) living in a single room dwelling; 7) living in houses with dirt floors; and 8) living in 
households with no more than two minimum wages. The index ranks poverty in six grades from 
zero to five, with five representing the highest degree of marginality.  Map 18, “Marginality 
Index by Municipio and Locality,” shows how the entire Huasteca Potosina is classified 
marginal, but with varying degrees. Forty-one percent of the municipios have low marginality, 
14 percent medium, 30 percent high, and 14 percent very high marginality. Four of the five 
municipios with very high marginality coincide with higher concentrations of the Teenek 
population, where as the urban municipality of Cd. Valles, with more than 100,700 habitants, is 











The locality level  
A “locality” in the national census refers to any inhabited area, from only one to hundreds 
of houses. Although the information is gathered at the household level, the data is only available 
in its aggregated form to protect householder’s privacy. The marginality index at the localities’ 
scale uses the same variables as the municipal level except in the economic dimension, in which 
income is replaced by the percentage of houses living without refrigerators. According to 
CONAPO, this proved to correspond better with the other variables than income at the localities 
scale (CONAPO 2012) 
As mentioned, the State of San Luis Potosí occupies the 9th place on poverty according to 
the number of municipios with very high and high marginality, but in terms of the proportion of 
marginal population living in localities the state occupies 7th place. The marginality index of the 
2010 census showed that of the 4,203 localities in the state, 89 percent had high or very high 
marginality; however, these localities represent only 35 percent of the total population. These 
data correspond to higher poverty levels in rural areas compared to cities where population tends 
to be concentrated. The distribution of the marginality index among localities and population in 
the state is shown on the table below. 
Marginality index Localities Population 
Total  4203 2572173 
Very High   781  55404 
High  3001  846750 
Medium   302  260612 
Low   95  351006 
Very low   24 1058401 
Table 8. Distribution of the marginality index in San Luis Potosi 
 
Within the Huasteca Potosina region, as seen in the previous map of “Marginality index 
by municipio and locality”, localities are concentrated in the southern most indigenous region. In 
the 2010 census, the Huasteca Potosina had 1,908 localities with some degree of marginality, and 










Localities’ marginalization index 
within the Huasteca Potosina region  
Index Value Frequency Percent 
 
High 1356 71.1 
Very high 410 21.5 
Medium 103 5.4 
Low 31 1.6 
Very low 8 .4 
Total 1908 100.0 
   
                                            Table 9.  Marginalization of localities at the regional level 
Within the 11 forested municipios in the study area lie 1,662 localities, with populations 
varying from just one to 3,614 houses. From these, 327 localities, which usually were isolated 
households, did not have the data to evaluate their marginality levels, and although they were 
very likely to have marginalinity, without reliable data they had to be excluded from the 
marginality analysis here. The 1,336 localities with complete data presented a high mean 
marginality value (0.1485), very similar to the average value for the Huasteca Potosina region. 
The index seen on table 7 shows how 80 percent of the total population of the region also lives 
with high marginality. 
Marginality of localities within the forested municipios in the Huasteca Potosina Region  








 0  (none) 5 0.374 1,749 0.473 
(-1.83197-1.32309) 1 (very low) 1 0.074 9 0.002 
(-1.32309-1.06870) 2 (low) 10 0.748 3,617 0.979 
(-1.06870-0.81425) 3 (medium) 58 4.341 26,827 7.265 
(-0.81425-0.71231) 4 (high) 1003 75.07 298,343 80.801 
(0.71231- 8.34515) 5 (very high) 259 19.38 34,406 9.318 
 Total 1336 100 369,229 100 
                            Table 10. Marginality Index at the localities' level 
There is a tendency to believe that smaller settlements or localities present higher indexes 
of marginalization because they are located in more remote places where basic services are 
harder to implement however no significant correlation was found between marginality and 




like geographical location, economic opportunities, and governance systems. Localities must be 
studied in their full spatial context, including in the agrarian nucleos of which they are part. 
 
 
At the nucleo agrario level  
An official marginality index at nucleo agrario scale does not exist and had to be 
calculated based on the localities’ census data. Two calculations were made: one using the mean 
marginality value of all localities inside the nucleos and another by aggregating the total number 
of households. Using the former method, the nucleos of the sample presented an overall 
marginality value of 0.3606, higher than the mean for the region but still within the range of high 
marginality. Compared to the values of 2005, the mean marginality of the sample decreased by 
2010 (see table 8), but not all nucleos showed improvement. The ejido Chalahuite, for example, 
experienced a big increase in marginalization by 2010 along with another 13 nucleos. 
 
 Marginality 2005 Marginality 2010 
N 
43 43 43 
   
Mean .129132 .057437 
Median .068963 -.003503 
Mode -1.0015a -.8350a 
Std. Deviation .5352534 .5314073 
Variance .286 .282 
Minimum -1.0015 -.8350 
Maximum 1.2393 1.1408 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 





Graphic 7. Nucleos' marginality index from 2005 to 2010 
 
 At the nucleo agrario level as with the locality level, the marginality value and population 
density did not significantly correlate (0.109 using Pearson at 0.01 level), neither did the 
population densities changed much during that five-year period48 (see graphic below).  
 
Graphic 8. Population density among agrarian nucleos from 2005 to 2010 
                                                            
48 Only in two cases were there major changes in population: the ejido La Palma, with a significant increase, and 
Tampaxal, which experienced a major decrease. The major changes of those two nucleos suggested a re-
assignation of localities as it is not uncommon in the region when the basic needs of a settlement can be better 
fulfilled by another nucleo or without one. Fieldwork confirmed that in Tampaxal, one of the biggest nucleos, some 
localities requested their re-assignation to another nucleo because they were located within the boundaries of the 
state of Queretaro; far from the head town and it was easier to obtain their basic services from this state. It is 
important to also notice that these two communities haven’t certified their lands due to conflicts within their 





Because the mean marginality values of nucleos showed little variation, a second 
marginality index was calculated using the total population of the nucleos instead of the 
localities. The new index was based on the same eight CONAPO variables.  Here Pearson 
correlations can be seen between population and the percentage of houses with dirt floor, lacking 
tap water, lacking electricity, and illiteracy. The variables were weighted and the index 
constructed following CONAPO’s “Principal Components and Dalenius’ Stratification,” detailed 
in the methodology chapter. One of the main differences between the marginality index at the 
localities level and the nucleos’ level was the weight that each variable had on explaining or 
representing marginality; at the localities scale the percentage of houses without refrigerators 
have greater weight while at the nucleos’ level the percentage of people living on dirt floors are 
more predictive, closely followed by the lack of electricity, tap water and the percentage of 
illiteracy (see the table of principal component matrix below).    
Marginality Variables49 Component 
1 ω 2 3 4 
p15YM_AN .632 -.446 .379 -.118 
p15PRI_IN .073 .008 .950 .170 
PROM_OCUP .124 -.755 -.016 .074 
pVPH_S_EXCSA .419 .375 -.095 .767 
pVPH_S_ELEC .855 .254 -.013 .196 
pVPH_AGUAFV .819 .172 -.085 -.420 
pVPH_PISOTI .907 -.021 -.155 -.171 
pVPH_REFRI -.168 .722 .276 -.370 
       Table 12. Principal components matrix of marginality index 
The percentage of people without refrigerators had the least weight at the nucleos’ scale 
because the vast majority of the houses within them do not have one. The new index also 
presented a wider range between the minimum and maximum values among the nucleos as seen 
in the table 11. Marginality at the nucleos’ scale coincides with commonly identified health 
threats in developing countries, like like lack of cement floors and running water, which can lead 
to slow growth and cognitive development in children (D.Cattaneo et al. 2009).  
 
 
                                                            










Std. Deviation 3.25323 
Variance 10.583 
Skewness 1.494 
Std. Error of Skewness .361 
Kurtosis 3.542 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .709 
Minimum -4.22 
Maximum 12.07 
Table 13. Statistics of the constructed marginality index among nucleos 
The differences in marginality values obtained with the two methods are shown in the 
maps below; the one on the right was based on the localities’ mean marginality while the map on 
the left shows the nucleo index based on households. Because of of its greater accuracy, the later 





Map 21. Marginality indexes at the nucleos' level 
  
Evaluating risk of deforestation  
In order to analyze any potential correlation between deforestation and poverty, 
deforestation itself must be operationalized.  Fortunately, deforestation risk models have been 
developed and used by environmental government agencies and policy makers for the allocation 
of forest conservation programs like the PES. Two models are specifically used by government 
agencies in Mexico to identify areas under risk of deforestation: 1) that of the Federal Prosecutor 
for the Protection of the Environment (PROFEPA), which designates areas where the natural 




trafficking, burning, and agricultural expansion, and 2) the Risk of Deforestation Index IRDef 
2.0.1, a raster data set that provides a more detailed classification of forests under risk.  
The PROFEPA data set is mainly used by The Assistant Prosecutor of Natural Resources 
(Subprocuraduria de Recursos Naturales) to monitor areas where environmental violations are 
usually registered (see the map of “Municipios’ marginality index and critical areas subject to 
deforestation” below). Environmental violations here usually involve criminal mafias equipped 
with radio-communication systems and firearms, such that the national security forces are 
regularly involved in the monitoring (PROFEPA, 2011).  
During the first part of my fieldwork season in 2011, the presence of military forces was 
quite prominent in the region; the northern zone of my study area became an openly contested 
territory between the Zetas and the Gulf drug cartels for the control of the eastern highway routes 
leading to United States’ border. Throughout the Huasteca Potosina spread incidents of violence, 
but the heavily forested northern municipios of El Naranjo, Cd. Valles, and Tamasopo were 
especially hard hit; kidnppings and battles between the municipal police, the army, and the 
cartels forced several of the wealthy families to flee while government ministries like PROFEPA 
and CONAFOR could not monitor the mountain forests. For at least six month, government 
programs like Payments for Environmental Services (PES) delayed their follow-up evaluations 
on participating areas, and technicians working for several communities fell behind in their 
visits.  I visited a few communities in the northern region accompanied by a technician I already 
knew, but I followed up with a more in-depth investigation in 2012 when violence calmed down. 
In addition to induced fires and deforestation associated with drug trafficking (see 
(Dueñas 2013) for Chihuahua and (Alatorre 2011) for Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Zacatecas and San 
Luis Potosi), farmers in the Huasteca region also start forest fires. The extended dry season 
(February to June), the juxtaposition of forests with pastures and sugarcane plantations, and the 
practice of burning the latter (zafra), all exacerbate the spread of forest fires.  
The people from the region distinguish between fires associated with criminal activities 
of drug cartels that create social disruption and those unintentionally spread by farmers.  In 2013 
criminal fires particularly were rampant, starting in the delimited critical areas at the end of 
March and rapidly spreading through pastures and deciduous forests via strong winds. On March 




Santa Catarina and Rio Verde municipios (Enciso 2013). SEMARNAT and local citizens argued 
that 129 fires seemed to have been intentionally set around Ciudad Valles, the biggest city of the 
region, the largest of which are represented by the yellow dots in following March 24 map by the 
U.S. National Geophysical data center (NOAA) fire detection satellite service. 
 
PROFEPA’s critical areas presented in Map 21 correspond with the areas related to 
organized crime as well as to social properties; 4,726 km² or 42 percent of the territory that has 
been classified as critical, covers most of the Sierra Madre Oriental. All the municipios, 
regardless of their level of marginalization, are subject to criminal activities, but easy access to 
forest resources and highways increases their risk.  Municipios like Cd. Valles, El Naranjo, 
Aquismon, Matlapa and Tamazunchale, which are linked by highway directly to the US border 
and Mexico City, are among the most in danger of deforestation due to criminal activities.  
 
 










When considering the type of land tenure system in the areas under risk of deforestation 
as defined by PROFEPA, 62 percent (3,000 km²), representing 183 communities and ejidos, 
were social properties.  
Type of forest under risk of deforestation 
The PROFEPA data on critical areas subject to deforestation is broad and includes a 
variety of environments, including land other than forest (37 percent include agriculture and 
pasture lands). According to the last INEGI vegetation inventory in 2007-2011, the Huasteca 
region had 4,078 km2 of forest, and 49 percent of it (1,989 km2) was considered old-grown 
forest, mainly located in the northern parts of the Sierra. The other 51 percent was considered 
secondary, including scrub (1,032 km²), mixed arboreal stratum (969 km²), and herbaceous (88 
km²). 
The table below shows the predominance of tropical forest in the region and its high 
percentage under critical areas.  
Vegetation types Critical areas in km² % in critical area % of the total study 
area 
Temperate Forest 546.6 11.8 26 
Tropical forest 2,026.3 44.08 67 
Table 14. Types of vegetation in critical areas for deforestation in the Huasteca study area 
 
To find out the degree of deforestation risk that these areas are facing, the IRDef (risk of 
deforestation index) 2.0.1 data set, developed by INE, was used. This model calculates the 
probability of deforestation based on the locals’ decision to change nine hectares of forest to 
another more profitable land use according to the Von Thünen model.  The results from 
intersecting the vegetation data and IRDef raster data shows secondary tropical forests are at the 
most risk (see table and graphic below).  Of those, 329.29 km² were transitional ecosystems like 
palm grove (natural and induced) and farming lands surrounding forested areas. This indicates 
that either deforestation already occurred in these areas during the observed period (1993 – 
2000), or they were the piedmont frontier between farming lands and forested mountains. 
 
Level of Risk Type of forest in the Huasteca region (km²) 




Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
Very Low 120.35 7.07 136.19 92.16 
Low 318.06 22.27 367.33 50.94 
Medium 181.73 42.01 193.14 289.30 
High 78.65 41.05 136.19 561.97 
Very High 48.85 44.35 155.14 740.10 
Total 747.64 156.75 987.99 1734.47 
Table 15. Risk of deforestation index by forest type 
 
Graphic 9. Forest in risk of deforestation at the Huasteca region 
The map below shows the location of areas under different degrees of risk according to 
features like distance to main roads and major towns that would facilitate access to markets and 
agricultural conversion. The lower forested areas closer to main roads, towns and agricultural 
frontiers are at higher risk (in red) while the highest parts of the mountain range present the 
lowest risk (in yellow). According to this model, from the 4,101 km² of forested lands in the 
Huasteca Potosina, 87 percent were classified in risk of deforestation, while the rest is found 
scattered in small areas throughout the region, especially in El Naranjo and Xilitla. A more detail 






























The IRDef’s data resolution of 9 hectares per grid allowed making spatial correlations 





The table below indicates the municipio’s total forested area, mean risk of deforestation, 
and marginality index categorized from 1(low) to 5 (high).  








1 Aquismón 482.16 60.79 3.87 5 
2 Axtla de Terrazas 23.17 12.22 4.33 4 
3 Ciudad Valles 1146.83 47.40 3.76 2 
4 Coxcatlán 23.48 26.20 4.23 4 
5 Ebano 12.55 1.77 4.79 3 
6 El Naranjo 571.15 67.46 3.71 3 
7 Huehuetlán 20.17 29.87 4.22 4 
8 Matlapa 34.85 31.33 4.15 4 
9 San Antonio 25.96 25.25 4.03 5 
10 San Martín Chalchicuautla 99.75 24.03 4.04 5 
11 San Vicente Tancuayalab 18.88 3.66 4.73 4 
12 Tamasopo 966.72 72.07 3.55 4 
13 Tamazunchale 162.26 45.85 4.03 4 
14 Tampacán 42.97 23.25 4.17 4 
15 Tampamolón Corona 49.23 18.94 4.22 5 
16 Tamuín 57.98 3.15 3.85 3 
17 Tancanhuitz de Santos 31.51 23.29 4.18 4 
18 Tanlajás 38.32 10.35 4.34 5 
19 Tanquián de Escobedo 1.05 0.74 4.25 3 
20 Xilitla 269.66 66.56 3.72 4 




When correlating marginality and risk of deforestation at the municipio level, no 
significant correlation (.101 using Pearson’s correlation) was found (see graphic below). 
  
                   Graphic 10. Risk of deforestation and marginality at the municipios of the Huasteca 
 
Forest converted into herbaceous areas from the 1980’s to 2010   
The analysis of change in forest coverage was based on INEGI’s land use and vegetation 
series SI to SIV, which includes the decades of the 1980s to 2010. The different types of forest 
included in these series were grouped into two categories: temperate (TE) and tropical (TR) 
forest in order to simplify the analysis.  
From 1980 to 2010 the region forest’s decreased 31 percent. Tropical forests suffered the 
most, while temperate forests actually regain coverage over the last decade. These values 
coincide with the risk of deforestation index data, which place TR under major risk. The most 
intense deforestation period occurred between the 1980s and 1990s and then slowly decreased 




































































































































                 Graphic 11. Changes in forest coverage at the regional level, from 1980 to 2010.  
                Source: INEGI Land use and vegetation series I, II, III, and IV  
 
Secondary forests were also particularly hard hit, especially in the 1980s, as seen in the graphic 
below.  
 
Graphic 12. Forest composition at four different periods in the Huasteca Potosina, from 1980 to 2010.  
Source: INEGI Land use and vegetation series I, II, III, and IV 
 
 For a forest to be secondary means that the original coverage has been disturbed and has 
undergone partial regrowth, with no guarantees that it will not be cut again and made into 
permanent herbaceous pasture or agricultural fields.  
 





Herbaceous areas are no longer forests at all, and analyses show that they are rarely if 
ever allowed to revert to the original primary forest. Herbaceous areas increased by 33 percent 
(from 6,400 hectares of perennial tropical forest, 4,200 hectares of sub-perennial and deciduous 
forest, and 1,105 hectares of temperate forest) in the 1980s, the majority of which occurred in 
social properties of the municipios of Xilitla, Huehuetlan, Coxcatlan, Tanlajas, Ciudad Valles 
and San Vicente Tancuayalab. By 2000, 25 percent of those herbaceous areas were permanently 
converted into agricultural lands and the rest remained herbaceous stage in 2010.   
 
Changes in the agrarian structure and deforestation patterns  
Land use decisions are affected by social, economic, political, and environmental factors. 
Part of the political and social context in which forest coverage in the region has changed during 
the period of analysis involves major transformations in land ownership. The 1980s, the period 
of the most intense deforestation, corresponds with the last major land granting process – the 
NCPE (new centers of ejido population) – before the neoliberal land reform.  The NCPE in 
conjunction with the government efforts to expand the agricultural frontier into the tropics were 
intended to modernize and boost production in the countryside.  
The bonanza of cattle ranching that started in the 1940s ended in the 1990s for both social 
and private properties but especially the former. Harnapp (1972) explained the “Mexican 
miracle” of modern cattle ranching in the Huasteca from the 1940s to the 1970s as a convergence 
of increasing urban demand for meat associated with a rising of living standards and the 
government policies to develop the region.50 The prosperity of cattle market in the Huasteca 
allowed investment in intensive cattle ranching for some areas that took advantage of 
government aid programs to improve pastures and ranch facilities. In addition, cattle quality and 
quantity rose with the introduction of species suited to tropical conditions, like the Zebu breed 
and exotic grasses (Harnapp 1972). During the 1980s and 1990s, the growth of cattle ranching 
continued, although at a slower rate due to the 1982 economic crisis and a switch in government 
focus to expanding the agricultural frontier.  As explained in the ethnography chapter, the NCPE 
ejidos were expropriated lands, most of which were “unused” areas, but in the northeastern 
                                                            
50 The government implemented a law in 1966 that loosened the restrictions on sales and shipment of beef and in 
1968 created the Livestock development program for the Huasteca to speed the ranching industry as part of the first 




Huasteca (Ebano, Tamuin, Cd. Valles and San Vicente Tancuayalab), these were pasturelands 
with extensive cattle ranching.  
Also contributing to deforestation in the 1980s was the granting of about 176 agrarian 
nucleos as part of the irrigation program of Pujal-Coy, which intended to convert the 
pasturelands and the remained tropical forest of the lowlands into irrigated agricultural areas 
(Hernández et al. 2008). Against the will of cattle ranchers of the region, the Pujal-Coy project 
started its first phase in 1973 buoyed by 197 million USD of World Bank investment and 
pressures by the landless peasant movement Tierra y Libertad (Díaz Cisneros et al. 1991 in 
Aguilar Robledo 1995:26-31). Especially for the municipio of Ebano, where the first phase of the 
program was implemented, 46,753 hectares of ejido lands were granted, including some 
deforested with bulldozers for the implementation of the irrigation program. In fact, of the 
300,000 hectares affected by the Pujal-Coy the irrigation project from 1973 to 2000, 90 percent 
was deciduous and thorn forest (Hernández et al. 2008). It bears noting that the program never 
fully transformed the previous land use practices of the region or implemented an irrigation 
system for the new ejidos. The majority of irrigated areas remain in private hands (bis). In 
Ebano, for example, about half of its 84 NCPE nucleos rely on rain-fed agriculture, while the 
other half continued to graze cattle.51 
The implementation of the NCPEs were not, however, the main cause of forest depletion 
during the 1980s; according to the GIS analysis, the loss of 14,463 hectares of TR and 726 
hectares of TE within the new NCPEs represent only ten percent of the total deforestation 
(153,700 ha) of that period. The major decrease during the 1980s was found within private 
properties, representing 64 percent of the total forest loss while the already established social 
properties equate for another 36 percentage of the total deforestation. The major changes took 
place in the previously mentioned municipios of the northeast, where the Pujal-Coy project in 
addition to the land use transformation introduced a dramatic increase in population into areas 
previously dominated by cattle; Tamuin, for example, doubled its population in 15 years from 
18,000 in 1970 to 32,000 inhabitants by 1985 (Aguilar-Robledo 1995). The increased population 
during the last period of expropriations brought instability to private properties, encouraging the 
depletion of remnants of forest in the lowlands for the introduction of pasturelands, which 
increased 43 percent between 1985 and 1990 and another 40 percent increase between 1990 and 
                                                            




2000 (Aguilar-Robledo 1995, Hernández et al. 2008). For the last decade pasturelands have 
stopped expanding, however, agriculture has continued to creep into the forests.     
 
The influence of the agrarian land reform of 1992 at the regional scale         
After the implementation of the new land reform in 1992, only 32 more nucleos were 
created in the Huasteca Potosina, opening an additional 6,952 hectares to agriculture. During this 
last decade, the speed of deforestation decreased in comparison with the previous (31,129 
hectares deforested in 10 years), however, this time old growth forest was affected the most.  
The last two decades have been marked by the implementation of the neoliberal reforms 
and two major aid government interventions: the agricultural program of “Procampo,” meant to 
promote agricultural productivity, and the PROCEDE program with the goal of certifying and 
titling all social properties.  
Procampo, launched in 1994 and still in full action, emerged as part of the NAFTA negotiations 
for free trade and labor. This profit-driven program intended to pay for the cultivation of a fixed 
area of land until the year of 2010 in order to make farmers more competitive in international 
markets, incentivize the modernization of agricultural practices, and use lands more efficiently 
(Klepeis 2003). The idea of intensifying production within a fixed area to reduce pressures on 
forests has proven to be a major failure in impoverished areas of southern Yucatan peninsula 
according Klepeis et all. (2003). There, the model was incompatible with the traditional 
agricultural systems of swidden agriculture. A detailed study of the Procampo program and its 
impacts on deforestation has not been made for the Huasteca Potosina, but anecdotes about the 
negative impacts of the program on forested areas are abundant and will be discussed later.  
The PROCEDE land certification and titling program started in 1993 and by 1999 
completed the registration of 56 percent of the social properties in the region. As discussed in the 
neoliberal reforms section, one advantage of land certification was the reduction of deforestation 
due to property certainty. However, analysis of the different degrees in which agrarian nucleos 
embraced certification and their deforestation patterns reveals a more complex picture. For this 
analysis, I grouped 613 nucleos in the Huasteca Potosina according to their type of certification: 
466 certified their properties at the individual parcel level, 80 certified only the perimeter of their 
nucleos and maybe few communal parcels like schools plots, 41 had not entered the certification 




pleno category. In general, all groups experienced a small decrease in forest coverage (less than 
seven percent) during the first decade of the certification process, from 1990 to 2000, except for 
the dominio pleno group that lost 24 percent of its forest. Contrary to predictions, nucleos 
without certification and the ones that certified only the perimeter of their nucleo preserved their 
forests better, losing only two percent, while nucleos that certified individual parcels had a six 
percent decrease in forest coverage during the same period.  
Over the last decade, the nucleos that only certified their perimeter had a forest increase 
of three percent, nucleos that certified all their parcels saw a one percent increase, and those 
without certification whatsoever increased their forest coverage by less than one percent. In 
contrast with the rest, the nucleos with dominio pleno have not recovered any forest coverage, 
although the rate of deforestation fell to two percent. Before concluding that greater degrees of 
privatization lead to greater deforestation, a deeper analysis of the internal and external factors 
prompting individual land use decisions is necessary.   
 
Deforestation at the municipios of study   
To understand the importance of forests in local livelihoods, 11 municipios in the 
Huasteca region with 30 percent or more of their territory covered with forest were prioritized in 
this study, as well as lands adjacent to them (numbers 2, 4, 7, 17 of table 14 above) held in 
nucleos agrarios.  
Municipios TE  
(hectares) 
TR  Total forest 
in the 1980s 
TE  
(hectares) 
TR Total forest 
in  2010 
Percentage of 
forest lost 
Aquismón 1002 55077 56079 1940 46276 48216 14.02 
Axtla de 
Terrazas 
0 4851 4851 0 2317 2317 52.24 
Cd. Valles 214 155947 156161 183 114497 114680 26.56 
Coxcatlan 0 2895 2895 0 2350 2350 18.83 
El Naranjo 35142 25309 60451 35649 21468 57117 5.52 
Huehuetlan 0 3321 3321 0 2017 2017 39.27 
Matlapa 0 4834 4834 0 3485 3485 27.91 
Tamasopo 46382 53351 99733 47860 48813 96673 3.07 
Tamazunchale 2 20244 20246 25 16202 16227 19.85 
Tancanhuitz 0 5200 5200 0 3151 3151 39.40 
Xilitla 7688 25762 33450 12523 14441 26964 19.39 
Table 17.  Forest lost at the municipal level from 1980 to 2010 
According to the percentage of forest lost on the INEGI’s vegetation series I (from 
1980s) and IV (2010), two municipios presented considerably low change in forest cover: 
Tamasopo and El Naranjo (see table below). El Naranjo’s low percentage of forest change (5.52) 




however, Tamasopo with the lowest percentage of change (3.07) presents a high marginality 
index, while others like Aquismón, Coxcatlán and Tamazuchale, which also have between 14 to 
20 percent of forest lost, have very high and high marginality.   









Aquismón 14.02 3.91 1.47345 High 
Axtla de Terrazas 52.24 4.29 0.39458 Medium 
Cd. Valles 26.56 3.27 -1.09287 Very low 
Coxcatlan 18.83 4.47 0.79284 High 
El Naranjo 5.52 3.02 0.21848 Very low 
Huehuetlan 39.27 4.70 0.84717 High 
Matlapa 27.91 3.97 1.04811 High 
Tamasopo 3.07 2.44 0.23585 Medium 
Tamazunchale 19.85 4.51 0.43663 Medium 
Tancanhuitz 39.40 4.88 0.96855 High 
Xilitla 19.39 3.85 0.69622 High 
Table 18. Percentage of Forest and Marginality Index at the Municipios of the Study Area 
Be that as it may, the percentage of total forest within municipios is inversely correlated with the 
risk of deforestation and percentage of forest loss. As the matrix below shows, the risk of 
deforestation increases as the percentage of forest decreases. The amount of forest is also 












Percentage of forest loss 
(1980-2010) 
Pearson Correlation 1 .798** .064 -.869** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .003 .851 .001 
N  11 11 11 11 
Mean risk of Deforestation Pearson Correlation .798** 1 .389 -.954** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003  .238 .000 
N 11 11 11 11 
Marginality index (2005) Pearson Correlation .064 .389 1 -.162 
Sig. (2-tailed) .851 .238  .634 
N 11 11 11 11 
Percentage of forest Pearson Correlation -.869** -.954** -.162 1 




N 11 11 11 11 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 19. Correlation Matrix of Percentage of Deforestation, Marginality and Risk of Deforestation 
Like the deforestation pattern of the Huasteca Potosina Region, the major percentages of 
deforestation at the municipios took place during the 1980s, most of it occurring in the municipio 
of Cd. Valles, while Aquismon, Tamasopo and El Naranjo experienced more forest depletion 
during the last two decades. Here again, the differences in land tenure systems might also be 
influencing such differences given that among these selected municipios, Cd. Valles is the one 
with major area under private property (44 percent). To have a better understanding of what have 
actually happened within social properties and its forest a sample of 43 nucleos selected for the 
analysis.    
 
Risk of deforestation at the nucleos agrarios scale  
From the sample of 43 nucleos, 31 were within or at least part of a critical area defined 
by PROFEPA and altogether presented a mean risk of deforestation of 3.47 (medium risk). The 
graphic below shows the distribution frequency of the deforestation index value (X axis) among 
the nucleos in the sample. 
 
Graphic 14.Frequency distribution of the risk of deforestation index among the nucleos of the sample 
 
The map of the nucleos’ risk of deforestation below shows clearly that the forested territories in 










The risk of deforestation index and percentage of forest change were compared with the 
variables thought to influence deforestation at the nucleo level. Marginality was not significantly 
related to either.  Instead, the most influential variables for the risk of deforestation turned out to 
be 1) the percentage of indigenous population (0.412 with Pearsons’ at 0.01), 2) population 
density (0.345 at 0.05), and 3) the percentage of forest within the nucleos (-0.328 at 0.05) (see 
correlation matrix below). The nucleos with the highest percentages of forest decrease, located 
predominantly in the south, do not always coincide with their risk of deforestation. Moreover, 
the percentage of forest lost by nucleos is correlated (0.471 Pearson’s at 0.01) with the 
proportion of land held in forest; the bigger the percentage in forest, the greater the percentage of 
forest lost during the period.  
 
 
Patterns of land use and deforestation within the sample of nucleos agrarios 
Deforestation in social properties varies according to their geographical context and land 
use composition; within the sample of 43 nucleos located along the sierra and where the 
majority has more than 50 percent of its territory forested, the periods of deforestation differ 
from the overall region. After the same major drop in forest coverage during the 1980s, a period 
of stabilization occurred from 1990 to 2000, but over the last decade two thousand hectares of 





Graphic 15. Forest coverage in the sampled nucleos from 1980 to 2010 
Looking more closely at where forests were lost over the last two decades (a period of land 
certification and titling), the biggest losses occurred in nucleos that certified all their territory as 
individual parcels (see table below). 
 
Graphic 16. Percentage of forest change in sampled nucleos according to their certification process 
 
The overall forest within the sample decreased 23 percent in three decades, but as the 
graphic below shows, changes in forest among nucleos of the sample had different outcomes; 19 
out of the 43 actually increased their forested areas, some as much as 30 percent, while 22 have 





Graphic 17. Percentage of forest change by nucleos (from 1980 to 2010) 
Looking at the land use composition of these social properties throughout the period, it was 
mainly agricultural land that was replacing forest, occupying from 8 percent of the territory in 
1980 but 17 percent by 2010 (see graphic below).         
 
Graphic 18. Proportion of land uses in sampled nucleos, from 1980 to 2010 
Interestingly, grasses for cattle (induced and cultivated) also have decreased over agricultural 
lands, reflecting the region’s rugged topography, low quality soils for the cultivation of grasses, 
and many other political and economic reasons mentioned above that undermined the cattle 
market. The causes for decline in cattle production in the region are beyond the reach of this 
dissertation but anecdotally several sample nucleos reported the activity to be unprofitable when 
new options like PES appeared.  
As previously mentioned, the forest conservation programs have become popular in the 
region over the past two decades, especially the PES program during the last one. The map 











Deforestation at the nucleos’ scale, tropical vs. temperate forest 
The types of forest affected most by deforestation within the nucleos’ level differ from 
the regional pattern; in nucleos, temperate forests showed a total reduction of 46 percent while 
tropical forest decreased 12 percent (see graphic below). While at the Huasteca Potosina region 
scale temperate forest has actually regained areas during the last decades, the biggest lost in 
temperate forest among the sampled nucleos happened during the last decade, while tropical 
forest has stayed stable for the last two decades. The discrepancy between the forest change at 
the regional and the sampled nucleos’ scale could be due to a skewed sample of nucleos or a 
different dynamic of forest clearing between nucleos, private, and public properties, but further 
investigation would be needed to identify the discrepancies. 
 
Graphic 19. Forest change by type of forest within the sampled nucleos from 198 to 2010 
 
The correlation values between marginality and deforestation at the nucleos’ scale also 
differed from the regional results, showing a significant correlation of 0.391 (under Pearson’s at 
0.01 level) but only when restricting the analysis to temperate, not tropical, forest. The areas of 
the sample where temperate forest is dominant include the municipios of Tamasopo, El Naranjo 
and Xilitla. For the last two, where the PES program has been operating over a decade, several 
nucleos have actually experienced an increase in their forest coverage, but for Tamasopo, where 
the presence of PES has been null so far, temperate forest decreased prominently. Some nucleos 
in Xilitla have lost temperate forest, contrasting with the El Naranjo to the north, where, on the 
contrary, all nucleos have increased their temperate forests (as high as 14 percent) and where the 
marginality rating is medium, thanks to the sugarcane industry. In communities losing the most 




correlation; however, the causes of deforestation may not lie in poverty itself but in recent 
longer, hotter, and drier dry seasons, resulting in more forest fires, and other factors associated 
with poverty, like the imposition of highways and illegal privatization of land. 
La Palma, for example, has lost the most temperate forest and represents a starkly clear 
case of how insecurity of land tenure, ethnically discriminatory development schemes, and social 
disruption can deeply impact the forest and its inhabitants. An indigenous community in 
Tamasopo and one of the biggest nucleos agrarios in the state, La Palma lost 2,071 ha. of forest 
from 1990 to 2010, and of those 1,542 ha. were primary temperate forest. A factor long 
exacerbating deforestation there has been the Mexico-70 freeway, the main artery connecting the 
city of San Luis Potosí with the Huasteca. Compounding this, the construction of a new parallel 
toll road begun in the mid 2000s and completed in 2013, which has dramatically impacted the 
area socially and ecologically. The new road inflamed territorial divisions between the 
indigenous and the mestizo (45 percent) populations in the nucleo. The lands, originally bought 
by the indigenous people after the passage of the communal lands law and officially restituted as 
such by a presidential decree in 1922, have since 2006 been in the process of conversion to a 
non-ethnic ejido by the mestizos without the indigenous people’s consent. Indigenous resistance 
has stalled the certification process, but regardless, during highway construction several mestizos 
sold permits and properties to the construction company ICA for land the indigenous people 
consider theirs.52 In 2012 a wave of ethnic violence surged when the mestizos tried to complete 
the certification process while the indigenous population was trying to secure the title of 
indigenous community based on the new state reforms on indigenous rights. Two indigenous 
activists were killed and death threats continue against other members.53 Despite the internal 
conflict, the nucleo tried to participate in the PES program in 2010, but since no agreement could 
be made between the mestizo and indigenous populations, their participation never passed the 
proposal stage.          
For the tropical forest, decreases occurred throughout the region during the 1980s, 
especially in the southern municipios of Xilitla, Matlapa and Tamazunchale, but thereafter 
                                                            
52 Interview with indigenous inhabitants of the ejido by the human rights commission of the State of San Luis 
Potosíin 2009.   
53 Personal communication with Juan Cisneros, personnel of the National Commission for the Development of 
Indigenous People (CDI) in San Luis, who was assisting them in legitimate the indigenous community as part of one 




remained stable. It is worth noting that all the nucleos that experienced over 30 percent decrease 
in tropical forest are now participating in the PES program, specifically in shade grown coffee 
agroforestry, which includes the promotion of a great variety of arboreal species that provide 
fruits, traditional medicines, and construction material. 
The cultivation of shade grown coffee is so embedded in the cultural traditions especially 
in the southern region despite the instability of coffee prices, less land availability, and the 
increasingly unpredictable weather. When the government withdrew support for coffee 
production in 1989, it had little impact on the amount of land devoted to coffee in the southern 
region (Martinez-Torres 2006). The world coffee crisis in the 1990s due to overproduction and a 
dramatic drop in prices, devastated small coffee growers in the region the most. Regardless, 
Ponette-Gonzales (2007) reported that almost ten years of low coffee prices did not deter the 
Teenek region of Aquismón from continuing coffee cultivation. What is ultimately motivating 
conversion from coffee to subsistence production is rising population, such that landowners must 
consider food security over the risks of the market (Ponette-González 2007).  
Between 2011 and 2012, coffee production dropped dramatically within the region, in 
part because of unusually hot, dry weather and a severe frost in the high-altitude areas. Coffee 
orchards were temporarily used to grow subsistence crops, but the coffee plantations eventually 





Figure 19. Coffee plot turned into a milpa (with corn and squash) while recovering from a frost. Tampaxal, Xilitla 2011. 
Unfortunately, as in many other places, more extreme temperatures have become common, 
hurting peasant production already stressed by overpopulation, shorter fallow periods, and soil 
degradation.  
The state-government implemented the Fondo Potosino del Café (Potosí Coffee Fund) to 
bolster coffee production and help growers during natural disasters, but as with many other 
programs, the program is inefficient due to a well-established culture of corruption in the region. 
The money designated for inclement weather losses barely trickles to the affected people, 
reinforcing the urge to combine coffee production with swidden agriculture as a way to diversify 
and secure subsistence in impoverished areas. The agroforestry PES program, in which several 
southern nucleos are participating, is another way that coffee growers can increase their profits, 
but not enough to reduce poverty. 
In sum, the correlation between deforestation and poverty was weak at the regional and 
nucleo scales from 1980 to 2010.  Both marginality and deforestation decreased, but they did not 
coincide to a significant degree at the local level and the degrees of marginality did not vary with 
the amount of deforestation.  Rather, land reforms and government programs have been more 
influential in changing land use of the region.  Deforestation was highest in the 1980s especially 




impacted by the Pujal Coy irrigation project.  During the 1990s, deforestation slowed, as tropical 
forest depletion decelerated and temperate forest regain three thousand hectares. 
Correspondinlgy, the distribution of NCPE ejidos slowed and finally ended in 1997 and the 
restitution of indigenous community lands ended in 2000. Although forest depletion due to land 
redistribution practically ended during this period, the implementation of the neoliberal reforms 
starting with the land certification and titling process, and the liberalization of the market 
impacted lands use in agrarian nucleos, including their communal forested areas. In addition, 
subsidiary programs like Procampo, launched in the mid of the 1990s with the purpose of 
improving peasants’ agricultural practices and the economy, encouraged the expansion of 
agriculture into forested areas. At the same time, the first programs involving payments for 
forestry conservation began, such as that of the grassroots’ Sierra Gorda organization in several 
nucleos of Xilitla. 
For the last decade, forest cover has maintained fairly stable with no major decreases; 
only 950 hectares of temperate forest were lost while tropical forest actually gained 4,422 
hectares. In this period the land certification process ended in 2006 with the completion of 90 
percent of the social properties of the region,54 but land certification and titling did not prove to 
have a decreasing impact on deforestation.  Nucleos that certified their lands up to the parcel 
level have higher percentage of loss than the ones that did not enter the certification process or 
that only certified the perimeter. On the contrary, nucleos that engaged in full privatization in the 
form of dominio pleno experienced higher forest depletion during the first decade of the 
certification process.  
The creation of the CONAFOR forest commission in 2001 promoted numerous reforestation 
projects at the community level throughout the region. Even though many of these projects failed 
due to poor planning and bad quality of seedlings,55 it revived the discourse on the importance of 
forest protection and restoration, and together with Sierra Gorda set the bases for the 
implementation of the PES program in 2004. While forest depletion has largely been due to 
agricultural expansion and government incentives, more so than marginality per se, as seen 
                                                            
54 After 2006, a similar program, FANAR, has continued certifying the remaining agrarian nucleos at a much slower 
pace, since most of them pending ones have either boundary problems or are against the certification ideology. 
55 From field work and interviews with private and social properties that participated in the CONAFOR’s 




below environmental services programs have more recently played a critical role in forest 





VI. The Spatial Correspondence between the Implementation of PES 
Programs in the Huasteca Region and CONAFOR’s Prioritized Areas. 
 
After identifying the patterns of the deforestation in the region, one of the main research 
objectives was to see correspondence between deforestation and the implemented projects in 
CONAFOR’s PES program. First, I will describe the PES areas, their coverage in the Huasteca 
region and the sampled nucleos’ degree of prioritization according to CONAFOR’s grading 
system.  
By 2012 CONAFOR’s prioritization scheme included six categories of eligible areas (I to 
VI) based on the type of forest, the environmental services it provided, and its risk of 
deforestation. Certain categories of vegetation, like cloud forest under high risk of deforestation, 
were graded for the higher payments, while dryer and disturbed forest, like thorn forest and 
secondary forest with low risk of deforestation, received the lowest payments. For San Luis 
Potosi, the areas eligible for PES cover 8,403 km² of different types of vegetation. Areas in 
categories I, II, and III are eligible for hydrological services, and areas IV, V and VI are eligible 
for biodiversity services. The Huasteca only includes areas in categories from II to VI, not I for 
cloud forest under very high risk of deforestarion. This exclusion of category I by CONAFOR 
contradicts INEGI’s IV (2010) land use vegetation series and INE’s risk of deforestation data, 
which if overlapped cartographically show 90 ha of cloud forest with very high risk in the 
southern municipio of Xilitla. Land owners with forest designated in category I would get around 
100 USD per hectare each year for the first five years with a possible extension of up to 10 years.  
Category II includes cloud forest under high to low risk of deforestation and is applied to 
areas found scattered in the municipalities of Xilitla, Tamasopo and El Naranjo.  There were 
3,742 hectares of cloud forest in the region classified by CONAFOR, but only 2,729 ha. were 
found when GIS intersecting vegetation and the risk of deforestation index. Payments for these 
areas are around 70 USD/ha. but the areas must fall between 100-200 hectaries for individual 
properties and 200-3,000 for lands controlled by social entities like ejidos and communities.  
Area III includes temperate and sub deciduous forest under very high to very low risk of 
deforestation. For this category land owners receive considerably less money, around $38 
USD/ha., but the area limits are increased to a maximum of 6,000 ha (CONAFOR, 2012).  




the study area, covering 144,859 ha., from which only 89,322 ha were as under risk according to 
the risk of deforestation index.    
Category IV covers perennial and sub-perennial tropical forest with very high to very low 
risk of deforestation.  Within the region, there are 141,364 ha of perennial and sub-perennial 
tropical forest, with 64 percent being sub-perennial forest and 36 percent perennial, and 70 
percent of these are classified with some risk of deforestation. This type of vegetation was taken 
out of hydrological services to conservation of biodiversity services in 2012, which is more 
appropriate for the region since most of the areas with perennial forest shelters shade grown 
coffee plantations with high diversity of birds. The payments in this area are around $55 USD 
per ha/year for land areas that must fall within 200-3,000 ha for social organizations 
(CONAFOR, 2012).   
The V and VI categories are also for the conservation of biodiversity, and the limits for 
area submission for organizations are between 200 to 2,000 hectares. The V category includes 
deciduous and thorn forest with high and very high risk of deforestation, while category VI 
includes the same type of vegetation but with medium to very low risk. For the study region, 
45,522 hectares of deciduous forest is covered under category V, three percent of which is 
riparian vegetation.  Landowners in these areas receive $38 USD/ha.  For VI category, with less 
risk of deforestation, covers 185,837 ha. of the study area.  The program pays around $28 USD 
per ha/year under this category (ibib.).  Oddly, 59 percent of category VI lands were agricultural 
fields and urban areas, according to INEGI’s survey. 
The new delimitations eligible for PES in the study region published in 2012 have some 
moderate changes from those of 2010, expanding from 352,688 ha. to 389,366 ha. The types of 
land uses under each category changed as well.  One major change was perennial tropical forest 
(category IV) being transfered from hydrological services to conservation of biodiversity 
services. The changes according to CONAFOR respond to the demand of applicants, observed 
results, and updated information of land use and forest change.56 Many of these are forested 
shade coffee plantations, and the biggest ecological benefit is providing habitat for a high 
diversity of birds. The areas with perennial and sub-deciduous forest are one of the most 
extensive in the study region, and the reclassification of use for conservation of biodiversity has 
                                                            





meant a reduction in payments from 56 USD/ha. to 44 USD/ha for areas of very high risk of 
deforestation and 30 USD/ha for areas of less risk.  Thus, even with an overall increase of land in 
the PES program, the re-classification of areas has diminished the value of payments provided to 
the region (see maps below). The diminution of category IV payments has hit the southern region 
the hardest because it has more perennial forest (and coffee orchards) and is also the poorest in 
the region, providing further reason, besides having to engage in activities that does not suit their 
land use, to withdraw from the program. 
                                     Map 26. Areas eligible for PES in 2010  




                         Map 27. Areas eligible for PES in 2012 
From the sample of 43 nucleos of the study area in the 2010 delimitation, 37 had more 
than 50 percent of their territory eligible for PES, while six were not eligible at all. In 2012 one 
more nucleo became eligible. Regarding the actual enrollment in the program, 29 nucleos are 
participating: 23 in hydrological services, five in agroforestry with forests shading coffee, and 
one in a planning phase of a project for conservation for biodiversity. For the 14 not 




shows the location of the nucleos, their number of years in the program since its implementation, 
and the distribution of categories. Because the program length is five years, the nucleos were 
grouped into three categories: zero, five, and ten years or more. A common practice among the 
participating nucleos is the submission of separate forested areas to the program during different 
periods to increase their chances of extended funding. This strategy is obvious in the bigger 
nucleos of the northern zone.  There, for example, participating ejidos commonly have areas 
staggered in different periods under hydrological services, while in the southern region, where 












The CONAFOR’s grading system for the prioritization of proposed areas for PES is 
explained in detail in the methodology section, so only the main three parts of the prioritization 
process will be highlighted here. First, the proposed polygon has to be within the eligible areas 
described before; only applicants to agroforestry – mainly coffee growers – can apply without 
this requirement. Then, a grading system of eight general variables with a maximum score of 37 
point is applied to all the applicants, and depending on the category of the program they want to 
participate, there are six other variables considered, for a maximum score of 29 points (see the 
appendix I. PES grading prioritization in nucleos). Curiously, the point totals for participants 
ranged from 14 to 27 points, but some non-participants ranged even higher, from 18 to 27 points, 
and the average of rejected applicants was 25 points.  
The map below displays the nucleos’ scores and the years they have been in the program, 
showing that in general there is a correspondence between lower scores and lesser time in the 
program.  Conversely, the areas with longest time in the program – the northern mountains of El 
Naranjo and the southeastern mountains of Xilitla – had the highest prioritization scores. Using 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient to analyze the relationship between the environmental and 
social variables on the one hand, and length in the program on the other, revealed a significant 
correlation (0.431 at a 0.05 level). The nonparametric Spearman’s coefficient also showed a high 
correlation (0.462 at a 0.05 level, see appendix II). In these terms, the allocation of the PES 










Since CONAFOR’s prioritization variables for PES have constantly changed, the targeting 
areas have also changed throughout the years, but as the INE graphic shows below, high 
marginality, although with different weight, has always been an element of focus (INE 2011). 
Even for the years after 2008, marginality has maintained a core element along with risk of 
deforestation for the prioritization of PES areas.  
 
 
           Graphic 20.  Prioritization of variables for PES, from 2003 to 2008. Source: INE, 2009 
 
For the sample of nucleos, however, an analysis between prioritization scores and 
marginality index presented no significant correlation in any of the parametric or non-parametric 
coefficients. Although the marginality index has been used by government agencies to prioritize 
program implementation at the local and regional level, it does not seem to be related to 
increasing deforestation or any other environmental variables considered for the prioritization of 




and at the nucleos scale most of the sample presented from medium to very high marginality 
values.  This alone should make all nucleos priorities for the PES program.  
When compared with the actual implementation of the program we found that among the 
seven nucleos with very high marginality, four of them have PES, and one of them, “Tampaxal”, 
has been incrementing its PES categories since 2007 and now manages three services. In terms 
of the economic impact of PES funding, it is not reflected in the nucleos decrease of the 
marginality57. The marginalization index alone, however, does not explain all the possible 
economic benefits that these kinds of programs can bring to a community in the short or long 
term; therefore, a deeper scrutiny involving interviews with community members regarding the 
economic impact of the program was implemented. These economic impacts will be discussed at 
the section, “Perceptions and Impressions on the Social Impacts of the Program among PES 
Participants.”    
On the other hand, the risk of deforestation and prioritization scores were significantly 
correlated (0.612 at 0.05 level using Spearman’s coefficient), coherent with the PES program’s 
policy to prevent deforestation in areas of high risk. When evaluating the actual implementation 
of the program among the PES participants of the sample, 16 nucleos presented very low and 
medium risk of deforestation while 13 presented high and very a high risk. Between the 
nonparticipants, 8 out of 14 with medium prioritization scores (between 16 to 20 points) 
presented medium to high deforestation risks, two with higher scores (22 points) presented high 
and very high risk, and one with 25 points presented medium risk. This last case in particular 
refers to El Chuchupe, an indigenous ejido that has been rejected two times and once accepted 
with no funding, is surrounded by PES participant communities and 98 percent of its territory is 
forested, all elements that gives them a high score, however its medium risk of deforestation and 
boundary conflicts with private owners seems to prevent their participation.    
When calculating the scores of the nucleos for the two main categories of the program, 
hydrological and conservation for biodiversity services, the northern region appeared more 
suitable for hydrological services and the southern for biodiversity services, as the 2012 re-
categorization determined.  
                                                            
57 Marginality is calculated every five-year period, but periods cannot be easily compared because each period is 




For the category of hydrological services, the highest score obtained was 26 out of 29 points 
possible by the ejido San Nicolás de los Montes, whose proposal was actually rejected in 2010. It 
contains a mestizo population, presents high marginality, lies within eligible areas, but its forests 
covering 95 percent of the communal lands (16,913 ha.) have low risk of deforestation. On the 
other extreme, a community with second lowest score at only 16 points was participating in the 
program. From the polygons already participating in hydrological services, five received higher 
scores for agroforestry services, but as mentioned, participants prefer hydrological services 
because they are more profitable.   
For the conservation of biodiversity services, the highest score found in the sample was 26 
points from 29 possible, received by both participant and non-participant nucleos with shade 
grown coffee. Scores for agroforestry were particularly high in the southern region because of its 
importance as areas for the conservation of birds and endangered species. The Huasteca Potosina 
is part of the distribution corridors of mammals in danger of extinction like Panthera onca 
(jaguar) and potentially for Leopardus pardalis (ocelot).  It is also inhabited by threatened 
nectar-feeding bat species like Choeronycteris Mexicana, located around the municipios of Cd. 
Valles and Xilitla, and Leptonycteris nivalis, found in Cd. Valles. Both are key pollinators with 
an ample distribution around the country, but their temperate forest habitat is shrinking and has 
put their population under risk (Baker and Cockrum 1966). The region also hosts protected 
species like the monkey Poto flavus (kinkajou or mico de noche) still found in remote areas of 
Xilitla and Tamazunchale, and the small-eared shrew Cryptotis obscura, also found in Xilitla.  
For the category of biodiversity services, the two highest scores were obtained by participant 
nucleos in the hydrological services program, which again provides greater payments. One of the 
consequences of coffee-growing nucleos participating in categories other than the more suitable 
biodiversity one has been the reduction of the variety of tree species used as shade. The lowest 
scores of participating nucelos were 12 points, a score lower than all seven of the non-
participating nucleos, including three that had in fact applied and were rejected. There seems to 
be no pattern for why non-participating nucleos are rejected.  Most had the same or higher scores 
as the participating nucleos, were within eligible areas, and had at least 50 percent of their 
territory forested. Only one, the ejido of Estación Micos, did not meet the priority qualification 
of having old grown forest (also categorized as in arboreal stage), while the rest had more than 




presentation of nucleos’ legal documentation (carpeta basica) for the area to be managed. For 
the nucleos that were certified by PROCEDE all this documentation is easily assembled, but for 
the nucleos not certified it can be much more challenging. As mentioned above, the certification 
of property was once a requirement for participation, but since many of the areas with higher risk 
of deforestation were not certified, that requirement was rescinded, at least until the last 
operational rules in 2012. Within the sample, there are 13 nucleos without certification and 10 of 
them are participating in the program (see Map 27), but in many cases the reason why they are 
not certified, for example boundary problems, can prevent their participation in the PES. Of the 
seven nucleos outside the PES program, none were officially excluded due to certification, and 






The following map shows the location of the PES program and the scores for the two 
categories within the sample of nucleos agrarios. 
 
Map 28. PES prioritization scores by category within the agrarian nucleos of the sample 
 
When the scores for each category were correlated with the social variables involved in the 
prioritization process (see appendix II. Correlation matrix of PES in nucleos), statistically 
significant relationships were found but not with the marginality index.  
Using Pearson’s correlation coefficient, the scores for hydrological services were 
significantly correlated with the percentages of: forest within the nucleo, common use areas, and 
forest in arboreal stages within the program. The nucleos with higher scores for hydrological 
services also had a higher proportion of forest within the nucleo and the highest percentage of it 
in arboreal stages. The percentage of land held in forest was inversely correlated with the 




proportion of forest. The risk of deforestation was correlated with the general preference scores, 
such that nucleos with higher risk of deforestation in CONAFOR’s prioritization scheme are 
indeed prioritized for the implementation of PES.  
     For the biodiversity scores, the Spearman’s coefficient showed a significant inverse 
correlation (-0.553) with the percentage of communal use; the nucleos with higher scores tend to 
have less percentage of land held in communal property. This value is consistent with the 
nucleos that have shade grown coffee, the most common activity practiced by indigenous 
population where parcels are owned communlly and reported as such for the hydrological PES 
program, but managed individually. The difference between the “official”ownership and the 
internal land management makes the administration of the program a little trickier when 
payments and labor have to be made according to the percentage of land that each member has 
submitted.  The new categorization of perennial tropical forest into the eligible areas for 
biodiversity conservation might restrict these practices, but the payments must increase or at 
least match the hydrological payments per hectare for the services to be profitable and for coffee 





VII. The Contributions of the PES Program to Stop Deforestation. 
 
The scope of the PES program since the beginning of its implementation in 2003 until 2011 
has been small but nonetheless important, covering less than 20 percent of the 407,800 hectares 
of forest in the Huasteca Potosina. As seen in the patterns of deforestation section, forest for the 
whole region has stabilized during the last decade and tropical forest even increased 1.5 percent, 
but because of the programs’ scope, the decrease on deforestation cannot be attributed to it. As 
discussed in previous sections, there are numerous economic, political and cultural factors that 
influence the lost of forest, but among the most representative for the region during the analyzed 
time period have been in the form of the state interventions. As Aguilar-Robledo (1995, 2002) 
characterizes state interventions that target land-uses, they can be operative or normative, the 
regional development projects of Pujal-Coy for example, is a perfect illustration of an operative 
direct intervention. Other not regionally specific operative interventions that nonetheless have 
different impacts within the region are for example, the agricultural subsidiary programs like 
Procampo or the Payments for Environmental Services program. Impacts of such programs differ 
according to specific social, cultural, economic and environmental factors in each micro-region. 
The impacts of the PES program have been different in the north and southern region of the 
study area but also within nucleos of each area, however, as will be described below, some 
shared elements of the PES development can predict a positive or negative impact on reducing 
deforestation.  
 
At the nucleos level 
Since most of the forest in the country is owned and managed communally within agrarian 
nucleos or social properties and most of the PES programs have been implemented on these land 
tenure system, the analyses focused on the variety of conditions in which the program work or do 
not work at this scale. To approach the impact of the program on reducing deforestation only the 
six nucleos in my sample that have been participating in the program for at least two periods (ten 
years) were considered. These nucleos are: 1. Chalahuite, 2. Coronel Jose Castillo Tlamaya, 3. 
La Trinidad, 4. La Concepcion, 5. El Limonal, and 6. Los Alamos (see map below). Some of 




experienced disrupted payments for a variety of reasons that will be discussed ahead. Influential 
factors like land tenure, land use, forest management, community organization and perceptions 
















El Chalahuite  
The ejido of Chalahuite has 1,950 hectares and a relatively small population, with 180 in 
total and 38 ejidatarios. It is one of the nucleos with the highest marginality index in the sample, 
and one of the first nucleos in the region to enter the PES program in 2003. Its orginal 1,460 
hectares in the program has been reduced to only 645 hectares, but it is applying for another 700 
hectares. The ejido has not been certified because it has boundaries problems with the 
neighboring ejido of Tampaxal, Aquismón, whose inhabitants have invaded the territory. Its land 
tenure system has gradually changed from originally all common use in 1960 to only the hectares 
in hydrological services program as communal today. They also have 40 ha. of collective 
pasturelands and 400 ha. of individually controlled croplands. 
The ejido entered the program with the assisatnce of the Sierra Gorda NGO, an ecological 
group with a long-standing presence in the area. The comisariado (president of the ejido) 
explained that initially only 11 ejidatarios entered the program because everyone else was afraid 
that the NGO intended to buy their lands. Only after the municipal president of Xilitla at the 
time, Mario Mtz. Peralta, convinced them of the program’s real intensions did enrollments 
increase. 
Besides the forest-maintenance activities required by the program, like building fire breaks 
and keeping the water springs clean of debris, payments helped them on the construction of a 32-
ton water reservoir for the dry season. After the first five-year period more ejidatarios decided to 
participate, totaling 24 by 2009. The money ($790 USD) is distributed equally between 
ejidatarios (landowners) and avecindados (residents with rights to assigned lands) and the rest 
$1,2000 USD is kept as cash reserves for coming expenses58. Problems of internal corruption 
have been disrupting maintenance activities and payments, and the last administration reported 
the cash reserves as missing. The current comisariado explained that the payments are not 
always sufficient because the amount of work-days needed to complete the activities, paid at 
$9.6 USD/day, exceeds the profits of the program. By the time I visited the ejido in 2011, they 
were still waiting for the 2010 payment, and the delay had angered some community members to 
the point that they started to deforest areas inside the program for slash-burn agriculture. This 
created divisiveness in the ejido because some members preferred to wait for the payments but 
                                                            




would be punished or even banned from the program just as the others who did not wait.  This a 
common problem for lands communally held when actually they are managed individually.    
Despite the problems, the ejido experienced no major changes in forest coverage over the 
decade. As with the regional pattern, its major deforestation occurred during the 1980s when it 
lost 10 percent of its forest cover. Today, although 90 percent of the ejido is forested, only 15 
percent of the forest inside the PES polygon is in the arboreal stage, and the forested areas lost in 
1980 have not been recovered. One outstanding difference in forest cover is an increase of 33 
percent of temperate forest and a decrease of 65 percent of tropical forest. Such changes in forest 
categorization, however, should be taken with caution, especially when comparing between the 
first and the rest of INEGI’s vegetation series due to the different techniques used for the 
classification of vegetation. 
From the participants’ perspective, the major impact of PES has been the reduction of 
seasonal migration.  Fewer people have to leave in search of jornales (temporary labor): 
“Before, people use to go as far as the state of Monterrey in the search of a job, and now with the 
program many prefer to stay.  We all prefer the program to continue, but when payments are so 
unstable I cannot prohibit other members to work their lands and reestablish pastures to obtain 
much needed income59” 
Payments delays are a common problem, the reason for which is almost always the poor 
performance of technician. For Chalahuite, technicians have delayed submitting annual activities 
reports to CONAFOR. Especially worrisome is that technicians receive their payment in 
advance, so they are not punished for poor performance.  Members of ejido believe that the 
$3,280 USD earned annually by the technician could be better spent. CONAFOR has tried 
different payments system throughout the years, initially passing payments to the technicians by 
way of participants, but poor accounting practices resulted in a shortfall of payments to 
technicans, so CONAFOR began to pay the technicians directly even though technically they are 
in the employ of the participants. The comisariado suggests that if payments were increased and 
given on time, the program would work better.  
In summary, it is hard to evaluate the effects of the PES program in reducing deforestation in 
the ejido over the course of a decade because Chalahuite experienced the same long-term forest 
patterns as the rest of the region.  Nevertheless, the fact that forest coverage is not decreasing and 
                                                            




its members are receiving much needed extra income suggests some positive impact.  The 
payments alone have benefitted ejido members in reducing migration, although marginality 
levels are still very high. For an ejido that is still fighting over boundary limits, to have both 
community cohesion by participation in a common program and decreased migration is critical 
in their struggle for just certification of their land.  
 
Coronel Jose Castillo Tlamaya  
Also within the jurisdiction of Xilitla, the Nahua ejido of Coronel Jose Castillo Tlamaya has 
been participating in the program for more than a decade. It is one of the most beautiful ejidos of 
the region in terms of scenery, is 75 percent forested, and contains the emblematic geographical 
feature of the Xilitla region, “El Cerro de la Silleta” (Saddle Mountain), the highest peak of the 
Xilitla range that resembles a seat. The ejido has a total population of 2,463, with 200 
landowners, increasing by 2.2 percent from 2005 to 2010 while maintaining a high marginality 
index. The principal economic activities is the production of shade-grown coffee, subsistence 
agriculture, and occasionally guiding tours to Saddle Mountain (Xilitla is better known for Sir 
Edward James enormous surrealistic jungle sculpture or “castle”). The ejido entered the program 
without PROCEDE certification in 2003 with 2,600 hectares, submitting 85 percent of their 
territory into the PES, but in 2005 they certified their lands, parceling 1,836 hectares and leaving 
1,197 hectares in common use according to PHINA. Ejido members, however, claim they have 
2,600 hectares for common use.  When they renewed their contract with CONAFOR in 2008, 
only the “official” 1,197 hectares of communal use were accepted, but the ejido had not given up 
the struggle to add 1,400 hectares of parceled lands to the program. The parceled lands are 
primarily used for shade-grown coffee, although also include between 300 and 400 hectares of 
corn, and around 70 hectares of pastures.60 Only ejidatarios (land owners) have the right to 
access and decide on the use of the common area. When asked about the regulations of the 
communal area, all agreed about their existence but nobody has seen them for more than 25 
years. 
One of the committee members commented that before they started participating in the PES 
program, they use to cut a lot of timber without control, but now they have oversight committees 
for each neighborhood that also perform reforestation. As a result, the forest coverage analysis 
                                                            




shows a loss of 25 percent during the 1980s but none thereafter, with risk of deforestation 
declining to “medium.”   
The major problem that they face now is plagues like mistletoe, which occupies a primary 
maintenance activity supported by the program, and although the PES money can be applied to 
it, participants can and usually do request additional funding for this procedure. The only plague 
control that the ejido implemented was in 2003 as an activity separate from the PES, but the 
ejido funds typically used to pay for day labor was “lost,” compelling the ejido to demand faena 
(obligatory and usually unpaid community work). After that experience, two delegates now 
manage the money to be distributed to community laborers. 
The first years of the PES program, as previously mentioned, did not require participants to 
do any maintenance activities, only encouraged them to guard the forests from illegal timber 
cutting. Since 2008, however, reforestation activities and the construction of firebreaks and water 
reservoirs were included as part of the required activities for PES. This ejido assures that for the 
last four years they have planted 5,000 pines and made more than 50 kilometers of firebreaks. In 
regards to the management of reforestation, they usually occur immediately before the municipal 
president or somebody else in the government needs to report ecological activities, so the 
optimum seasons and locations for replanting are often not considered. I had the opportunity to 
be present at one of these events when the representative of CONAFOR in San Luis, needed to 
report the amount of area reforested for the period and Poncho, a former oceanographer now 
working as PES technician for several ejidos of the Huasteca, offered to distribute the needed 
seedlings among the participating nucleos, and after only a brief meeting with some ejido 
members, they decided to plant the pine seedlings in a private shade grown coffee plot that had 






Figure 20. Reforestation with Pine seedlings in a shade grown coffee plot in Coronel Jose Castillo Tlamaya 
As in Tamaxal, the owner had planted corn in the plot while his coffee recovered. When I 
asked Poncho about the percentage of surviving plants in this kind of reforestation on private 
parcels, he said it was actually better than in communal areas. It is a win-win for everyone 
because they fulfill the requirements of the program while the private owners get planted trees 
free of charge. After noticing my skepticism, he later took me to a private corn plot where 
another reforestation had taken place the year before.  To my surprise, pine saplings a meter and 
half high were spread around the hectare plot (see photo below). Though such private plantings 
of pine are seen all over the region, the future of such reforestations is uncertain because pine is 
suitable neither for shade grown coffee or corn plots, both of which are central activities in local 
life.  Poncho’s hope is that people will abandon those long-established activities for the sake of 





Figure 21. A year old pine, reforestation in a cornfield. 
Another common activity in hydrological services is clearing lanes for firebreaks, which is 
fortuitous for ejidos because their members have traditionally made such lanes at territorial 
boundaries for free anyway, but now are done with PES remuneration. Only the ejidatarios 
which sum 200 or more members can participate in the program and receive individual payments 
of $164 USD for forest maintenance.  At the onset of PES they received $312 USD, but since the 
amount hectares in the program were reduced, the payments were cut nearly in half. As in other 
large ejidos, the members of Coronel Jose Castillo consider the payments to be inadquate for the 
activities required, but they appreciate how the payments have served as an impetus for 
community organization for the protection of the forest.     
Overall, this ejido has had a better experience than their neighbors in El Chalahuite.  The 
payments themselves have not reduced the high marginality rating for the community, and 
reforestation has had little impact because of poor planning, but they praised the experience of 
community organization and the protection of the forest.  They also spoke positively about 
Poncho, the technician, and his forestry PES collaborator, Miguel, together they receive $4,544 
USD annually for the technical assistance, an amount that the ejido feels fair considering the 





La Trinidad  
 La Trinidad is another ejido from the Xilitla region that has been participating in the PES 
program since 2003. It has 1,885 hectares of forest and a small settlement located in a valley at 
the top of the mountain range, with a total population of only 103 (see photo below).  
 
Figure 22. Village of La Trinidad, by Sierra Gorda A.C 
Its marginality index is high despite the implementation of a tourism project in 2005, and its 
population experienced a 24 percent increase in the 7 years thereafter. They started with only 90 
hectares in the PES program but by 2011 had 256 in and were in the process of including another 
700 more to the forest management program (controlled timber). The ejido is now mostly 
devoted to rural ecotourism by renting the use of bungalows and a rustic meeting hall (see photo 
below), providing tours to the surrounding cloud forest, and selling rural cuisine with local, 
organic garden produce and fresh made tortillas, to which they hope to add a trout farm. Unlike 
the rest of the communities and ejidos where houses are made from either bamboo and mud or 
concrete blocks, all the houses here are made from wooden logs and have solar panels installed 





Figure 23. Rustic meeting hall in the ejido La Trinidad, by Alejandro Ortiz Moya 
La Trinidad is remarkable for its dramatic reversal in land use.  Since the formation of the 
ejido, one outsider arranged to rent their land for his 60 head of free ranging livestock for the 
bargain price of seven dollars per year, when the going rate was 30 cents per head in natural 
grass and 40 cents in cultivated grass. Most of the people also practiced subsistence agriculture 
and earned income by illegally cutting cheap timber in Xilitla (14 km below). Since the livestock 
business was profitable for only a very few, the PES program combined with the Sierra Gorda 
tourism project provided an opportunity for all ejido members to better manage the land. They 
terminated a grass-planting project that benefitted mostly outsider for 35 years61 and were 
required to fence their own animals, such that one by one the members decided to sell their own 
animals. Although they have all the documentation required, unlike the vast majority of ejidos in 
the region, they have refused to certify their territory because most of it is held in common use 
and certification could cause privatization and eventual sale. As the comisariado proudly 
explained to me, and as I later experienced in one of my visits as a “tourist,” they are very well 
organized. Recovering their lands, forest and soils were among the major benefits that the 
program brought to the entire community, in addition to new jobs with the ecotourism project 
and the experience of community organization. 
 
 
                                                            




Their geographic location on the ridge of the mountain range, natural resources like 
streams and forests, and organization via the forestry and tourism programs have empowered 
them to demand basic services from the municipal government in exchange for access to their 
water. Gaining government support for infrastructure improvements is a constant battle 
communities and ejidos face.  In Xilitla, the landscape is littered with evidence of conflict, 
negligence, incompetence, and corruption, except when one nears La Trinidad, where mixed 
patches of crumbling pavement and rutted dirt gives way to a wide asphalt road.  This was only 
constructed with municipal and state government funding after the ejido took extreme measures 
and closed the water supply for 14 communities down the mountain, including parts of the Xilitla 
town center. Members of the ejido are proud of this achievement, however, the road is only 
improved within La Trinidad, not the 10 km between it and town, thus discouraging tourists 
without four-wheel-drive vehicles.  Nonetheless, that battle has showed them the power of 
natural resources and the negotiating skills that they need to make the most of environmental 
services. 
They receive around $6,960 USD annually from the PES program for 256 hectares, 
which is supplemented by the proceeds from ecotourism and other temporary projects.  The 
income is shared “almost evenly” by all families on Catholic holidays special days: on all saints 
day every family receives $80 USD, and on Christmas avencindados receive $160, ejidatarios 
receive $200, and the rest is kept to pay for work in reforestation, clearings, firebreak lines, etc. 
As mentioned, the population is relatively small but has been growing steadily, and the 
comisariado – who himself had 10 kids and a pregnant wife living in one room house – pointed 
out that “the community never ends, families keep growing in great need and the resources they 
receive are never sufficient.” 
The community lost six percent of its forest in the 1980s, but all regrow by 2000, and 
since, they have maintained a very low risk of deforestation. The GIS analysis concurred with 
the community representation of forest maintenance and the total land use conversion into forest 
conservation practices. As the comisariado explained, the conservation program has improved 






The non participant nucleos at the southern region 
All the nucleos in the southern region know about the PES program and many want to 
participate, but for internal problems or problems with property boundaries, many have failed to 
even complete the application process.  
The overwhelmingly mestizo nucleo of Miramar, for example, a neighbor of La Trinidad with 
1,020 inhabitants in 1,144 hectares, tried to submit 256 of their common use area into the PES 
program in 2008, but internal disrupts and land invasions prevented them from continuing the 
application process. The ejido had become involved in forest conservation with the Sierra Gorda 
association, and from 2003-08 fifteen members received payments for setting their individual 
parcels in the common use area for reforestation. They were still waiting for some promised 
equipment for pruning from the Sierra Gorda  association. During a community assembly they 
explained that the invasions in their common use area started in 1994 with the Procampo 
program, when landless peasant colonized provisional parcels there to receive the government 
support. The problem was exacerbated in 2004 when those disputed lands were certified in 
PROCEDE despite the trespassers not having proper documentation. Miramar legally challenged 
the certification of those areas based on the agrarian attorney rules62 about the common use, 
which states that it cannot be divided, but no agreement has been reached. During my visit in 
2012, there were 80 hectares invaded by 38 peasants from whom 15 were ejidatarios and the rest 
avecindados.  The usurpation has given them five to eight hectares per person whereas the rest of 
the ejidatarios and posesionarios (217 land owners in total) with legal titles had one and a half 
hectares apiece.63 
The ejidatarios all felt that PROCEDE divided the community and created a situation in which 
people are selling their parcels and very few attend the assemblies anymore. Although taxes are 
paid as a community, in reality most certified their properties and even house plots as 
agricultural parcels but are not paying their corresponding individual taxes. To make matters 
worse, “the amount of people invading the common use area keeps increasing because nobody 
receives a punishment,” said the comisariado, and “in the mean time we are losing our forest and 
the good source of income that La Trinidad has.”  Another member added, “our land is not 
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expanding but people are, and there is nowhere else to grow but to the common use area.” 
Despite land conflicts, the usurpations of the communal use area, and the high risk of 
deforestation index, the ejido has increased their forest coverage from 1980 to 2010 from 631 to 
747 hectares. However, population pressure and the consequent division of the agricultural land, 
the internal land conflicts, and the fact that they are not under any forest conservation program 
has put its forest and common use area at risk. Paradoxically, the agrarian reform intended to end 
land division has put pressure over common use areas, as they become the safety valve for 
desperate peasants. Unlike regions like Oaxaca, Michoacan, and Guerrero, where migration 
constitutes such a safety valve, peasants of the southern Huasteca Potosina migrate seasonaly to 
major cities like Monterrey, San Luis Potosi, and Guadalajara. For underpopulated nucleos like 
El Chalahuite, the PES program has reduced migration, but for overpopulated nucleos like 
Miramar, population pressure combined with poor community organization has increased their 
risk of deforestation and disqualified them from environmental services.  
Aguayo is another forested ejido within the jurisdiction of Xilitla, with 307 hectares 
certified by PROCEDE in 2003, 83 percent of which is forested and 78 percent is in arboreal 
stage. According to the INEGI vegetation inventories, Aguayo has lost 17 percent of their forest 
in the last 30 years, but in contrast with Miramar, its largely mestizo population is considerably 
smaller with only 33 ejidatarios and 156 people. The ejido has 139 hectares of parceled lands 
and 161 hectares of common use forest, for an average of workable land per ejidatario and 
posesionario of four hectares, above the regional average. The marginality of the ejido reduced 
from 2005 to 2010, and, unlike the majority of the houses in other communities, those in Aguayo 
are made of concrete with paved floors.  Nonetheless, it is still has high marginality rating. 
Although the ejido is surrounded by areas under the PES program, they are not participating in it 
because they do not had the minimum 200 hectares required to enter in the hydrological services 
category.  According to the risk of deforestation index, the ejido has a high risk of deforestation, 
which is threatened further still by a growing population. Still, they have prevented major 
deforestation since the 1980s and expanded the forest by eight percent in the 1990s.  
Another southern community of the sample not participating in the program is the Nahua 
community of Cuatlamayan in the municipio of Tacanhuitz, which has 788 hectares certified for 
common use. Here only the boundaries of the territory were certified in addition to few 




controlled by individual comuneros (330). The total population in the 2010 census was 2,463, an 
increase of 1.4 percent per year since 2005, a little above the national rate of one percent for the 
same period. The marginality index declined from 0.52 in 2005 to 0.06 by 2010 due to several 
infrastructure projects, although they still lie within the range of high marginality (-0.81 to 0.7).  
The last vegetation inventory of 2010 indicates 308 hectares of tropical forest in the 
community, almost none of which in the arboreal stage, making them unlikely candidates for the 
hydrological PES program.  They do, however, qualify for the agroforestry category. They 
transformed their landscape dramatically since the 1980s, as is visible in INEGI’s vegetation 
series. According to the participatory research mapping of the Mexico Indigena project in the 
Huasteca, the cultivation of corn during the 1970s and 80s was replaced by citrus orchards, 
especially oranges. Oranges were profitable for several years but falling prices have caused the 
abandonment of several orange plantations,64 which explains why former crop lands have 
reverted forest for a total increase of 12 percent since the 1980s.  Their economy is now based on 
migratory wage labor and a little earned from the orange and chamaedorea palm plantations, 
which is completmented with subsistence crops like corn, sugar cane and coffee.  Despite this 
forest increase and normal population growth within the ejido, the risk of deforestation index 
remains very high.   
Cuatlamayan has received CONAFOR and SEMARNAT support for the reforestation of 
10 hectares and the development of a carpentry shop involving a small group of comuneros. This 
enterprise has become renowned in the region for the quality of their products, but a solid forest 
conservation program involving the majority of the community remains lacking. Deforestation 
has been reduced in part because of the abandonment of orchards and CONAFOR and 
SEMARNAT requested vigilance against illegal timber cutting, but also because all the old 
growth forests with precious woods had already been cut. Elders lament the replacement of vast 
amount of valuable cedar and rosewood sold outside the community and the remaining less 
profitable woods like chijol (Psidia grandifolia), chaka (Bursera simaruba), and garabatillo 
(Mimmosa aculeaticarpa).  
When I visited the community in 2011, people knew little about the PES program, and in 
fact no nucleos were participating in PES in the entire municipio of Tancanhuitz, where no forest 
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remains under communal use and what is left of it lies outside CONAFOR eligible areas for the 
program. Their lack of mature forest and forest in common use makes the implementation of 
such programs harder because enough individual owners would have to organize to meet the 
minimum requirement of 200 hectares.  Even so, since they are outside the areas eligible for 
PES, their chances would be very low anyway. In addition, the long internal conflict between 
two of the major barrios of the community, Tuzantla and Cuatlamayan, has already prevented 
them from taking advantage of other government programs.  
 
Forest health and management in the southern mountain range  
Overall, the forested ejidos participating longer in the program have reduced their deforestation 
rates over the last two decades, but so have non-participants of PES. The region’s forests, 
particularly the temperate ones, however, are under the new threat of a rapidly spreading pine 
beetle (Dendroctonus frontalis, see photo below), which only the PES nucleos, with only 10% of 
the region’s forests, are trying to control in an organized fashion.   
 
 




The nucleos under the PES program have the obligation to notify CONAFOR or SEMARNAT 
about any pest or plagues affecting their forest and mitigate them. They can request extra funds 
for clearing and fumigating, but regardless of whether they receive extra funding, they are 
obligated to take remedial measures. So far, in the cases I have witnessed, all who have notified 
authorities about the plague have received funds for needed material (electric saws and 
pesticides) and worker remuneration, thanks to their technicians’ assistance. To attack the pine 
beetle, the forest technician has to identify and mark all the affected trees in an area, then the 
community members cut them as close to the ground as possible, after which the bark is stripped 
and pesticide is applied to the trunk and the branches (see sequence below).           
 
 
Figure 25.  A clearing of pine beetle infestation in the ejido Ollita de Pino, Xilitla.   
      For the labor in clearing and fumigating the infested forests, CONAFOR offers around 80 
USD per hectare, where 80 percent is for the work and 20 percent for the technical assistance.  




beetle and received around $5,632 USD for the community and 1,408 for the technician in 
addition to their regular PES payments. As with the regular payments, 80 percent of the money is 
granted up front and the rest after the work is completed and the report delivered to CONAFOR. 
All of the nucleos in the PES program managed by technicians with training in forestry were 
implementing plague controls against the pine beetle, but several others managed by unqualified 
technicians were not. The lack of coordination in controlling plagues leads to one of the major 
threats to forest conservation in the region: corruption, especially at the municipal level.    
 
The effects of corrupt forest conservation practices in the southern area 
Especially in this region, corruption and political proselytism from municipal 
governments have severely threatened the sustainability of the PES program, causing a chain of 
adverse effects in participant nucleos. The implementation and administration of the PES 
program and its money have become a matter of contention between different actors, starting at 
municipal government levels. The main link between mayors offices and the PES program are 
the municipal ecology offices, which every municipio is supposed to have for attending to 
environmental problems within their jurisdictions and promoting and supporting federal and state 
programs.  The extent of ecology offices’ effectiveness depends in large part on their 
administrators, in the south administrators monopolized the post for several years, charging 
communities extra fees for its services and diverting PES payments to support political parties.  
As an example, in January of 2011, a piece in the regional newspaper of Xilitla 
complimented the mayor who took credit for distributing PES funding to the participant 
communities (Reséndiz 2011). Precisely to avoid such misrepresentation, CONAFOR is 
supposed to deliver the PES directly to the communities’ and ejidos’ bank accounts, but 
somehow municipal governments managed to procure control of the money. The modus 
operandi is to simply request the PES money from participanting nucleos so the mayor could 
“officially” record the distribution of the funds. This was a secret to no one – neither the nucleos, 
technicians, or even the PES delegate in San Luis Potosi, but certain municipal administration 
threatened any nucleo with cutting off municipal services if they did not cooperate. To make 
matters worse, in some areas PES were not returned entirely to the nucleos because the ecology 
department kept a “fee” and in some cases even nucleo representatives (comisariados and 




stipulating that PES be given in remuneration for work, the mayor distributes the money in 
envelopes personally to all members present in assemblies, regardless of whether they had 
worked in program activities or not. Obviously, this created internal divisions and discouraged 
all from subsequent work in program activities consequently reducing the chances of receiving 
upcoming payments or a second five-year PES period. Thus, such municipal administrations has 
managed to damage not only the communities participating with ecology offices, but also the 
ones refusisg to be complicit in the corruption and have thus had their services cut. 
Not satisfied with the “fees” charged to nucleos, certain ecology admistrators also 
charged a fee to the PES technicians’ working in the region, sometimes requesting 50 percent of 
their earnings for its backing, as three of the most respected technicians of the region explained. 
One ecology office usually subcontracts technicians willing to surrender half or even more of 
their earnings, which they were willing to do because they came from far away regions and felt 
no obligation to the communities under their supervision. The actual technical work was taken 
on by the administrator, but with no training or professional degree he guided the nucleos to a 
series of failures.  
For example, he submitted areas into the wrong categories, especially shade grown coffee 
areas and even arable lands for hydrological services and then requesting funding for their 
reforestation that was never intended to take place. In the shade grown coffee-oriented ejido of 
Xilosuchico, the ecology office assisted in the submission of 297 individual parcels as a 
“common use area” for the hydrological PES program. The ejido had no common use areas but 
was registered in the program as such and they were required to reforest the area. The ecology 
office pushed reforestation with cedar, but the people rejected it because it is not compatible with 
coffee.  The technician then suggested reforesting the arable lands, but they were not registered 
in the program and the ejido refused to surrender lands on which they depended for subsistence. 
At that point most wanted to simply abandon the program, but the comisariado suggested 
reforesting a small area of cattle pasture, but free range cattle are likely to destroy all the 
seedlings. This was only one mismanaged, corrupt case among many. 
 
On the northern region, three ejidos in the sample have been participating in the program 
since 2003: La Concepcion, El Limonal and Los Alamos. Only La Concepción and Los Álamos 





La Concepción is a mestizo ejido with 4,327 hectares certified by PROCEDE in 1997, 
although they insist on a total of 5,428 hectares.  Almost all, 4,051 hectares, are certified as 
common use, while only 261 hectares were registered as parceled plots and several uncertified 
private parcels are located below the common use area. As previously mentioned, the northern 
region is known for its sugarcane and cattle ranching, and the nucleos are no different; sugarcane 
is the principal activity supplemented by cattle grazing. Sugarcane is mostly produced in 
certified individual parcels, remains of an old hacienda that had its own a sugar factory and 
currency65. The uncertified parcels on the slopes are mostly for pasture, but some grow a total of 
20 hectares of corn. Before they certified their lands in 1997, the population was separated into 
three polygons granted at different periods; the first 1,550 hectares were granted to 22 ejidatarios 
in 1963, and two more extensions of 3,249 hectares were assigned to 45 of their sons in 1982, 
although only 2,766 were actually granted. Now the total population of 293 members is 
concentrated in one settlement to ease the provision of services.  Although the number of houses 
with utility services is greater than in the southern region, its marginality index is still medium-
high. Regarding the disparity between the agrarian registry and community claims, it is common 
for the amount of hectares granted by the government to be more than the amount actually 
measured on the ground (ejecutadas in agrarian slang). This has caused several problems 
between the government departments involved in the measurements and the agrarian nucleos. In 
this case, La Concepcion members think they have more than 5,000 hectares because the 
granting government document Resolucion presidencial said so, but PROCEDE’s measurements 
resulted in almost a thousand hectares less, arguing this was the amount they always really had. 
This could be true, but many private owners have tried to corruptly expand their properties in 
collusion with the agrarian prosecution at the expense of ejidos and communities. La Concepcion 
accepted the certification regardless of the reduction of hectares because no limits were changed 
on the ground, but every time they are asked the size of the ejido they insist on more than 5,000 
hectares.   
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inscription of “Roy Cunninham-La Concepcion” and his grandfather confirmed that was the currency that it was 




La Concepción started in the PES program in 2005 with 3,600 hectares of temperate 
forest under hydrological services (see photo below), then in 2010 they renovated their contract. 
People were not sure how many hectares they had submitted in the second period, but according 
to the CONAFOR’s archives, it was 3,301 hectares, a little less than what they have now. During 
one group interview, a woman mentioned that it was the same amount they submitted in 2005, 
but that they were receiving less money because CONAFOR decreased the payments per hectare. 
In 2005 the government was paying 300 pesos (about $24 USD) per hectare and by 2010 the 
payments were $430 pesos (around $35 USD) per hectare according to the operational rules, so 
they should have been receiving more money but instead some was being embezzled66.  
      
  
 
                  Figure 26. The sierra under PES in La Concepcion 
This ejido has been very active in the forums that CONAFOR organizes in Cd. Valles 
every two months because they get to know what other nucleos are doing in regions like Xilitla 
or even in other states. Recently, the committee won a “scholarship” to visit the state of 
Michoacán for a PES convention, months later for which, by the way, they were still waiting for 
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second half of their reimbursement. There they took a trip to the ejido of San Juan Nuevo, one of 
the most successful sustainable forest management programs in the country, which include 
controlled forestry, the extraction of resins, and the production of turpentine.  The delegation 
from la Concepcion was very pleased to see that this model of PES program included extraction 
of resources instead of simple forest preservation, although plague control and and intentional 
management were required. According to one of the delegates, “nothing got wasted there, and 
besides the stumps, there was no sign of the forest exploitation. The branches of trees with less 
than two meters were used for the production of turpentine and the manufacture of brooms. The 
trees over two meters were kept for the production of boards, and the tops of the trees were 
shredded for compost and the production of particle boards.”67 The delegation said that they 
would like to have an area of controlled exploitation, such as harvesting fallen branches, but just 
for their own use in carpentry, especially for the production of furniture. Controlled timber 
extraction interests several PES participants, but currently they need to obtain a permit from 
SEMARNAT, which discouragingly requires time and money. The ejido, however, was seriously 
thinking on acquiring a special permit to harvest fallen trees because they are a fire hazard in the 
dry season. 
One member highlighted that they are continually learning new techniques in the 
program.  For example, they used to make firebreaks even before entering the program but now 
include other strategies like the construction of barriers with rocks and sticks to prevent washouts 
during the rainy season (see photo below).  
 
                                                     Figure 27. Fence to prevent washouts during rainy season in La Concha. 
                                                            




Other arduous activities are firebreak lines, especially around sugar cane crops, which are 
burned before harvest, the construction of shelter (see picture) and an observational station in 
conjuction with the neighboring ejido of Las Abritas on the mountain ridge, as suggested by their 
technician. This later activity involved carrying the zinc roofing 10 km. up rugged mountain 
slopes to La Hierbabuena, a place where they share a border with Las Abritas, another PES 
participant. Besides having a great view of the sierra, the area also has a little spring, the water 
for which is used to fill a water trough for grazing animals in the dry season.  
 
 
                                                         Figure 28. Roof installed in the sierra by La Concepcion with PES money. 
Don Tano, the comisariado, mentioned another advantage of PES was the constitution of a fire-
fighting crew in coordination with their neighboring ejidos of El Limonal and Los Alamos, 
although still lacking is better coordination within the community.  
Here, only landowners or ejidatarios are allowed in the PES program, and they designate 
about 50 percent of the annual payment to the required activities, such as the construction of 
ditches, fences, and the posting of signs demarcating the area under the program.68 Another 20 
percent goes for the construction of infrastructure like the mentioned shelter, a one km extension 
of their paved road, and the first phases in the construction of a health clinic. The remaining 
payments are distributed among the ejidatarios participating in the required activities. Although 
the personal payments are considered inadequate, the ejido has invested the community 
payments to general improvements, such that everyone benefits indirectly whether they receive 
personal payments or not.  
                                                            
68 As it is the case in the nucleos participating in the hydrological PES program, the polygons do not have a physical 
delimitation of the area under the program, firebreak lines within neighboring ejidos and announcements placed on 




When I started visiting the ejido they were working with Alfonso Robledo69, the afore 
mentioned technician who works throughout the region, including in Xilitla, Rio Verde in 
conjunction with Miguel Cruz from Xalpan, and ejidos in Cd. Valles, Tamasopo, and Sta. 
Catarina. The community praised his capabilities as a technician but felt that he could not 
commit enough time to them. The concern was raised when CONAFOR’s San Luis branch 
withheld a payment from them, and they thought it was because of the technician’s decreased 
visits (two per year), assistance, and submission of reports. After two years of delays (for 2011 
and 2012), the ejido was considering replacing the technician, which they eventually succeeded 
in doing. As with the ejido of El Chalahuite in the south, they lamented that they could no longer 
control the technician’s payments directly, but as stated, the operational rules changed because 
many communities were keeping the technicians money regardless of performance. Now the 
nucleos are even unaware of how much the technicians are being paid. According to the 
operational rules the technician should receive $60,000 pesos (around $4,878 USD) for more 
than 1,000 hectares under PES.  
Concerning the impact of the program on preventing deforestation, the ejido has actually 
increased its forest coverage by 12 percent from 1980s to 2010. Here again, the forest increase 
cannot be attributed to the program alone since it has also increased for the overall municipio. 
The people, however, mentioned that they now know many more values of the forest and how to 
take advantage of them, so they will likely continue to conserve it as long as the profits are 
maintained. 
The payments are destined to be replaced by the market of environmental services, for 
which the nucleo is little prepared. The CONAFOR crew had just begun to explain during 
regional PES meetings held in Cd. Valles, the market in services is basically the same as PES 
program except with the inclusion of private enterprises and organizations purchasing 
environmental services from ejidos rather than ejidos receiving payments from the government. 
In the northern region some businesses, the Federal Electric Commission (CFE) that has a 
hydroelectric dam in the region, and a sugar mill are already directly benefitting from the 
hydrological services. One of the neighboring ejidos, El Sabinito, has signed an agreement with 
the sugar mill in which laborers’ contributions of one to two tons of sugar cane to a community 
                                                            
69 Alfonso incurred into the PES with a private environmental consultancy office in Rio Verde and after a few years 




fund is matched by the mill, the state government, and the federal government. Don Tano, the 
comisariado, acknowledged that besides the afore mentioned enterprises, Coca Cola, Pepsi, and 
breweries are also desirous of their water. The marketing of environmental services is supposed 
to develop with a joining fund after they get to know the companies and arrange agreements. La 
Concepcion is heading in that direction but is already facing the pervasive problem of corruption. 
 
El Limonal 
El Limonal is another ejido in the northern mountain range.  It entered 50 percent of its 
4,301 hectares into the PES program from 2005 to 2009, after which their were disqualified. 
They certified the property in 1997, but it created boundary problems within and outside the 
ejido that prevail today. Boundary problems have also affected the management of the PES 
program; according to the ejido Los Alamos, El Limonal has been invading their land and 
clearing their forest, subverting their credibility with CONAFOR verification staff. Private 
landowners and the ejido La Concepcion also accuse El Limonal of destroying boundary markers 
and appropriating 1,545 hectares of their land, which is devoted mostly to sugar cane and some 
corn.  El Limonal has two communal parcels of seven hectares where they grow sugar cane, one 
to benefit the ejido union and the other one for a school. In the highland in other area they grow 
crops but PROCEDE refused to measure and certify it because it was inaccessible. The 
remaining 2,725 hectares in the common use area is maintained as forest for the most part, 
although around 400 hectares are used for cattle herding by individuals. With the sugarcane and 
an average of 17 hectares per ejidatario, El Limonal has one of the lowest marginality indices in 
the region.  
Like La Concepcion, the right to access the common use area is given to ejidatarios, 
avecindados and posesionarios, but only the former participated in the PES program. Among the 
activities they did was reforestation of a pasture in the sierra with pine and cedar, but as usual, 
none of the plants survived the dry season.  
As mentioned, the dry season is especially dangerous in the north because of the burning 
of sugarcane before harvest. A tour to the area once in the program revealed evidence of a 
massive forest fire in a particularly dry year. Since the 1980s, though, the ejido’s forest cover 
increased by six percent, but due to recent fires spreading from the state of Tamaulipas south to 




vegetation survey. The Sabal Mexicana palm, a secondary species that appears on disturbed 
areas, has spread due to these fires (see photo 11 and 12).  
 
                          Figure 29.  Sabal Mexicana palm sprouts after a forest fire in the ejido El Limonal 
Although the palm is considered an invasive plant, almost all of it is traditionally used; 
the indigenous people eat the heart of palm (palmito) obtained from the stems of young plants 
especially in soups, while the mature stems are so resistant to decomposition that they are used 
as fence and electricity posts. The leaves are used for thatching, all sorts of crafts, and also for 
cattle feed when tender and no other forage is available. Finally, the flowers are also de-tasseled, 
washed, boiled to release their bitterness, and eaten, usually with tortillas or eggs. Because of its 
several uses, locals do not consider it a plague unless it spreads to croplands where it grows fast 
and the roots can only be removed with bulldozers. 
 





    Figure 31. Sprouts of Sabal Mexicana in a burned sugar cane field in El Naranjo 
El Limonal is having a hard time obtaining a second PES period apparently because of its refusal 
to pay a fee demanded by a CONAFOR staff member in San Luis Potosi. As I was told, the 
previous delegate of the PES program in San Luis knew about this extra fee and told one of the 
ejido members that it was bogus, so when that member became the comisariado, they refused to 
pay it. Unfortunately, that technician also rose in the CONAFOR system and managed to exclude 
them somehow from the program. The same story was corroborated by the delegate of the 
ecology department of El Naranjo, who is also an ejidatario of El Limonal; he explained that the 
ex-technician worked with them for several years and brought profitable programs, so he felt the 
community owed him more than the technician’s stipulated payment. They gave him extra 
money but over time he became more and more brazen, asking the delegate to collect 50 
thousand pesos from each of the ejidos he helped before. This was when El Limonal stopped 
paying him fees.  
The ejido’s forest coverage has not decreased in the last 30 years, and the deforestation 
index shows a medium risk of deforestation; however, the loss of 66,463 USD in annual PES has 
hurt them financially, and they continued to look for ways to re-enter the PES program. During 
my stay in the region, they acquired a new technician for this purpose but they still failed to gain 
PES approval for 2012. In 2013 the PES program passed to its second phase, “Support to 
promote local mechanisms of payments for environmental services through conjoining funds,” so 








The ejido of Los Alamos has managed to participate in the PES program by submitting 
separate polygons in two consecutive periods. According to its members, the ejido has 2,950 
hectares, 2,650 of which are common use, but according to the agrarian registry only 1,718 are 
such. There are 90 ejidatarios in a population of about 350 people, and as opposed to other 
nucleos, here the posesionarios have rights and access to the common use area as if they were 
ejidatarios.  This was also one of the few ejidos that had internal regulations developed when 
one of its polygons was granted in 1984, before the PROCEDE program. They certified their 
lands in 1998, including individual parcels that sum 872 hectares. Besides the registered parcels, 
another 160 hectares of unregistered parcels remain in the common use area where posesionarios 
grow corn and graze cattle during their fallow. Not having those properties registered does not 
seem to create any problems with the government, one posesionario told me, as his parcel was in 
the common use area and he was able to obtain aid from the federal support for farmers program, 
PROCAMPO. Those parcels were granted to the posesionarios 28 years ago and there is still a 
debate over whether they should grant more parcels in the common use area or not.  The 
comisariado at the time said they would not, such that all the ejidatarios have a right to put their 
livestock there, but they have to pay the ejido for each head. So far they estimate 400 head in the 
common use area, which they herd from one area to another, depending on which area is under 
the program.  
They started participating in PES in 2006 with 909 hectares and obtained the second 
phase for another 375-hectares zone in 2010. They submitted the 909 hectares again in 2011, 
which was approved but without funding, meaning CONAFOR simply ran out of resources. As 
mentioned, this gives them extra points but does not assure funding in the next selection of 
nucleos. During my visit in 2012 they submitted 1,500 hectares and were waiting for the 
approval.  
When asked what would happen to the 400 head of cattle if all the common use area gets 
accepted into the PES, they said they were already planning to circulate them, although this 




forests had no overwhelming plagues of mistletoe or weevils. Los Alamos does have some areas 
with mistletoe that they want to eliminate using the PES funds and technical help, however. 
During the early months of 2012, the community did manage to procure a forest specialist in 
plagues to visit and agree on a mistletoes control plan. 
Despite the regularization of their property, the cutting of firebreaks for their PES project 
exposed boundary problems with the neighboring ejido of La Concepcion. As previously 
mentioned, nucleos are obligated to clear their boundary limits, and such clearings can count as 
part of the firebreaks required by the PES program. When two neighboring nucleos are 
participating in the PES, each needs to clear a swath 3 meters wide (see photo below) precisely 
on the property line.  
 
 
                              Figure 32. A road to the mountain range of Los Alamos, also maintained as a firebreak 
The other boundary problem, described previously, is with El Limonal, which extracts wood 
from El Alamo PES lands, affecting the evaluation of their project. Therefore, they are planning 
to hire a surveyor to make another demarcation.  
The forest coverage analysis reveals that the ejido has increased six percent of its forest 
coverage, although the level of detail reached in the study is not precise enough to reveal 
changes in forest density. We know at least that no land use conversion have taken place there. 
Regarding how the program is managed within the nucleo, both ejidatarios and 




ejidatarios participate. They comment that with their previous technician (who demanded 
additional fees) they did not directly receive remuneration for labor such as constructing 
firebreaks, as did the rest of the participant ejidos, but now they do at the workshops organized 
by CONAFOR in Cd. Valles.  CONAFOR, however, has suggested that the money only be 
applied to required activities, like the acquisition of tools and equipment for forest maintenance. 
So far they have taken this heart, spending all the money to pave a road that connects them to La 
Concepcion, construct a bridge, and pay for labor. Having no payments go directly to 
participants’ pockets is fine for the people of Los Alamos, as most produce enough sugarcane to 
cover household needs and the PES then can go towards infrastructural improvements for the 
community. It also helps that they already had a tradition of investing the profits of their 
collective sugarcane in collective endeavors as well. 
Another impact of the PES program is the decrease in timber extraction.  They recounted 
that illegal logging used to be rampant but is now regulated and only with the permission of ejido 
for personal use within the community.  They are very interested in contracts for hydrological 
services, such as with the sugar cane factory and the Federal Electric Commission, that benefit 
from their captured water. “If every ejidatario invests a penny, the municipality matches that or 
half the amount, and if a private company is found to match the total, then government support 
would no longer be needed and we would be self sufficient in the conservation business.”70  
In relation to the technical assistance, the ejido felt comfortable with their technician, 
although they could not agree on how much he was earning since they were no longer paying 
him directly. The discussion during an assembly about how much the technician was paid went 
from 20 percent to 8 eight percent, but they knew the previous corrupt technican charged 20 
percent.  They actually had an argument with their neighboring nucleo of El Limonal, which 
refused to pay 20 percent, because Los Alamos insists that the technicians, with three visits per 
year, deserve 20 percent of their PES payment.   
 
Corruption in the north and its effects 
The illegal fees that ejidos in the region have been paying have varying effects.  As 
described before, some nucleos have simply submitted to added fees in order to stay in the PES 
and other CONAFOR programs, and the only one to refuse has been disqualified.  On the other 
                                                            




hand, surrendering to the extra fee is not without its problems, either.  According to Abel, the 
delegate of the ecology department of El Naranjo, the payments withheld from La Concepcion 
were related to the fees. The administrator of PES in San Luis withheld their payments to tear 
down the long-lasting corruption of the chief of CONAFOR operational department, who used to 
work as their technician. The people of La Concepcion told me that the PES delegate wanted to 
personally check their last activities before releasing the payments, so it was not clear whether 
they knew the real reason for the withholding payments or not, but several months later they got 
paid and acquired a new technician from Cd. Valles. To my dismay, I later discovered that the 
delegate told their ex-technician, Alfonso, that I convinced the people of La Concepcion to 
replace him. It seemed that the delegate associated the technician with the extra fees and did not 
want to make it obvious, but whatever the case, competition between the technicians and the 
CONAFOR staff was evident. Sadly, as in the southern area, the nucleos were caught in the 
middle and always ended up losing the most, such as El Limonal that lost the program or the rest 






VIII. The PES participants’ perspectives on the social impacts of the program.  
As seen in the previous chapter’s anecdotes, the social milieu within each community 
influences the effectiveness of the PES program, and the program itself can can have a positive 
or negative impact on community well being. The organizational capacity, culture, local 
traditions regarding equity of participation, and the economic standing before and after the 
program influence the nucleos pesepctives of the program. Semi-structured group interviews 
during assemblies, CONAFOR meetings, and participant observation on excursions to evaluate 
PES areas were the methods used to collect such perceptions.  
From the sample of 29 nucleos and one agrarian colony participating in the program, 18 
strongly considered that the program had benefitted them overall, but the different levels of 
participation and the perceptions of its effectiveness are correlated. The main issues discussed 
are whether communities decide to distribute the money among all members or apply it to 
community infrastructure improvements. 
 
Community infrastructure improvements  
The use of money for infrastructural improvements was for the most part perceived as an 
effective measure of program success among participants since they were direct and tangible 
results that benefitted all. Thus, participants that used some of the PES money for community 
improvements tended to have a positive perception of the program even if they were not paid 
individually for work. Unfortunately, this allocation was practiced mostly in the north while in 
the southern region only La Trinidad used the money this way, despite the fact that investments 
in such activities were strongly encouraged by technicians.  This may be because the southern 
region is poorer and therefore families have immediate needs to address with the money. 
In the northern region the types of infrastructure improvements varied.  The most 
common was the construction of galeras (open community halls) for community assemblies and 
events as well as meeting rooms and the purchase of furniture (see top images in Figure 15).  
For several ejidos this was a great improvement since several of them had no proper meeting 
halls before. Also improvements included the construction of paved roads, sidewalks, a research 
station, a health clinic and the purchase of a plot to expand a cemetery. Often, these community 




different levels of government. For example, the construction of a road in Los Alamos involved 
matching PES funding from the sugar cane board and the municipal government.  
 
                  Figure 33. Infrastructure improvements using PES funding in the northern region. 
 
In both regions ejidatarios and comuneros, or landowners, were the main beneficiaries of 
the PES payments; however, there were marked differences between the northern and southern 
regions regarding the inclusion of others into PES labor and payments. In the northern region, 
nucleos tended to set aside part of the money for daily wages to members who wanted to work 
on the required activities, regardless their status in the nucleos. In the southern region, the money 
tended to be divided almost exclusively among landowners.  
Helping explain the differences between the northern and southern regions regarding the 
differential uses of the PES are population density, the amount of arable land, land use, and 
tenure system stand out. There is an average of 80 landowners per nucleo in the north and around 
700 in the south. When fewer owners and thus laborers in the north, they can incorporate 




surpasses the need, and in several cases they even have a waiting list for the landowners to work. 
The nucleos of the south also have a lower percentage of arable lands for individual use, and 
with the exception of the ones with temperate forest, none manage their property areas in 
common use.  The northern nucleos, on the other hand, have more arable lands and held forested 
areas in common. Having sugarcane, the northern nucleos have more stable income that those in 
the south, where communities tend to rely on coffee production that is risky due to both weather 
and the fluctuating market. Consequently, competition for PES money in the north is less. While 
the PES money is not absolutely critical in the south, especially when it is shared among all 
landowners, the poverty there is such that few are willing to divert this source of family income 
to community projects.  
From the southern, often indigenous, perspective, the distribution of payments to 
individuals actually follows their traditional cargo system. The cargo system71 once present in 
most indigenous nucleos consisted of individuals fulfilling communal duties. In some indigenous 
nucleos it was common to see young males working on the PES activities for only meals 
because, in the words of one Teenek leader, “It is good for them to go and learn how to work and 
know their ejido.  Most don’t know its boundaries.  We all did the same when we were young, 
and it’s their duty as members of the ejido.” However, in some communities like the Nahua San 
Pedro Huizquilico, the elders recognized that the youth needed money, so they reserved 
payments for them to do arduous activities like the making firebreaks, clearing wells, and 
reforestation, and if there was money left over, it was shared among the ejidatarios. 
In the northern ejidos, as the leader of Ojo de Agua explained, the situation was 
completely different, as young members avoided working in PES activities because they could 
earn more by working as seasonal sugarcane cutters, so the legal landowners ended up doing 
most of the required activities whether they needed the money or not.   
In terms of gender, participants have been almost exclusively male, although women 
have slowly become more active in decision-making as they replace their diseased or seasonally 
migrating husbands. Of 20 nucleos in the PES program, three had women’s committees 
specifically for the program, and in three others – Ollita del Pino, El Cristiano and La Victoria – 
                                                            
71 Also known as civil-religious hierarchies within communities, involves “voluntary” service without remuneration 
(although there are usually high pressures to participate in it) in order to complete the system of hierarchically based 
offices and earn prestige or access to land in the community (see Dewalt (1975) for a detailed description and 




women were either part of PES committee or related administration committees like those for 
firebreaks. Otherwise, no women were involved in projects related to forest in common use 
areas, and only the agroforestry program did women work in individual shade grown coffee 
plots. Thus, it was hard to obtain their opinion about PES since few attended the meetings.  
Fortunately, on two occasions they were invited to accompany me for safety while walking in the 
sierra with the men. I initially insisted that it was not necessary, but desisted when it became 
clear that they were excited to walk the sierra for the first time.  They mentioned the positive 
impact of the program in bringing job opportunities for men and the protection of diminishing 
water resources. Conversely, women in the agroforestry PES program saw it as making little 
difference to their marginalized situation, as they had already been practicing ES improvements 
prior to the program except for making compost receptors.       
Finally, the agroforestry program in the more marginal south has only exascerbated 
inequalities because it includes only formal landowners, not the landless people or those without 
title.  In fact, the greatest concentration of benefits goes to those with the most land.       
 
Organizational capacity 
Building community organizational capacity is a key program objective for long-term 
sustainability. Several nucleos were already well organized before the implementation of the 
program, while for others the program helped develop their organization skills. One example of 
the first case is the Nahua ejido of El Cristiano y sus anexos, which had a population near nine 
thousand habitants and 706 ejidatarios or landowners. This coffee growing ejido entered all its 
parceled territory (3,124 hectares) to hydrological services program in 2007. Recently, a young 
group of community members (between 16 to 24 years old) manages the PES program, together 
with other development programs, and are supervised by the ejido’s committee and Fidel, an 
agronomist who has worked with them for several years, originally as a promoter of the 
indigenous reforms to the constitution lead by the CDI. The reforms – Article IX of the San Luis 
Potosístate constitution – were developed in three communities of the Huasteca region: El 
Cristiano, Tampaxal and Coxcatlan starting in 2000. The process inspired of the community 
organization, indigenous pride, and self-governance still seen today in their management of the 
PES. The PES program was originally managed by an outside NGO called the Foro Huasteco, 




decided to take over. Since 2010 the youth have been in charge of promoting and obtaining 
resources for ejido development programs. Below, there is a photo of new members recruitment, 
led by CDI activist, Juan Cisneros.  
 
                               Figure 34. Committee members of PES in El Cristiano y sus anexos  
The crew had a small office in the head town of the ejido, equipped with a conference room, 
computers, a projector and other office furniture necessary for meetings. All but two or three 
members out of ten staff members rotate in and out of the office, and each of twelve barrios has a 
representative in charge of reporting on the current programs. As Fidel, the agronomist that 
coordinates the group explained to me, it was the ejido’s idea to have its young people working 
as technicians and promoters of programs to become self-sufficient. Right now the group still 
needs a lot of guidance from Fidel, but they are learning quickly with full community support.  
The major problem that this ejido faces is with outside agencies.  CONAFOR, for 
example, has requirements for certified technicians that El Cristiano has been unable to fulfill. At 
the beginning of the program technicians were not needed because no maintenance activities 
were required. None of the youth has more than a high school education, although they aspire to 
gain a professional degree. Even Fidel, with his agronomy degree from the best program in the 
country (the University of Chapingo) has not been able to pass the certification process. He 
argues that it is corrupt so that certification is given only to politically connected people, but, of 
course, other certified technicians expressed no such suspicions. The PES delegate in San Luis 




youth team fulfill the technician’s work, like turning in reports and attending to CONAFOR 
meetings.  
The overall organization of the ejido is also impressive, as I learned when I was invited to 
their general assembly to present my research.   In exchange for the maps I made for their 
territorial planning project, they organized a series of meetings and tours in each of their 12 
barrios, some of their shade grown coffee parcels, and some of their projects like the butterfly 
sanctuary in the barrio of Tecaya. Such projects are intended to develop the ejido’s eco-touristic 
potential and have been implemented with the help of a CDI program called PETAZI 
(Alternative Tourism Program for Indigenous Zones). In each barrio a PES committee keeps a 
list of members and the work they have done in such activities as the soil prevention and 
enrichment agreed upon in their better practices program (PMP in Spanish). The development of 
a PMP is a requirement of CONAFOR for the PES to help them plan their annual goals for five 
years. This process in El Cristiano was very difficult because it required the agreement of all the 
community and most did not want to do collective work, so in the end they decided to work on 
individual parcels and report the work by barrios. That was also when they came up with the idea 
of having their own technician, after reflecting on the bad experience they had with Foro 
Huasteco, which seemed to involve the Foro pushing for support of a political party.72 The PES 
program in El Cristiano is not working perfectly, as some members pointed out, as not all the 
barrios are responding as they should, but their progress until now makes them optimistic.  
Another example of building organizational capacity was the northern ejidos 
collaborative efforts to decrease fires during the dry season. Zafra, the burning of sugarcane plots 
before harvesting, is an activity dating back to Spanish colonial times, but now it is controversial 
because of the unintended spread of fires to the forest. As part of the PES program, the 
participant nucleos have to organize and equip a fire brigade of around ten members in charge of 
mobilizing people in case of fire outbreaks in the sierra. At the beginning their technician urged 
them to coordinate with other ejidos for fire control, and PES can be reduced or canceled if 
property under the program gets burned. After the great loss of forest to fire in 2012, they 
decided that more efforts were needed to prevent fires instead of only combating them, so a 
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funding support of the Procampo program and he replied shamelessly that he withhold it because she voted for the 




multi-ejido meeting was set that included two of the main technicians in the region, the 
municipal secretary, and representatives of the sugar mill. All the ejido representatives were very 
active in the discussion and proposed several approaches, from training sugar growers and 
cutters in fire prevention, to environmental education of the youth to increase awareness of fires, 
and to have more community participation during fires outbreaks. One of the main subjects of 
discussion was the zafra and how it can be done more safely.  Everyone already knew that to 
burn the cane, one needs a permit from SEMARNAT and the sugarcane committee has to verify 
proper firebreaks (guarda-rayas in spanish, see photo below) are in place, but these have 
traditionally been ignored. 
 
Figure 35. Firebreak between sugarcane and the forest in the agrarian community of El Salto 
The debate centered on who should enforce those permits, with the sugar mill company arguing 
that it was the responsibility of the workers committee and the ejidatarios claiming it should be a 
higher authority with enforcement power. SEMARNAT permits are also problematic because 
they require two costly fire hazard studies. Some spoke of completely banning the zafra, which 
the sugar mill supported, explaining that they already have the machinery to harvest unburned 
sugarcane and do so for 25 percent of production already; however, to expand machine 
harvesting to the other three quarters of production would enormously increase costs and cause 
the loss of hundreds of cutting jobs. Other suggestions involved obligatory courses on fire 
prevention along with the enforcement of sanctions for anyone who refused not follow instructed 
procedures. One challenge to this is that sugarcane plots commonly change hands, such that 
newcomers are ignorant of firebreaks, the danger of burning with winds, and the time of the day 
when the spread of fires is least likely. A representative of the ejido Minas Viejas suggested the 




of work.  Still, after a recent 14-hectares forest fire caused by the combustion of stubble, some 
have started doing it. This practice also returns nutrients to the soil and keeps it moist.   
 
Figure 36. Alignment of stubble in a sugar cane plot in the ejido of La Concepcion 
Ultimately, they did not reach an agreement on methods, verification, or sanctions, but 
the municipality, the sugar mill and the representatives of the ejidos agreed to purchase a water 
tanker. Though a water tanker alone will not solve the problem, the unity behind fire prevention 
was a major step forward. 
 
IX. The Program’s Influence on Forest Community Management: Land 
Tenure, Rights, Access, Use and Decision-Making.  
The 1992 land reforms that created different land tenure arrangements among communities 
and ejidos also influenced forest access and management. Such new arrangements have a direct 
effect on how programs like the PES are developed and executed. Having a certified forest was 
once a CONAFOR requirement for entering into the PES program, but due to the amount of 
uncertified forest throughout the country, CONAFOR decided to expand coverage to the most 
critical areas subject to deforestation, which were often uncertified. Nevertheless, the PES 
program does require nucleos to have their property documentation, or carpeta basica, in order, 
which has compelled some to do just that. 
The analysis of the forest change according to the five categories of land tenure – uncertified, 
the perimeter and communal use areas certified, individual parcels and communal use areas 




only certified the perimeter forest has remained most stable while at the ones that certified at the 
parcel level forest coverage had more fluctuation.    
Land tenure 
system 









certification 26,004.43  24,797.54 24,892.03 24,836.16 
Perimeter 57,343.16 57,774.39 57,588.54 56,348.37 
Parcels and 
communal area 60,408.55 55,798.16 56,056.03 55,325.32 
All Parcels 5,549.05 6,084.53 5,648.62 5,648.62 
Dominio Pleno* 1,378.08 1,549.05 1,575.22 1,575.22 
Table 20. Land tenure systems and forest change in the sample of agrarian nucleos.   
Source: INEGI’s vegetation series I to IV and PHINA’s agrarian data.  
*Under dominio pleno, nucleos dissolve into private parcels but forests remain public. As previously seen, 
only one nucleo in the sample, El Sabinito, reverted to dominio pleno for a small percentage of its 
individual parcels of sugarcane, and it is interesting to see that this positively impacted forest management. 
  
Graphic 21. Percentage of forest change in the sample of nucleos from 1980 to 2010 acording to their land tenure system 
 
The information collected from the sample of certified and uncertified nucleos revealed three 
different types of relationships between land tenure systems and the management of forests in the 
PES program: nucleos that certified forests as communal lands and managed them communally 






parcels; and nucleos that certified parcels individually but managed them communally. The same 
categories hold for the uncertified nucleos that were participating in the program.  
As pointed out in the examples of participant nucleos, some problems can come with the 
implementation of the hydrological PES program for individual parcels, not only for required 
activities but also for the distribution of payments because they are allocated according to the 
amount of hectares each person has. One example of how complex this situation can get was the 
Nahua ejido of San Pedro Huizquilico, a community in the process of certification that started 
participating in the Hydrological PES program in 2010, submitting its individual parcels as 
common use forest. They were familiarized with forest conservation programs from their 
previous work with Sierra Gorda, but back then they participated with individual parcels since 
they do not have a common use area. The last 45 hectares of common use area were divided 30 
years ago among individual owners. San Pedro, as well as other uncertified nucleos, have 
shunned land certification mainly to avoid the payment of taxes.  Don Remigio, the comisariado, 
also explained that people consider the certification to be necessary, but the level of poverty 
pushes them to reconsider it. Some consider certifying their parcels only without obtaining title 
for their houses (solar), for which taxes have to be paid individually.  Some of the poorest even 
considered moving their house to their parcels to avoid taxes. Don Remigio was confident that 
the certification process will eventually be completed and he will get a title for his property 
because he has the means to do it, but also understands why people are resisting.    
Most in San Pedro have shade grown coffee and said they entered into the hydrological PES 
program at the recommendation of a technician from Queretaro who presented a persuasive 
video during an assembly. One conflict that they faced while I was there was the requirement of 
reforesting 20 hectares because all their property was individually parceled for coffee. Someone 
would have to give up their coffee for communal forest. Similarly, in other ejidos where forest is 
held communally, the PES program has contributed to the prohibition of individual cattle 





X.  The multi-scalar approach 
  
Deforestation and marginality patterns were examined at two geographical scales, the 
Huasteca Potosina region as a whole and the local scale with the sample of 43 nucleos.  The 
evidence from both scales complemented each level most of the time, but some inconsistencies 
between them highlighted the need of the multi-scalar approach. Patterns of deforestation, as 
previously discussed, proved to differ in some degree within the Huasteca Potosina region, at the 
municipal level within the 11 forested municipios of the Sierra, and among the sample of nucleos 
agrarios throughout the 30-year period. Although for all scales of analysis the 1980s was the 
period of major deforestation, each scale gave more detailed information as to the factors 
influencing it. According to the GIS analysis of deforestation and land tenure at the regional 
scale, it was found that most of the deforestation during this decade took place within already 
established private properties (64 percent) mostly in the lowland northeastern municipios (Ebano, 
Tamuin, Cd. Valles and San Vicente Tancuayalab). The findings coincide with Aguilar-Robledo 
(1995) and Hernández et al.’s (2008) findings about the government agricultural project of Pujal-
Coy, which in addition to the land use transformation introduced a dramatic increase in 
population that destabilized private properties, resulting in the depletion of their remnant-forests. 
Social properties accounted for 36 percent of the deforestation from which granted lands in the 
form of NCPE’s represent only ten percent of the total deforestation (153,700 ha) of that period.  
Attention to deforestation in the sample of 43 nucleos agrarios yielded more details.  
Temperate forests showed a total reduction of 46 percent, most of which occurred in the last 
decade in the central and souther areas, as the regional scale analysis showed temperate forest 
actually regaining areas in the north during the last decade. Tropical forests, located mainly in 
the south, decreased 12 percent, mostly in the 1980s, but have remained stable since. Fieldwork 
and archival analysis at the community level, like the ejido of La Palma, allow for explanations 
of such varying patterns.  
Examination of deforestation patterns at the regional and local scales over time also 
proved insightful when analyzing the impacts of the PES program. A halting of deforestation 
would seem to point to the effectiveness of the program, but in fact nucleos outside the program 




The different scales of analyzing marginality also proved useful. While the region as a 
whole is categorized as marginal, only fieldwork and spatial analysis at the community level 
revealed that marginality and temperate forest depletion have a significant correlation. The 
construction of a marginality index at the nucleo scale, using population census data versus the 
mean marginality index per locality, allowed a clearer differentiation of marginality within the 








Five hypotheses were posited at the outset of this research, which will be evaluated here.  
Other major findings will be discussed, as well as the limitations of this research and directions 
for future study. The first hypothesis was that the poorest communities are less likely to deforest 
but the most likely to be priority areas for the PES program. The hypothesis was formulated from 
the fact that most of the standing forest in the country are located in the hilliest and poorest 
regions (Alix-Garcia, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2008) with least risk of deforestation. The two 
propositions of the hypothesis were tested at the municipal and community scales, with different 
outcomes throughout the region.  
As the results showed, the region has different degrees of marginality as well as patterns 
of deforestation, and these variables were not significantly correlated at the municipal scale. 
Aquismón, for example, where 60 percent of its territory is covered by forest, had the highest 
marginality index value (5) and a high risk of deforestation (3.87 from a maximum of 5), but its 
total percentage of deforestation from the 1980s to 2010 is among the lowest of the region (14.02 
percent). The low percentage of deforestation in Aquismón is even more impressive considering 
that its main vegetation is tropical forest, which tends to be the preferred target of land use 
conversion. The lowest percentages of deforestation in the region, with less than 5 percent 
change, came from the municipios of Tamasopo with a high marginality index (4) and El 
Naranjo with a medium marginality index (3). These examples might suggest that marginality is 
related to low deforestation, however, the pattern was not constant; the municipios of Axtla de 
Terrazas, Tancanhuitz and Huehuetlán lost about 40 percent of their forests in the same period 
and also have a high marginality index (4). Hence, at the municipal scale no clear connection can 
be seen between poverty and deforestation, and other factors like the type of forest proved to be 
more important.  
A higher resolution scale at the community level using the sample nucleos, however, 
showed a correlation between poverty, deforestation, and the type of forest.  The percentage of 
agricultural lands grew from eight to 17 percent from the 1980s to 2010, but the resulting 
deforestation was concentrated in poorer nucleos with temperate forests in the northern zone 
(positively correlated at 0.391 for the 0.01 level), not for poor nucleos with tropical forest 




Although temperate forest has actually regained cover at the regional scale over the last 
three decades, in my sample of 43 communities the pattern has reversed over the last decade, 
especially in the middle and southern zones. The ejidos of La Palma in Tamasopo and El Bagazo 
in Xilitla are very poor and have major deforestation, but other factors like the introduction of 
highways and the illegal privatization of land are more influential than poverty, especially in La 
Palma. Meanwhile, the northern nucleos of El Naranjo have seen an increase in temperate forest 
(as high as 14 percent) during the last three decades thanks to more arable land and the sugarcane 
industry, such that poverty and forest conservation are inversely correlated there.  
The clearing of tropical forest in poor nucleos of the southern zone was due to the 
expansion of cattle pastures and agricultural plots in the 1980s and the 1990s, especially in the 
municipios of Tanlajas, Ciudad Valles and San Vicente Tancuayalab in the low coastal plains 
toward the gulf coast and in the slopes of Xilitla, Huehuetlán, Coxcatlán. The forest clearing was 
not related to poverty or marginality, since 64 percent of the conversion occurred on private 
properties. Rather, the conversion was encouraged by government agricultural incentives, 
irrigation programs from the 1970s to 1980s, and the land expropriation program accompanying 
them.  These, in turn, led to a dramatic population increase as people flooded in to take 
advantage of the development programs. These major events shook the stability of private 
landowners, who felt pressure to double the amount of pasturage from 1985 to 2000.  In fact, the 
data shows a correlation between increased tropical deforestation during the last two decades and 
nucleos that certified at the individual parcel level.   
In summary, the poorest, most marginalized communities were not more likely to 
deforest as predicted in the hypothesis.  Other factors like government agricultural programs, 
lack of arable land, major infrastructure projects, and social instability during land granting 
periods were more determinant of deforestation.   
The second part of the hypothesis concerned the PES program’s preference for poorest 
areas.  This proved to be partly true, but other variables were more influential to PES 
prioritization. As explained above, one of the main national PES objectives over the last decade 
has been to reach the poorest communities in order to reduce deforestation while improving their 
economic condition, but the constant modification of the prioritization scheme has expanded 
coverage to other areas, too. At the beginning of the program, large areas of temperate forest 




is considered one of the least marginalized municipios in the Sierra. More recently the emphasis 
has shifted toward poverty reduction, yet El Naranjo and Xilitla continue to hold most of the PES 
projects. In contrast, Aquismón, the most marginalized municipio in the Huasteca, has largely 
been left behind despite significant patches of tropical forest. The fact that numerous agrarian 
nucleos in Aquismón faced property-rights issues at the start of the PES program complicated 
their inclusion. Although the certification requirement has since been waived, Aquismón 
contentious land issues are still perceived to influence the PES in largely excluding them. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Agrarian nucleos with well-defined property rights are more likely to 
conserve their forest and participate in conservation programs than ones without.   
Well-defined property rights have been part of the neoliberal land reform strategy to 
alleviate poverty and the deterioration of natural resources under the assumption that insecurities 
in land tenure and poverty are one of the first threats to forest and biodiversity conservation. 
Presumably, securing property rights will encourage landowners to regulate land uses and stop 
migration into forested areas while providing them the legal tools crucial for environmental 
governance (Spears et al. 1994). Others have argued, however, that land privatization does not 
guarantee the mitigation of poverty, and could lead to community disruption and forest 
overexploitation (Heynen N 2005). The assumption under Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” is 
people will selfishly overexploit communal resources such as forests, as opposed to their own 
private properties.  However, I found that most nucleos, regardless of their certification status, 
have internal rules and traditions for regulating access and use of the forest. In addition, 
government conservation programs did not seem to privilege either communal or private 
properties.  
As mentioned, land certification was once required for PES but is now considered as only 
one of several positive scoring elements in the prioritization scheme. The ongoing preference is 
because land certification enables CONAFOR to ensure the exact amount of hectares that 
communities legally own and the assumption that nucleos with property rights will have less 
internal and external territorial conflicts.  Indeed, in the sample of 43 agrarian nucleos, 14 (32 
percent) were not certified, mainly because of the difficulty in reaching an agreement with the 




 The results show that since the 1990s (the decade where the land certification process 
started to be implemented) the nucleos that had parceled all their territory lost the most 
percentage of forest, seven percent. Nucleos that only certified their perimeter lost two percent of 
their forests, while the ones without land certification presented an overall increase of 0.56 
percent. Thus, the certification of property rights has not necessarily entailed better forest 
conservation practices and vice versa, and the lack of certification has not implied a major 
increase in deforestation.  In fact, looking more specifically at the uncertified nucleos over the 
first decade of the 21st century, only two lost forest, while eight maintained a stable coverage and 
five increased coverage (by less than five percent). 
The hypothesis that nucleos with certified lands would have increased PES participation and 
forest conservation was nullified for the region, and especially for high priority areas for 
hydrological services like that of the temperate forest of Xilitla, with its high percentage of 
uncertified nucleos participating in the PES program. Even the less prioritized shade-grown 
coffee areas of Tamazunchale and Aquismón, had several uncertified nucleos participating in the 
PES program. Ten out of the 28 participating nucleos did not had their lands certified, and of the 
seven nucleos rejected for PES program, only two were not certified, whereas three had certified 
their perimeters and the other two had certified individual parcels and common use areas.  
Securing land tenure, however, remains one of the key elements for successful PES schemes.  
While it is true that economists, policy makers and stakeholders in the national and international 
arenas, and grassroots actors continue to debate its positive impacts and threats, conservation 
strategies like that of the PES have always supported the regulation of property rights, and more 
recently the subject has received unprecedented attention with the second phase of the market for 
environmental services and the international REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation in Developing countries) climate change initiative. Fortunately for 
Mexico, between 70 to 80 percent of its forest has been legally demarcated or granted as social 
properties for the peasantry in processes beginning with the Revolution and ending with the 
introduction of neoliberal land reforms in the 1990s.  
The neoliberal reforms never intended to divide and privatize forests, only the 
individualization of property rights as a way to liberate the market economy in rural areas, but 
the creation of permanent and undividable parcels took a toll on social properties, especially in 




Hernández (2012) found cases in Teenek nucleos of the total division of communal forest into 
individual properties (Hernández-Cendejas 2012). In several of my sample nucleos, even after 
the land certification of individual parcels and forested communal areas, landless members had 
been lent parcels in the forests. In these cases, overpopulation and desperate need of arable lands 
seem to have trumped certification. 
In the regions of the country where vast tracks of social properties remain uncertified, such as 
in Oaxaca, Chiapas, lands are usually held in common, but that does not mean that property 
rights are not well defined internally. PES requires a common and clear management scheme of 
the land itself, so internally well defined property rights had a major impact in the 
implementation of the program at the nucleo scale even without certification. Internal property 
rights could or could not be in tune with the certification process recognized by the State, as the 
sampled nucleos showed, internal property rights are not always registered and therefore 
recognized by state institutions. The discrepancies between the internal and the officially 
registered land rights should not suggest an immediate conflict for the nucleos, but when 
interacting with government institutions like CONAFOR, the design and implementation of 
programs can create conflicts if a good internal diagnostic of the participant nucleo is not made. 
Especially for PES projects, it is imperative to have well defined property rights understood by 
both the nucleo members and the external organizations and technicians working with them, such 
as the municipal ecology departments, the state branches of CONAFOR, and technicians 
working directly with communities. Reciprocally, nucleos with well defined property rights – 
certified or not – proved to perform better in PES projects.         
In the near future, the international emphasis on reducing greenhouse emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation and counting carbon stocks in conjunction with national 
institutions on programs like REDD+ have reinvigorated an urgency to complete the lands 
certification process in Mexico.  If Mexico is to fully engage the carbon market, it needs to have 
its lands registered. It may be that PES policy regarding certification will be reversed again such 
that uncertified nucleos will have to certify to participate in the new phase of development for 
carbon market. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The addition of an economic value to the environmental services of the forest 




In developing countries, several cases can be found in which the commercialization of 
environmental services of the forest has resulted in more rational land uses, forest conservation, 
and the diversification of local economies (C. Muñoz-Piña 2003, Velázquez, Durán-Medina, and 
Jean-Francois 2003). In the Huasteca, I found that the commercialization of forest services via 
the PES has indeed diversified local economies in some cases and multiplied adaptations 
according to nucleos’ land tenure systems and uses. For example, in the northern area, where the 
majority of the ejidos have forest in communal use and individual parcels for agriculture, the 
payments were used to invest in community infrastructure and protect the forest against fires, 
including the strengthening of collaboration between nucleos and enterprises like the regional 
sugarcane mill. Here, the payments have become such an important part of the communities’ 
income that brigades and patrolling crews, to combat fires and illegal logging, have been created, 
enhancing community organization and unity. The extra income and matching state and 
municipal funding complement their local inputs for infrastructure projects. This support has 
provided the nucleos the chance to plan and improve the services they need while creating a 
positive association between the PES program and the community building process, even for 
members that do not receive direct payments from the program. 
In the southern, more indigenous area where shade-grown coffee dominates the landscape 
and individual parcels prevail as the dominant land tenure system, PES’s management and 
economic impacts are significantly different. Prior to the PES program, the region used to 
receive government subsidies from INMECAFE (The National Coffee Institute of Mexico) for 
their coffee crops, but with the collapse of the program in 1989, the PES for agroforestry has 
more or less partially replaced that lost source of aid. The PES funding subsidizes individual 
shadegrown coffee farmers independently from the category of the program in which they are 
participating. The management of the program here is complicated by the land being divided into 
collective and obligatory activities – from religious affairs to social and economic development – 
traditionally being organized by barrios, especially in bigger nucleos, like El Cristiano in Xilitla 
or Santiago and Mecatlán in Tamazunchale with over five thousand inhabitants. Each barrio 
resembles the ejido’s organizational structure, and decisions about land management start here in 
many occasions, followed by approval of the general nucleo committee. In El Cristiano, for 
example, where a special committee is in charge of managing government programs, delegates 




to smaller participant nucleos, where the planning activities for government programs are usually 
proposed by the external technicians and approvals are made only with the general committee. 
Ultimately, though, the management of participant lands is done individually. In El Cristiano for 
example, where CONAFOR pays the nucleo for the overall amount of forest, the ejido internally 
distributes payments to each parcel owner participating in the program.  
Regarding the introduction of new or improved techniques for cultivating shade-grown 
coffee, little new has been adopted. The installation of compost is one exception and not 
universally adopted. The addition of non-native species for shade has been noteworthy in several 
areas, although this was less voluntary than resulting from government pressure to reforest and 
the availability of seedlings in contracted greenhouses. The introduction of unsuitable species for 
shade-grown coffee has indirect negative effects on the PES program, particularly the 
introduction of pines that prevent anything from grow beneath them. The coffee growers knew 
this but planted them anyway to avoid sanctions and loss of future government support. As one 
of the coffee owners explained, if the pine seedlings succeed, they will have to plant their coffee 
in another area, but such areas are scarce.   
In both the northern and southern areas, the commercialization of forested lands is not new, 
whether they be temperate or tropical. The novelty of the PES has more to do with the 
commercialization of forest and ecosystem preservation, which has prompted communities to 
think about their natural resources (and their economic marginality) as a new source of income. 
It has also brought communities together for a shared vision and management of these forests 
and allocation of the funds to community investment projects in the north and subsistence in the 
south.                  
 
Hypothesis 4. The effects of the PES program on decreasing deforestation vary 
geographically, depending on the topographical characteristics of the agrarian nucleos and 
their degree and time of dependency on agricultural and cattle ranching activities.   
This hypothesis relates to the previous one in the sense that the impacts of the program 
have differed between the northern and southern regions. As previously explained, the economic 
conditions and possibilities of land use diversification play important roles in the effects of PES 
programs, and these elements are linked to the topographical characteristics of the nucleos. The 




the major threats to the forests here is the introduction of free ranging cattle areas and the 
demand for more farm land as the population of avecindados and posesionarios keep growing. 
Temporary PES-related income from activities such as forest maintenance, fire prevention, and 
community infrastructure projects have at least slowed deforestation.  While it is true that in the 
lowland valleys well established dependencies on sugarcane and cattle ranching have thwarted 
PES projects there, the income from employment in sugarcane has taken the pressure off the 
forests from landless peasants who might otherwise cut it down for subsistence farming.  
For regions with deciduous tropical forest like the Teenek of Sierra La Pila near Cd. 
Valles, communities have needed no persuasion to adopt PES because arable lands in the 
forested sierra are so scarce. Deforestation during the 1980s and 1990s was due to the 
exploitation of precious tropical woods, leaving the sierra largely in secondary forest, but now 
the program is expected to achieve full restoration. In the majority of the nucleos located along 
this sierra, small provisional milpas can always be seen in forest clearings, but since landowners 
possess at least one half a hectare of arable land outside the forest, it reduces the deforestation 
pressures on the sierra.  
For the communities relying on traditional slash and burn agriculture in the mountains, 
the benefits of setting aside forests were not so easily perceived, especially with growing 
families. In addition, federal and state subsidies for agricultural development counteract the 
forest conservation efforts. As previously discussed, the Procampo program, economic support 
intended only for established agricultural plots, actually encouraged the clearing of forests for 
new milpas, even in areas that were under the PES program. These competing government 
programs created conflicting interests inside nucleos, especially where the topography allows for 
only shifting agriculture. Such factors bore hypothesis four to be true: the impacts of the PES 
program were closely related to the topography and the possibility of land use diversification, 
although the degree and time of dependency on agricultural activities did not always prove to be 
determinant factors.  
As shown in the sample of cases, the ejido of La Trinidad was an extraordinary example 
of how a long tradition of timber and cattle ranching can be completely converted to forest 
conservation through PES when it benefits the majority. Here, the combination of PES subsidies, 
the struggling timber business, and the inequitable sharing of cattle grazing all encouraged land 




implementation, but as the small original population has grown, the profits per family have 
diminished and now threatens forest conservation.   
The growing population density, as mentioned throughout the dissertation, has impacted 
the Huasteca environment and its social organization over the time. The patterns of population 
growth within nucleos directly affect land use and resources management; less densely populated 
nucleos have more land to put aside for conservation than the more heavily populated, especially 
when there is arable land available. Despite this fact, some heavily populated nucleos have 
managed to conserve their ecosystems and participate in PES projects, especially in agroforestry 
projects which highlight the importance of supporting well established economic activities like 
shade-grown coffee production.  
For the highly indigenous and heavy populated southern region, shade-grown coffee 
production is not only a well established economic activity, it is also an activity deeply imbedded 
in their culture as subsistence corn and beans agriculture, or milpas. The indices of deforestation 
in highly populated areas are always higher than reality pans out the southern region, mainly 
because of the permance of shadegrown coffee orchards and the shifting nature of subsistence 
agriculture; therefore, the protection of these agro-systems complements PES goals. However, as 
previously mentioned, the financial support that PES designates for these agroecosystems is not 
nearly sufficient to lower the poverty levels of the inhabitants. 
The middle region actually suffered the worst deforestation and incidentally was not in 
the PES program.  This area, specifically the ejido La Palma, suffered all of the factors inversely 
correlated with PES success: lack of unity and organization due to Mestizo land invasions, 
privatization and selling of disputed lands, and external interference in the form of a massive 
highway construction project.    
 
Hypothesis 5. The maintenance of traditional community organization in an essential factor 
in the sustainability of forest conservation programs.  
With the introduction of the neoliberal land reforms and accelerated privatization, traditional 
community organization in social properties was considered to be under threat. Nucleos with 
forests under communal ownership tend to have strong community organizational structures with 
internal rules for forest management, including involvement with NGOs in forest management 




Alix-Garcia et al. 2009), so the potential threat that land reforms could bring to traditional 
community organization are also extended to forest management and conservation. From what I 
found in the sample of participant nucleos, community organization was crucial for the local 
performance of the PES program.  
Big and strongly indigenous nucleos like Tampaxal or El Cristiano, which had strong and 
complex organizational structures, participate in several environmental conservation programs. 
The Teenek ejido of Tampaxal, for example, managed two PES projects from CONAFOR (one 
in agroforestry and one in hydrological services) in addition to participating in carbon market 
with the private NGO Pronatura, all managed through their traditional cargo system and the 
aforementioned barrio division of activities. The Nahua ejido of El Cristiano adapted its 
traditional community organization scheme by delegating development program management to 
a group of young student members. According to the general committee, the inclusion of young 
members in the management of government programs and land use matters as a replacement of 
external technicians has eased internal distrust from the planning process and the activities’ 
verification. Training their younger members in such matters on the job also served to strengthen 
traditions and reinforce their autonomy. It is no coincidence that Tampaxal and El Cristiano were 
key informants in the consultation process for desiging indigenous constitutional reforms of the 
State of San Luis Potosi. Well organized nucleos with no major internal problems had better 
opportunities to reach community agreements to participate in conservation programs. 
Among the non-indigenous nucleos successfully managing the PES program, the ejido of Las 
Abritas stands out for its ability to use the funding to improve the community’s infrastructure 
and acquire technological equipment like GPS devices and cameras to track their activities. Here, 
the construction of their first community meeting hall and an awning for community gatherings 
and celebrations highlights how important commune and traditional organization is for them. Las 
Abritas has little arable land compared to the majority of nucleos in the northern region, and 
most of its territory is covered by forest submitted to PES. The program significantly increased 
their income and encouraged the improvement of their community organization. The success of 
the ejido in managing the program made them a model for the region, as CONAFOR selected it 
as an exemplary PES project and awarded some members grants to travel abroad to other 




encouraged their community re-orientation, and CONAFOR training seminars and workshops 
have helped them sustain the project for their first five year period. 
On the contrary, nucleos with major internal conflicts were less likely to participate in such 
programs, and when they did, the project often was not sustained.   The ejidos of Miramar and 
Soledad de Zaragoza in Xilitla are illustrative examples. Although Miramar wanted to participate 
in PES like its neighboring ejidos, internal invasions in its common forest prevented them from 
reaching an agreement to apply for the program. Miramar’s internal problems worsened during 
the certification process, when several landless members of the community obtained certificates 
of property in areas inside the communal area that had been lent to them. This conflict hurt 
individuals who reforested plots in the communal area and were receiving funding from the 
Sierra Gorda initiative, as eventually the NGO withdrew Miramar’s payments for forest 
conservation because of the clearing. Besides the impacts on the forest, the internal conflicts in 
Miramar were also reflected in the lack of paved roads, in contrasted to their neighbors. They 
themselves admit that the lack of organization and land invasions have motivated very few to 
attend general assemblies anymore, which are held less often. 
Soledad de Zaragoza had not only complex community divisions but also deleterious 
interventions by the municipal government. Pre-existing community divisions were exacerbated 
when the PES payments were delayed and a splinter group decided to enter the Procampo 
program with the help of the municipality’s ecology department, despite the ejido committee’s 
insistence to not participate in contradictory programs. As PES delegate of the PES program 
declared, CONAFOR’s delay in PES payments was caused by its own mismanagement. The 
ejido had fulfilled all the program requirement on time, but CONAFOR’s long delay of 
payments nonetheless and the resulting distrust was too much to keep an already fractious group 
together. The ejido committee made several petitions to CONAFOR to visit the nucleo and 
clarify the situation, but it never occurred and the ejido had to slow the pace of programmed 
activities. Added to the increasing internal distrust and interruption of activities, was an 
opportunistic delegate in the ecology department of the Xilitla municipal government’s fanning 
of the flames by promoting the nucleo’s involvement in Procampo. This example shows that 
even if a nucleo is unified and organized enough to enter the PES program, mismanagement by a 




As reviewed in the case studies, nucleos managed the PES program in myriad ways but the 
advance of such programs to the marketing of environmental services stage requires most of all a 
strong community organization. It is exactly at the nucleos level and their local organization 
where a major effort needs to be and is put. Government agencies like CDI have invested greatly 
in the development and strengthening of nucleo autonomy, especially indigenous ones through 
the incorporation of indigenous reforms, programs to strengthen indigenous identities and 
capacities, and community planning and development projects.  Other agencies like CONAFOR 
have fostered community organization as well by holding workshops to construct participatory 
land management plans.     
In summary, from the five objectives that were established at the beginning of this 
dissertation, the correlation between deforestation and extreme poverty proved to be weak. Only 
at the community scale did reduction in temperate forest coverage significantly correlate with 
marginality. Thus, the PES program focus on marginalized areas as major risks of deforestation 
is not efficient. Other factors like agricultural government programs, major infrastructure 
projects and agricultural conversion of forest mainly within private properties have had more 
impact on forest depletion. 
As for the coincidence of the PES program in marginal areas based on the CONAFOR 
prioritization scheme, I found it to be partially true.  Although the program has claimed to 
prioritize high marginality areas, very few nucleos of Aquismón, the most marginalized 
municipio in the region, were participating. The allocation of PES projects according to their 
category of suitability did not occur for several agroforestry areas that were participating in 
hydrological services. One of the main causes of this had to do with land tenure system; where 
communities that certified only the perimeter of their nucleo tended to manage the program as a 
communal area, although within, it was all divided into individual parcels. Entering the program 
as a communal area makes is easy for entry into the program, but the individualized parcels 
inhibited program management and the fulfillment of required improvements. The new 
prioritization scheme of 2014 is expected to reduce this issue. 
Concerning PES’s contribution toward stopping deforestation in the Huasteca, deforestation 
indeed slowed and even reversed at the regional level, but a more fine grained analysis at the 
community level shows that this was regardless of participation in the program. Both the nucleos 




neighbors show no change in forest coverage from 2000 to 2010. The influence of previous 
forest management programs, like previous CONAFOR programs and the Sierra Gorda initiative 
in the southern area, have also contributed to the reduction. Other possible contributing factors 
considered were property regimes, population density, and marginality, which had significantly 
different impacts in the northern and southern areas. In regards to property regime, the north had 
more areas registered in communal use and managed as such for the PES program, as opposed to 
the south where many registered communal areas were internally managed as individual parcels, 
even for the PES program. Regardless, both have worked in terms of forest conservation. The 
hypothesis that nucleos with certified lands would have increased participation was nullified, as 
36 percent of the participating nucleos in my sample were not certified. The uncertified nucleos 
did not show higher percentages of deforestation either when compared to the different 
modalities of certification. Population density on the other hand did impact the internal 
management of the program and its overall effect on reducing marginalization. In the less 
populated north, PES payments have a more tangible impact on communities, as the 
improvement of roads, construction of community halls and other elements strengthen 
community cohesion. In the more impoverished and populated south, although payments are a 
very much-needed source of family income, it is far from enough to eliminate their marginality.  
In terms of the PES influence on land tenure, rights, access, and decisions over forest use, no 
change in land tenure and rights over the forest on participant communities could be identified, 
but access to and use of land did change in several cases.  The PES influenced La Trinidad, for 
example, to revert cattle pastures back to forests, and in other cases communities prevented 
landless members from grazing or cultivating milpas in participating areas. This has diverted 
campesinos to deforest other areas, but as milpa cultivation is shifted from one area to another, 
forest recovery does so too, especially in the more lightly populated northern area, allowing at 
least partial forest revegetation. Although nucleos reported small numbers of such milpas in 
common use areas with little related conflict, more study of their effect on the land and the 
program is needed. 
One of the main forces acting against the success of the program is the corruption found at 
different levels and sometimes convoluted within communities, government officials, technicians 
and CONAFOR staff. When present, it led to poor management of the program and divisionism 




Potosí led the list of the most corrupted states within the public sector of the country in 2013 
(Forbes Mexico 2014). Well organized communities however have been able to fight back and 
come up with ways to reduce it by minimizing external administrators and training their own 
PES staff like the ejido El Cristiano or like other nucleos in the south that refused to obligated to 
the rules of municipal administrators despite threats of cutting them out of municipal financial 
support. CONAFOR regional PES workshops have been one way to minimize corruption as 
communities have the opportunity to share experiences with other communities and talk to staff 
members, however the most affected communities were usually not notified of such meetings, 
actually, the missmanagemnt of information was one of the main corruption channels.  
Despite the heavy toll of corruption at all levels of the PES management, the program has 
had positive impacts in the region, communities now not only think about the conservation of 
natural resources as a new source of income but about their important contribution to their next 
generations. I belive that more effects of the program are yet to come as the new phase of 
markets of environmental services develop and the discourse of forest conservation as well as the 
popularity of the program continue to spread within the region.  
 
Scope, significance and limitations of the research 
The cultural and political ecology approach of this dissertation to analyze to the PES 
program in the Huasteca Potosina helped identify how environmental and social variables 
influence forest conservation practices at different geographic scales. This regional study 
enriches the developing field of study on PES and their effects throughout the world. As seen 
here, great differences and impacts on such forest conservation models are present even in small 
regions like the Huasteca Potosina. The broader documentation and analysis of the workings and 
impacts of this models the more we learn about what works and what does not in general and 
what need to be adapted at local levels.    
The variety of environmental and social conditions present in the Huasteca Potosina are 
in some ways unique to the region, but they also overlap with those in other regions of the 
country.  Similarities include forest heterogeneity in coexistence with agricultural activities, land 
tenure systems, and different levels of government intervention. The influential factors in local 
forest management like ethnicity, cultural traditions, land tenure, land uses, varying types of 




example, the two of the three main types of land tenure for forest in the country – communally 
owned and individually parceled – as well as four of the major agricultural matrixes – pasture, 
sugarcane plantations, slash and burn subsistence agriculture, and shade-grown coffee production 
– were present in the sample. Thus, this study is likely highly relevant for other parts of Mexico 
and perhaps beyond.  
 In relation to land tenure, those nucleos in the sample that parceled all their territory and 
left no communal lands showed a major decrease of forest (eight percent in the last two decades), 
contradicting the hypothesis that forests on individual properties are better protected. In 
comparison, nucleos with mixed land rights, including individual parcels, forest in communal 
use, and some properties in dominio pleno showed a two percent forest regained over the same 
period of time. Land certification did not decrease deforestation in social properties, but if 
anything the individualization of land rights increased the risk for deforestation. These findings 
differ from those deforestation factors for the temperate forest in northern ejidos of Durango, 
where specific characteristics of the nucleos like location, soil productivity and marginality had 
significantly more weight in comparison to ejidos’ attributes like the structure of property rights, 
total area, and numbers of members (Perez-Verdin et al. 2009). Interestingly, population density 
for the Huasteca Potosina region turned out to be corrrelated with marginality and risk of 
deforestation, but not total deforestation.        
The risk of deforestation was correlated (0.412 using Pearson’s at 0.01) with the 
percentage of indigenous population at the nucleo level largely because of their high population 
density, as it also showed significant correlation with this index (0.354 using Pearson’s at 0.05). 
But high population density and high percentage of indigenous population also correlates to 
certain land tenure and land use systems in the southern region, which is dominated by 
individually owned parcels devoted mostly to shade-grown coffee. This agroforestry system, 
integral to contemporary indigenous traditions, is economicaly unstable because of unpredictable 
weather conditions and the volatility of international coffee prices. 
Location and soil productivity are also significantly related to the total percentage of 
forest change, as they are in the northern ejidos of Durango. In the Huasteca, location determined 
not only the type of forest but the availability of arable lands, the soil productivity, and the type 




Patterns of temperate and tropical forest coverage and change varied between the regional 
and nucleo scales, indicating that further analysis might be needed to determine why temperate 
forests coverage seem to be expanding at the regional but not the nucleo level. The research 
focused only on the impacts of the forest management on the nucleo level but a finer analysis of 
private properties might reveal why temperate forests are expanding at the regional level. The 
national vegetation inventory series, landsat imagery, otho-photos, and this field work all cover 
changes in forest at the nucleo scale but lack fine-grained imagery at the level of individual 
peasant parcels. The average area of such slash and burn plots is around one half to one hectare, 
too small for INEGI’s national vegetation series at a scale of 1:250,000.  Land use dynamics at 
the parcel scale are very important for understanding the impacts of conservation programs like 
PES on individuals’ land use decision-making.  For example, such an analysis would have 
allowed me to go beyond documenting general forest transformations from, say, primary to 
secondary forest and vice versa, to ascertain more subtle changes stages of reforestation on plots 
in and outside of the program.  Thus, higher resolution imagery like spot imagery would be 
helpful.  Participatory mapping techniques could also be particularly useful to document land use 
changes in conjunction with conservation programs.  These methods are complementary and 
optimally both would be used for the clearest revelation of stated practices in participatory 
mapping and actual practices detected by higher resolution imagery.                      
One final recommendation for future research would be analysis of private properties (non-
nucleos) participating in PES. The government’s primary focus on social properties for PES has 
resulted in private owners of forest lobbying for participation, and slowly gaining inclusion in 
the Huasteca, especially in the northern region. The technicians actually prefer private owners 
over nucleos because the latter are harder to organize. A preliminary 2008 survey for the 
CONAFOR reforestation program showed that private owners had higher rates of seedling 
survival than social properties. Here, the technicians’ choosing and supporting private 
participants was decisive. For private owners, the money received for reforestation enabled them 
to pay labor to water and care for the seedlings, whereas in social properties funds were 
exhausted just in the transportation of seedlings, payments to the community members who 
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Appendix I. PES grading prioritization in nucleo
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Appendix IV. Community Questionnaire about the PES 
 
CUESTIONARIO COMUNITARIO 
Sobre el programa Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA)  
de la Comisión Nacional Forestal CONAFOR 
Proyecto de Investigación: Politicas de Conservación y la Reformas de la Tierra México  
Un acercamiento a los Pagos por Servicios Ambientales en la Huasteca Potosina  
Universidad de Kansas 
 
Fecha: ______________  
Municipio ________________________    Ejido ͸ Comunidad Agraria ͸    ______   
Informante: hombre: __ mujer: __  
Cargo:_______________    Ejidatario/Comunero__  Avecindado__  
Otro_______________________  
Área total del ejido o comunidad agraria en hectáreas ____________ Población total_________ 
Área total dentro de la categoría del programa Proarbol _____________ 
 
Aspectos generales del ejido o comunidad agraria 
 
1. Este ejido o comunidad agraria cuenta con: 
 Resolución presidencial  Si__ No__     
 Acta de posesión y deslinde  Si__ No__    
 Reglamento interno   Si__ No__ 
 Certificación por PROCEDE  Si__ No__ 
 Dominio pleno   Si__ No__ 
  
2. En este ejido o comunidad agraria, se tienen problemas de:                          
 Linderos al interior del ejido    Si__ No__ 
 Linderos con sus colindantes    Si__ No__ 
 Invasión de terrenos     Si__ No__ 
 Algún otro problema que considere importante Si__ No__  
(especifique:_______________) 












Uso del suelo en áreas parceladas de la comunidad o ejido 
3. ¿Cuántas hectáreas están parceladas? ___________ 
    ¿Cuántas son para uso individual?______________ 
    ¿Cuántas son para uso colectivo?______________ 
 
4. Dentro de las áreas parceladas cuáles de los principales usos que se tienen son para: 
Agricultura parcelada    ________ 
Ganadería parcelada    ________ 
Bosque parcelado con café, frutales, etc. ________ 
Cultivo de caña:              ________ 
Otras áreas parceladas                                     ________ 
 
Área de Uso Común 
 
5. Cuando se estableció el ejido o comunidad agraria, aproximadamente ¿cuántas hectáreas fueron 
otorgadas como área de uso común? ___________ 
 
6. ¿Cuántas hectáreas hay en el área de uso común hoy en día? ___________ 
 
7. Dentro del área de uso común, aproximadamente cuántas hectáreas hay de:   
   








Milcahuales        
Cultivos        
Bosque con pasto para ganado        
Bosque cultivado con café        
Bosque cultivado con frutales        
Bosque natural sin cultivo        
Potreros cultivados para ganado        
Potreros naturales        
Otro (especifique):         
Otro (especifique):         
    
8. ¿Quiénes tienen derecho para usar las tierras en el área de uso común (por ejemplo, ejidatarios 
solamente, cualquier persona de la comunidad, etc.)?   Ejidatarios__  Comuneros__  
Posesionarios__  Avecindados__  Otros 
(especifique:______________________________________________________) 
 
9. ¿Qué usos de la tierra no son permitidos por reglamento interno en el área de uso común? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 




Si ͸  (pastoreo, extracción de leña, plantas, caza, milpa, otro________)      No͸ 
 
11. ¿Se permite que personas ajenas a la comunidad puedan practicar alguna actividad en el área 
de uso común? 
  Si͸  qué actividades? ______________________________________ No͸ 
 
12. ¿Se ha parcelado el área de uso común?  Si͸   No͸ 
 a. ¿Cuantas hectáreas de las áreas de uso común están parceladas en total? _______ 
 b. ¿En qué año se parceló por primera vez? ________ 
 c. ¿Por qué se parceló esta área inicialmente?__________________________________ 
 d. ¿Actualmente están parcelando el área de uso común? Si͸ No͸ 
 e. ¿Por qué se está parcelando esta área hoy en día?_____________________________ 
 
13. ¿Dentro de el área de uso común, ¿existe áreas protegidas (por ejemplo, para la conservación 
de plantas o animales, reserva de bosque, sitios sagrados o espirituales, sitios histórico, sitios 
arqueológico, protección de cuenca o fuente de agua)?  Si__ No__ 
        Más o menos cuántos    
  





14. ¿Se ha recibido capacitación en la comunidad en los últimos  años relacionado con el manejo 
de bosque / conservación de la flora y fauna:  
 Los programas/objetivos de CONAFOR  Si__  No__ 
 SEMARNAT                                              Si__  No__ 
PROFEPA                                                                  Si__  No__ 
Otros__________________________                       Si__  No__ 
 
15. ¿En general cómo califica las siguientes condiciones en su comunidad?  
 Muy 
buenas 
Buenas Regular Malas Muy 
malas 
Salud de los bosques      
Diversidad de plantas y animales      
Limpieza del agua      
Abasto de agua      
Control de la tala ilegal      









16. ¿Desde cuándo participan en el programa de Proarbol?______________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. ¿Cómo se enteraron del programa?_______________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. ¿En qué categoría del programa Proarbol participan actualmente?______________________ 
 
19. ¿Por qué decidieron participar en esta categoría del programa?_________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. ¿Cuáles eran los propósitos y beneficios que les ofrecía esta categoría del programa?_______ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. ¿Cómo participan?  Toda la comunidad___  Sólo ejidatarios/comuneros____(cuántos__) 
Cómo colectivo___(cuantos__)   De forma individual___ (cuantos___) 
 
22. ¿A cuánto asciende el monto recibido por el programa individual y/o colectivamente? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
23. ¿Cómo fueron utilizados los recursos recibidos?____________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
24. ¿Cuantas hectáreas se inscribieron inicialmente bajo el programa?______________________ 
 
25. ¿Cuántas hectáreas se mantienen actualmente bajo el programa?_______________________ 
 
26. ¿Existen mojoneras u otras marcaciones físicas para delimitar y anunciar el área dentro del 
programa?___________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. ¿Cuál es el seguimiento que ustedes le dan al área dentro del programa?_________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. ¿Considera usted que el monto otorgado para estas actividades es suficiente para los 
objetivos propuestos? Si__ porqué__________________________________________________  
no__ por qué___________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. ¿Cuales son las obligaciones que tiene la comunidad o participantes dentro del 
programa?_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
30. ¿Se ha desmontado bosque o selva dentro del área en el programa para uso agrícola o 
ganadero? 
















33. Cómo participante de Proarbol ¿cuáles son las sugerencias que daría para mejorar el 




34. Si se da la posibilidad, volverían a participar en el programa de Proarbol?________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Asesoría técnica del programa PSA 
 
35. ¿Cómo obtuvieron asesoría técnica?______________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 




37. ¿A cuánto asciende el monto para la asesoría técnica?________________________________ 
 
38. ¿Considera ésta una retribución justa para el técnico? Si__ Por qué____________________ 
No__ Por qué_____________________________________ 
 
39. El técnico indicó cómo debía ser utilizado el recurso?  
Si__Indique cómo_______________________________________________________________ 
No__ Indique cómo se utilizó______________________________________________________ 
 
40. Se ha entregado algún producto por parte del técnico a la comunidad o beneficiario como 
resultado de su trabajo?  
Si___qué productos_____________________________________________________________ 





41.  ¿Se han recibido los planos o mapas de la comunidad como resultado del trabajo técnico de 
Proarbol?  Si__   No__ 
 




43. ¿En general, cómo considera el trabajo del técnico? Muy bueno_ Bueno_ Regular_ Malo_ 
Muy malo_   
 
44. En general cómo es su relación con el técnico? Muy buena__ Buena__ Regular__ Mala__ 
Muy mala__ 
 




46. Si se da la posibilidad de un nuevo apoyo para otro trabajo ¿buscaría la asesoría del mismo 
técnico o le gustaría trabajar con uno 
distinto?_______________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
